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PREFACE
The federal reclamation system,
constructed over a period of nearly 90 years,
is at a critical juncture. The era of system
expansion at substantial federal expense is
nearly over. The storage and delivery
facilities that have been constructed under
this program control an important portion of
the water supply of the western states. As
the demands for water use change in these
states, there is increased interest in making
the water in these federal reclamation
facilities available for additional uses.
The importance of this issue prompted
the Natural Resources Law Center to initiate
this research project in 1990 with support
from a grant under the Water Resources
Research Act. The primary objective of the
research was to examine experience in making
voluntary transfers to new uses of water
already provided from reclamation facilities
for existing uses. To this end, we carried out
detailed case studies of reclamation projects
in nine western states. The results of this
research are presented in volume II of this
report
This first volume seeks to provide a
summary of the issues identified concerning
federal transfer policy and procedures that
affect transfers of water provided by federal
reclamation facilities. It provides an analysis
of legal issues that were identified and
discusses how these issues have been
addressed in the context of the case studies.
It considers at length the Principles and
Guidance concerning transfers issued about
two years ago by the Department of the
Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation. It
offers recommendations for improvements and
clarifications in federal laws, policy, and
procedures.
Primary authors of this volume were
Larry MacDonnell, Richard Wahl*, and Bruce
Driver. Valuable research assistance was
provided by Richard Smith, University of
Colorado School of Law, Class of 1992, and
Peter Waack, Class of 1991. Dale Milne
handled the word processing task with his
usual outstanding professionalism. The report
was greatly improved as a result of the
comments and suggestions of an outside
group of reviewers, listed on the following
page, who met with us in Boulder on April
26, 1991. Of course, responsibility for the
report rests with the authors.
Research supported by the U.S.
Geological Survey, Department of the
Interior, under USGS award number 14-08-
0001-G1736. The views and conclusions
contained in this document are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as
necessarily representing the official policies,
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Section 1: Project Scope and Objectives
In 1902, Congress committed federal
resources to the task of expanding the usable
supply of water available to "reclaim" lands in
the West for irrigated agriculture. Under this
program, facilities for the diversion, storage,
and delivery of water have been built in 17
western states. These facilities include more
than 600 dams and 53,000 miles of canals and
laterals, representing a federal investment of
nearly $10 billion as of 1988.1 Total storage
capacity in these federally constructed
facilities is about 134 million acre-feet of
water.2 Water deliveries in 1988 totaled
about 29 million acre-feet: 25 million (85%)
for irrigation, 3 million (11%) for municipal
and industrial use, and 1 million for other
uses.3 Nearly 190 projects or units are
currently in operation.
The federal reclamation program is at a
crossroads. Its primary purpose - the
substantially subsidized construction of storage
dams to increase the usable supply of water -
- is coming rapidly to a close. The Bureau of
Reclamation, the federal agency charged with
implementing the reclamation program, issued
a report in 1987 (Assessment *87) aimed at
charting a new mission for itself.4 It presents
a picture of the Bureau as water "managers",
emphasizing such things as "system
optimization," shifting control of federal
facilities to the water users, and otherwise
making the use of the facilities more efficient.
An issue acknowledged but not
substantially addressed in Assessment '87 is
the growing need to reallocate some portion
of the water made available through these
facilities to meet the new and changing
demands for water throughout the western
states. In fact, the federal role in this
reallocation process is not well defined in
federal reclamation law. For the most part,
the plans and legal authority for Bureau
of Reclamation projects do not
contemplate changes in project functions
or in uses of water that may become
desirable or necessary after the project is
in use.
As mentioned, most of the water
delivered from Bureau of Reclamation
facilities goes to irrigation use.5 Yet
agriculture is declining in relative
economic importance in the western
states. In many areas, agricultural lands
are becoming urbanized and demands for
municipal and industrial water are
increasing. The value of water for a
variety of instream flow purposes such as
fisheries maintenance, recreation, and
riparian and wetlands protection has
increased. In a water-limited area like
the western United States where demands
are increasing, reallocation of some
existing uses of water to new uses is
inevitable.
The importance of redefining the role
of the federal reclamation system in
meeting the contemporary water needs of
the West prompted this project. The
research built on several other recent
studies.6 In particular, the project
examined the effect of federal law, policy,
and procedures on transfer of water
supplied from federal storage facilities.
There has been a widely held perception
that transfers of federally supplied water
are constrained by "impediments" in
federal law and practice.7 By evaluating
the water transfer experience in a broad
cross-section of federal reclamation
projects, the research sought to better
identify the type and nature of factoFS
found to impede transfers, to evaluate the
basis and purpose of these factors, and to
consider possible changes to facilitate
valuable transfers.
As a framework for considering a
redefinition of the federal reclamation system,
it may be useful to divide the functions of
reclamation facilities into three categories:
those facilities presently providing water to
irrigation, municipal, and industrial users
under legal arrangement; those with a
commitment to provide water but where the
water is not being taken; and those where the
U.S. itself is the user (for recreation or for
hydroelectric generation, for example). Of
course, reclamation facilities may, in fact, fall
into all three of these categories. The focus
of this research is almost exclusively on the
issues involved in making changes relating to
the first category - the facilities involved in
the delivery and use of the roughly 30 million
acre-feet of water provided each year.8
There is increasing interest in making
voluntary transfers of water provided from
Bureau of Reclamation facilities. As used
here, transfers refer to temporary or
permanent changes in the purpose and/or
place of use of water. The change of use
may be made by the existing user or the right
to use the water may be transferred to
another who then follows the legal
requirements necessary to make the change
of use. The key is that the transfer is
initiated primarily by the user of the water as
opposed to the Bureau of Reclamation and
the result is a new purpose or place of use of
the water.9 Transfers of this type either
occurred or have been proposed in each of
the projects studied in this research.
Nevertheless, there continues to be
considerable uncertainty about the
transferability of Bureau-supplied water. This
report seeks to address these uncertainties.
Federal reclamation law does not address
transfer of water entitlements governing rights
to use water supplied by reclamation facilities.
Under Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation
Act, water-right matters are explicitly
subjected to state law.10 This unaltered
principle, strongly reaffirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in California v. United
States,11 makes clear that state law related
to water rights transfer ultimately must be
followed.12
At the same time, there are federal
interests potentially affected by such
transfer that must be considered. At
base, the reclamation program represents
a major national investment in the
western states. The most tangible
products of this investment are the
facilities built to store and deliver water
to project beneficiaries. By law, these
facilities remain in U.S. ownership unless
otherwise authorized by Congress. The
U.S. has a clear interest in protecting its
investment in these facilities and a legal
obligation to meet commitments it has
made respecting their use. Transfers
impairing these interests should
legitimately be subjected to federal
review.
Congress simply has not addressed the
question of how transfers involving
federal reclamation facilities should occur.
In the absence of congressional guidance,
the Department of the Interior issued a
statement in December 1988 entitled
Principles Governing Voluntary Water
Transactions That Involve or Affect
Facilities Owned or Operated by the
Department of the Interior™ These
Principles, together with the Bureau of
Reclamation's implementing Criteria and
Guidance issued in 1989, recognize the
increased interest in changing some uses
of water made available by federal storage
facilities.14 For the first time they
establish a federal policy for such
transactions.
This report recommends several
specific additions and clarifications to this
existing water transfer policy. In
particular, there is a need for clarification of
the nature of the water right held by a user
of water supplied from Bureau facilities. As
a general matter, we conclude that these
rights are state water rights and - subject to
possible contractual limitations - are
transferable according to state law. In
addition, the federal role in these transfers
needs further clarification regarding such
matters as when a new or amended contract
with the U.S. is required, when a transaction
requires Congressional authorization, how the
U.S. determines that a transaction will be
detrimental to the water service of the
project or impair the efficiency of
the project for irrigation purposes, what
charges should be paid to the U.S. by new
users, and the role of the U.S. in addressing
other third party effects (beyond those to
other project water users) of a proposed
transfer. The case studies indicate
considerable variation in approach by the
Bureau to these matters. The DOI Principles
and Bureau Guidance help to clarify some
issues, but create uncertainty and confusion in
other areas and neglect some matters
altogether.
In the next section a brief introduction is
presented to the case studies that were the
primary work of this project Chapter 2
works through the various legal issues raised
by transfers. It begins with a brief discussion
of federal reclamation law and then turns to
specific federal legal interests implicated by
transfers. Chapter 3 provides a summary of
the Interior Department's Principles and the
Bureau's Guidance related to transfers.
Several specific areas of needed clarification
are discussed in detail. Finally,
recommendations are presented in chapter 4.
These recommendations are directed at the
Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of
the Interior, and Congress.
Section 2: The Case Studies
This project emphasized the analysis
of water transfer issues in the context of
specific reclamation projects located in
nine western states. These states are
Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Wyoming. The projects provide a
diverse sample in terms of when they
were constructed, their size, their
purposes, their location, and the legal
arrangements under which they operate.
Consequently, the analyses of these
projects allowed us to consider a broad
range of transfer issues. Detailed
descriptions of the case studies are
provided in volume II of this report.
Arizona Case Studies
The major Bureau of Reclamation
project in Arizona is the Central Arizona
Project (CAP), which pumps water from
the Colorado River and conveys it to the-
Phoenix and Tucson areas. The large
number of contractors in the project --
more than seventy municipal and
industrial entities, twenty irrigation
districts, and twelve Indian tribes - means
that there is the potential for a significant
amount of market activity to develop. To
date, however, most of the proposed
transfers involving CAP facilities have
involved non-CAP water (e.g.,
groundwater), with the CAP facilities used
for conveyance or with CAP deliveries
being exchanged for non-CAP deliveries.
Although there is a growing interest in
transfers of CAP water, there has been
little market activity to date because the
less expensive, subsidized water from the
project has not been fully contracted and
is probably subject to reallocation to
those contractors with additional demands
for water. Also, the rules for transferring
CAP water are not clear. In the case
studies in volume II of this report, we
examine the rules that might apply to
transfers of CAP water, including how the
priorities attaching to different classes of
water would apply, as well as the limitations
on transfers that certain of the existing
contractual provisions in the CAP might
impose.
The Secretary of the Interior is the
contractor for all Colorado River water in
Arizona, and there are several contractors
along the lower Colorado River whose
contracts predate the CAP. Because of their
more senior priority and the lack of clear
rules for marketing CAP supplies, these
contractors are being looked to as potential
sources of water for central Arizona cities
and for Indian tribes. In fact, one of the
principal motivations for water transfer
activity in Arizona is settlement of Indian
water claims. In these settlements, there are
often contributions of water from the federal
government, as well as local water districts.
As a result, the federal government has
sometimes entered the market as a purchaser
of water, and more transfers of this type are
likely to occur.
The federal government has also been
drawn into acquisitions of water to meet
international treaty obligations with Mexico
and to find replacement water for Cliff Dam,
a feature of the CAP which will not be built.
Boulder Canyon Project (BMI/Henderson
Transfer)
In understanding under what conditions
the Bureau of Reclamation will allow
transfers of water, it is also of interest to
examine cases in which proposed transfers
were either substantially modified or
disallowed. A proposed transfer in southern
Nevada between Basic Management,
Incorporated (BMI) and the city of
Henderson represents such a case. Because
of its proximity to Las Vegas, Henderson
has been growing in recent years and has
projected a need for additional water
supplies. BMI, an industrial concern that
has a contract with the Bureau of
Reclamation for water from Lake Mead,
sought to increase the amount of water it
subcontracted to the city. This additional
water was to come from BMFs unused
industrial entitlement.
The Bureau objected to an outright
resale (or subcontracting) of water by
BMI to Henderson, principally because
BMI had not established beneficial use of
the water. However, the Bureau did
allow a "reassignment11 of previously
unused water from BMI to Henderson.
This was accomplished by (1) reducing
the contractual entitlement of BMI, (2)
executing an "assignment and transfer of
entitlement to delivery" from BMI to
Henderson, and (3) executing a new
Bureau contract with Henderson.
Central Valley Project, California
Because of its size and importance,
special attention was given to the Central
Valley Project (CVP). The CVP provides
water to irrigate over three million acres
in California's Central Valley, or nearly
one-third of the acreage irrigated with
Bureau water in the West
Several forces create pressure for
reallocation of a portion of the water
provided by the CVP for irrigation,
including urban growth, need for water
for environmental uses, salinization of
cropland served by the CVP, and drought
conditions. The Mid-Pacific Region of
the Bureau allows and even facilitates
transfers of entitlements to receive CVP
water on an annual basis, albeit on a not-
for-profit basis. However, a mix of water
service contract provisions, contract
administration policy, and law effectively
prevents most transfers of CVP water for
more than one year. These policies include
preclusion of any profits by contractors on
transfers, informal rules restricting the
voluntary reallocation of water from irrigation
to other uses, and take-or-pay and other
contract administration policies that impede
conservation of water for long-term transfer.
As a result, urban and other potential new
users of CVP water cannot plan on the
availability of CVP water as a firm source of
supply.
The facts generated by the CVP case
study impel the conclusion that the regional
office should revisit policies that impede long-
term transfers of CVP water. In particular,
the regional office should bring its transfer
policy into line with the Department's
Voluntary Water Transaction Principles.
Otherwise, a significant opportunity to
improve the efficiency of water allocation in
California - desirable even if the drought did
not exist and essential in time of drought -
will be lost.
Emery County, Utah
A participant in the Colorado River
Storage Project, the Emery County Project is
situated in the Green River basin southeast
of Provo. The project was planned and built
to provide a water supply for agricultural
users in the Castle Valley vicinity. In fact,
early project reports specifically stated that
the project would provide no opportunity for
domestic water supplies or power
development. Project plans changed when
local fanners failed to subscribe for about
6,000 acre feet of the 28,100 acre feet
available from the project At the same time,
Utah Power & Light Company was looking
for a water supply for its Huntington plant.
UPL subscribed for this 6,000 acre feet and
then, 15 years later, purchased an additional
2,500 acre feet of water provided by the
project directly from agricultural users. In
addition, a local municipal water district
recently purchased 189 acre feet and
converted this from agricultural to
municipal use. The major impediment to
these Emery County transfers has been at
the local level: extended negotiations
have been necessary to obtain the
approval of one of the irrigation
companies in the area.
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Colorado
Extending from the headwaters of the
Fryingpan River and Hunter Creek on
the west slope of the continental divide
eastward to the Arkansas River basin, the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project was
authorized and currently operates equally
for the benefit of municipal and
agricultural users, in addition to other
authorized purposes. Under project
operating principles, municipal users are
entitled to 51 percent of the project
water supply, while at least 49 percent of
the supply is offered to agricultural users.
The water supply in most years exceeds
demands of both municipal and
agricultural users. However, the users are
concerned with the current allocation and
operation of the project storage space.
Agricultural users are seeking a
commitment of storage space in Pueblo
Reservoir for available nonproject water.
Municipal users, who have storage rights
for carryover project water, would also
like to be able to store nonproject water
in project storage facilities. Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District
policy precludes transfers directly between
irrigation users, utilizing instead an annual
administrative allotment process. Limited
transfers may occur among users within
the municipal water supply allocation.
Kendrick Project, Wyoming
The Kendrick Project is located southwest
of Casper along the North Platte River.
Originally the project was to supply water
only for irrigation and power purposes.
Financial difficulties of the irrigation water
users in the Casper-Alcova Irrigation District
(CAID) combined with the City of Casper's
desire to acquire more water for anticipated
population growth led to an agreement to
supply the City with up to 7,000 acre feet
annually of project water. The water
delivered to the City is limited to water saved
through conservation measures funded by the
City with some state assistance, thereby not
reducing CAID's irrigation supply. In
addition to funding and planning the
conservation measures, the City agreed to pay
off CAID's remaining repayment obligation.
Based on system improvements funded
through 1989, the cost to the City of Casper
to make the conserved water available is $542
per acre foot (permanent cost, as opposed to
the annual cost).
Newlands Project, Nevada
Named for the senator from Nevada who
sponsored the 1902 Reclamation Act, this
project was among the first to be authorized
for construction by the Secretary of the
Interior. The primary purpose of the project
was to irrigate an expected 240,000 acres of
land in the Great Basin area of Nevada with
water from the Truckee and Carson Rivers.
Efforts by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to
increase and protect flows of the Truckee
River into Pyramid Lake have led to careful
scrutiny of irrigation water uses in the
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District. The
Nevada change of water rights process is
being used to clarify the status of rights to
use project water on certain lands within the
District. Irrigation water rights based on
supply from the Newlands Project have been
purchased and are in the process of being
transferred to use for wetlands
maintenance in the Stillwater Wildlife
Management Area. In 1990, Congress
enacted legislation which, in part,
specifically authorized use of the
Newlands facilities for a broad set of
purposes including fish and wildlife.
New Mexico Case Studies
The case studies of water transfer
activity involving federally constructed
facilities in New Mexico focused on the
Rio Grande River basin." Although the
City of Albuquerque has a standing offer
of $1,000 per acre-foot to acquire water
rights, these purchases involve privately
held water rights within the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, rather than
rights associated with the Middle Rio
Grande Project The lack of transfers
appears to be due not to any prohibitive
policies of the Bureau of Reclamation,
but rather to uncertainty over the status
of such rights. This uncertainty arises
because of lack of quantification of rights
by the district, questions about whether
rights still exist on district lands on which
irrigation has been abandoned, and, if
they do, questions about whether they can
be transferred. The district and the state
can play important roles in resolving these
uncertainties.
Albuquerque and the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District have rights
to surface deliveries from another source
- the San Juan Chama Project.
Albuquerque intends to make full use of
its San Juan Chama project water to
maintain flows in the Rio Grande River
when the city reaches the ceiling on the
amount of local groundwater that it is
allowed to pump (the city's primary water
source). However, in the meantime,
Albuquerque has marketed small amounts
of San Juan Chama Project water. One
of the more interesting of these transfers
involves leases for recreational purposes to
the downstream Elephant Butte Reservoir.
Another lease by Albuquerque to
winegrowers in the Elephant Butte area
resulted in conflict with the Bureau of
Reclamation over whether the acreage
limitation and "full-cost" pricing provisions of
the Reclamation Reform Act (RRA) apply.
Albuquerque believed these restrictions
should not apply because the city was
reselling municipal and industrial water, not
irrigation water. The Bureau took the
opposite view, claiming that it had the right
and the obligation to apply RRA restrictions
to all water that was delivered for agricultural
purposes.
Elephant Butte Reservoir, which is the
principal storage facility for the Rio Grande
Project, stores water for the Elephant Butte
Irrigation District in New Mexico and for
several irrigation districts near El Paso, Texas.
The El Paso County Improvement District
No. 1 borders on the city and has been
looked to as a source of water for district
lands converted to domestic use, both inside
and outside the El Paso city limits. Although
the Bureau of Reclamation initially resisted
one proposed transfer agreement on the basis
that the project was authorized for irrigation
use, it subsequently allowed the transfer to
proceed on the authority of the Miscellaneous
Purposes Act of 1920. Under this
arrangement, individual owners within the
district assign their water deliveries to a
municipal supplier in exchange for payment of
tax assessments by the municipal supplier.
There may be a potential for interstate
trading of Rio Grande Project water to occur,
but to date this has been clouded by the
controversy over El Paso's attempt to secure
rights to groundwater in New Mexico.
Provo River Project, Utah
The Provo River Project is located in
north-central Utah, northwest of Provo
and southeast of Salt Lake City. The
project was planned with a major
municipal component to serve present and
future needs of the surrounding
communities. Many aspects of the project
work to facilitate the transfer of project
water from agricultural to municipal use.
The percentage of project water
controlled by municipal users has
increased from 58.3 percent at the
project's inception to 73.4 percent today.
This figure is expected to increase
another 10 percent once current irrigation
company stock transfers are completed.
The authorizing legislation is broadly
worded to include M&I uses, and there is
specific anticipation of future conversions
of project water use from agriculture to
municipal The Provo River Water Users
Association, which is the contracting
agency, similarly recognizes future
conversions in its by-laws. Project water
rights approved by the state were broadly
described as to purpose and place of use.
The water may be used anywhere within
project boundaries for agricultural,
municipal, or other types of use. Further,
agricultural and municipal users pay the
same for project water, so transfers
require no reallocation of the repayment
obligation.
Rapid Valley Unit and Rapid Valley
Project, South Dakota
The Bureau of Reclamation
constructed these two projects to increase
the usable supply of water in the Rapid
Creek Basin of South Dakota. The
facilities are operated jointly and supply
water primarily to Rapid City and, on a
supplemental basis, to irrigators in the
Rapid Valley Water Conservancy District.
Rapid City has recently transferred private
irrigation water rights to municipal use and
now is considering ways to increase water
deliveries from Bureau storage facilities. The
city's 40-year water service contract with the
U.S. is up for renewal in 1992. Supply
commitments from these facilities, especially
to the Rapid Valley Water Conservancy
District, must be clarified before additional
water can be made available to the city.
Strawberry Valley Project, Utah
The Strawberry Valley Project, located in
the Spanish Fork area southwest of Provo, is
one of the earliest Bureau projects authorized
and built. As was sometimes the case with
the early projects, there was no organization
representing the water users when the project
first began delivering water. Each user was
required to enter an individual agreement
with the Bureau. Although an association
eventually was formed, the Bureau
nevertheless issued certificates to all users
once the reimbursable costs of the project,
were paid out, recognizing that the user had
fully paid the construction project costs
associated with delivering a specific quantity
of water to a specific parcel of land. The
Association's Articles of Incorporation
presently place some limitation on transfers of
water to new uses. While project water has
been used primarily for agricultural purposes
for many years, recently some of the local
communities have become interested in
acquiring the right to use project water for
their outdoor watering and domestic needs.
The Association is currently in the process of
developing policies, rules, and guidelines to
assist it with processing such requests.
Trinidad Project, Colorado
The Purgatoire River in southeastern
Colorado runs through the heart of the City
of Trinidad, and until the completion of the
Trinidad Dam and Reservoir, was responsible
for extreme floods that caused extensive
damage to the City. These same erratic
flows made irrigation difficult much of the
time, so storage for irrigation was added
to the primary project objective of flood
control. Additionally, future conversions
of project water from agricultural to
municipal use by the City of Trinidad or
any other entity were specifically
recognized in reports supporting the
enabling legislation. Another feature of
this project is the nature of project water
rights: they are largely preexisting water
rights held by irrigators in the area. The
Purgatoire River Water Conservancy
District manages and regulates water
rights owned by the ditch companies
under an agreement with each company.
The City of Trinidad is currently seeking
to change water rights it holds that are
part of the project water supply from
irrigation to municipal and other uses, as
well as to change the place of use.
Additionally, a group of irrigation users
are negotiating with the State Division of
Wildlife for the sale of their water rights
to be used for wildlife habitat and other
related uses.
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CHAPTER 2: Legal Considerations
Section 1: Federal Reclamation Law
The 1902 Reclamation Act authorizes and
directs the Secretary of the Interior to
-construct "irrigation works" determined to be
"practicable" and to assess charges
"apportioned equitably" upon the lands to be
.irrigated in an amount adequate to return the
estimated cost of construction.16 No more
than 160 acres per individual landowner could
be served by these irrigation works.17 The
-Act allows the users to control operation and
.maintenance of the works but stipulates that
.title to the facilities remains with the U.S.18
It subjects the "control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, ..."
to state law.19 The Secretary is given broad
authority to carry out the Act20 Upon this
basic foundation and subsequent modifications
the federal reclamation system, summarized in
chapter 1, was built.
Payment Obligations
Much of the change in reclamation law
between 1902 and 1939 came out of the
widespread difficulties landowners were having
in paying their share of the cost of the
facilities. Under the 1902 Act, landowners
were to repay their share within ten years.
In 1914, Congress extended the payment
period to 20 years." In 1926, the repayment
period was extended to 40 years* and, in
1939, a ten-year "development" period was
added.23 The 1924 Fact Finders Act
introduced the idea of basing repayment
obligations on ability to pay.24 Congress more
fully embraced this approach in the
Reclamation Project Act of 1939.25
Project Uses
The 1902 Act also has been modified by
subsequent legislation to recognize additional
uses of reclamation facilities beyond irrigation.
In 1906, Congress authorized the use of
reclamation facilities for the supply of
water to towns in the vicinity of irrigation
projects.26 In 1920, Congress authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to provide
water from reclamation facilities "for
other purposes than irrigation,... .<f2T In
the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act,
Congress authorized the first multipurpose
Bureau project28 The 1939 Reclamation
Project Act directed the Secretary to
consider a broad range of possible uses
including power, municipal water supply,
flood control, navigation, and other
"miscellaneous" purposes, as well as
irrigation, in investigating the feasibility of
constructing new or supplemental
facilities.29 The 1946 Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act made the conservation
of wildlife resources a consideration in
the construction of any new federal water
project30 The 1965 Federal Water
Project Recreation Act required that "full
consideration shall be given to the
opportunities, if any, which the [Federal
water resource] project affords for
outdoor recreation and for fish and
wildlife enhancement. . . . "3I
Contract Arrangements
Reclamation law also has evolved
considerably in the manner in which
contracts for the payment of the
reimbursable construction costs of the
projects are handled. Originally each
individual landowner contracted with the
U.S. by means of a "water-right
application." The application described
the land area to be irrigated and typically
specified a maximum quantity of water
per acre that would be delivered by the
U.S. The application agreement obligated
the landowner to pay a specified annual
charge per acre during the repayment
period, calculated to return to the U.S.
the cost of the irrigation works allocated
to these lands. If the U.S. operated the
project, an annual charge for operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs also was included.
The U.S. typically held a lien on the land and
the water right application as security for
payment of the construction costs. Upon full
payment of the construction charges
(originally to be within ten years) the
landowner received a "final water-right
certificate.11
Because of widespread problems in
securing project repayment from individuals,
Congress in 1922 authorized the Secretary to
contract with irrigation districts for payment
of the reimbursable construction costs of
reclamation facilities as well as O&M costs.32
In 1926, Congress authorized the Secretary to
establish contracts with water users'
associations or irrigation districts that would,
in effect, take over all outstanding repayment
obligations on lands within their boundaries.33
A major incentive for conversion to contracts
with districts was the 40-year repayment
period authorized for such new contracts. In
addition, Congress required that deliveries of
water from new projects could only occur
under contracts between the U.S. and
irrigation districts empowered by state law to
pay the U.S. the costs of constructing,
operating, and maintaining the project
facilities.34 It was understood that state law
had to give districts the necessary taxing
authority.35
The Reclamation Project Act of 1939
continued and expanded the repayment
contract approach. Under Section 9(d),
irrigation water from a new project could not
be delivered until a repayment contract had
been established with "an organization,
satisfactory in form and powers to the
Secretary,. . . w, thereby authorizing contracts
with conservancy districts and other types of
irrigation water supply organizations.36 As
mentioned earlier, a ten-year "development"
period was authorized during which only
O&M charges had to be paid. The
contracting entity could allocate the
payment obligation for construction
charges according to the productivity of
lands within its boundaries and according
to the benefits accruing to the lands
because of project construction.
In addition, the 1939 Act introduced
the alternative of so-called "service"
contracts. Section 9(e) authorized the
Secretary to enter into contracts of any
length up to 40 years to furnish water for
irrigation purposes.37 Unlike repayment
contracts, service contracts need not
require the recovery to the U.S. during
the original contract term of the full
construction costs of the project
attributable to these uses. Rather, the
charges are to cover "an appropriate
share of annual operation and
maintenance costs and an appropriate
share of such fixed charges as the
Secretary deems proper, ... . m
Apparently, the purpose of 9(e) contracts
was to allow water to be supplied as
available from large-scale projects such as
the Central Valley Project in California
that would not be completed, and thus
where total construction costs would not
be known, for many years.39 Section 9(c)
authorized the Secretary to contract for
the supply of water for municipal,
industrial, and other miscellaneous
purposes.40
The 1911 Warren Act authorized an
additional type of contract, aimed at
utilization of excess capacity in existing
reclamation facilities or for construction
of additional facilities for the benefit of
lands not originally to be served from the
project Thus, where excess capacity
exists the Secretary is authorized to
contract with individuals and organizations
that provide irrigation water under their
own water right to use excess storage and
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delivery capacity in reclamation facilities.41
The charges in the contract for use of the
facilities are to "take into consideration" the
cost of construction and maintenance of the
facilities, and contractors are limited in the
charges they can impose on users of this
water.
In addition, water users whose lands are
either within or outside an authorized project
area may contract with the U.S. for the
construction of additional facilities beyond
those originally planned and authorized or for
the use of existing facilities.42 The purpose of
any such facilities is limited to irrigation, and
the title to works that are constructed stays
with the U.S. The Warren Act has been
interpreted as limited to situations where the
rights to use the water involved are already
established under state law.43
t
There are now more than 4,000 contracts
of various types involving the use of
reclamation facilities.44 In addition to the
different sources of legal authority under
which these contracts were established, there
are a number of other factors that tend to
make certain aspects of these contracts
unique. These include the particular facilities
involved, the uses to be made of the water,
and the payment provisions. Furthermore,
the contracts are the result of a negotiation
process and may reflect particular interests of
the users as well as of the U.S.45
Summary
Federal reclamation law is predominantly
concerned with setting the framework within
which reclamation facilities are to be built
and operated. Conceived initially as a means
of facilitating the supply of irrigation water,
the purposes of the reclamation program have
been greatly expanded over the years. The
federal interest in receiving reimbursement
for the cost of these facilities has been
outweighed by the politically stronger interest
in subsidizing the settlement and development
of the West.
For a program that has provided such
major benefits there are remarkably few
absolute prescriptions that apply to all
projects. One is the limitation on acreage
that may be served. Another is the U.S.
ownership of facilities. A third is the
requirement that state law be followed
concerning water rights for these projects.
Individual projects are subject to the
framework established by general federal
reclamation law and, in some instances, to
a specific statutory authorization. More
important are the contracts between the
U.S. and the entity representing the water
users. These contracts set forth the
commitment of the U.S. to make certain
uses of project facilities - most
importantly to provide specified maximum
deliveries of water — in return for a
commitment by the contracting entity to
make specified payments for the facilities.
Section 2: Reclamation Water Supply
and Water Rights
The West was rich with land but short
of the rainfall that made agriculture
possible in other parts of the country.
Supporters of the reclamation program
believed that the costs of increasing the
consumptively usable water supply in the
West would be returned by the increased
value of the lands that would become
agriculturally productive through
irrigation;46
While the western states wanted the
federal government to build the necessary
storage and delivery systems, they did not
want the U.S. to control the allocation of
water from these facilities. The western
lands and waters at one time had all been
under federal control, but Congress had
deferred to the states in the creation of
rules regarding water allocation.47 Section
8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act continued
this federal deference to state law. It
expressed the intent of Congress that this
important new law not "interfere" with state
law "relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,
or any vested right acquired thereunder,11 and
directed the Secretary of the Interior to
conform with "such laws" in carrying out the
provisions of this act.48 In California v.
United States*9 the U.S. Supreme Court
strongly affirmed the primacy of state law in
this area.
Of course, to the users who were
expected to pay for the construction of
reclamation facilities, it was the delivery of
water that had value - not the facilities
themselves. Thus the payment obligation for
the facilities was tied to the agreement to
provide water. As mentioned, originally
settlers made arrangements with the Bureau
for the delivery of water by means of a
"water-right application." Since the U.S.
typically held the state-based water rights
allowing diversion and storage of water and
then delivered water under water-right
applications, the U.S. did in fact appear to be
selling water. Even the U.S. seemed to
believe it had this authority.
In a 1937 decision, Ickes v. Fox* the U.S.
Supreme Court found to the contrary. This
case involved the Yakima Project in the state
of Washington. Irrigators in the Sunnyside
Unit of this project held water delivery
entitlements of 4.84 acre-feet per acre. The
construction cost charges of $52 per acre had
been fully paid by the users. To make water
available for irrigation use in another unit,
the U.S. decided to reduce deliveries from
4.84 acre-feet per acre to 3 acre-feet. The
U.S. argued that it owned the water rights
under which the deliveries of water were
made and therefore could control the use of
the water.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the
U.S. had agreed to supply the applicants with
"that quantity [of water] which shall be
beneficially used for the irrigation thereof,
not exceeding the share proportionate to
irrigable acreage of the water supply
actually available, to be paid for [in ten
annual installments] in an amount which
was fixed in each application."51 It found
that this quantity had been determined to
be 4.84 acre-feet per acre, that deliveries
of this quantity had been made for 20
years, and that 3 acre-feet per acre was
not sufficient to beneficially irrigate the
lands in the project area.
The Court next considered the
question of ownership of water rights. It
characterized the position of the U.S. in
its reclamation capacity as "simply a
carrier and distributor of the water
. . . . M52 It went on to draw a clear
distinction between the interest of the
U.S. in the facilities it had constructed to
provide water and the water rights held
by the irrigators:
Although the government diverted,
stored and distributed the water,
the contention of petitioner that
thereby ownership of the water or
water-rights became vested in the
United States is not well founded.
Appropriation was made not for
the use of the government, but,
under the Reclamation Act, for
the use of the land owners; and
by the terms of the law and of the
contract already referred to, the
water-rights became the property
of the land owners, wholly distinct
from the property right of the
government in the irrigation
works.53
The U.S. provided the water but the
water right to the water that had been
provided and used under contractual
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agreement vested in the user and not in the
provider.
In distinguishing between ownership of
facilities and ownership of water rights the
U.S. Supreme Court indirectly drew on a
considerable body of law that had developed
in western states involving irrigation water
supply systems not owned by the irrigators
themselves. The court referenced the
following discussion from a federal district
court decision, Murphy v. Kerr*
In the larger systems it has been the
practice for an irrigation company to
construct diversion dams, canals,
ditches, reservoirs, and other physical
works for the irrigation of bodies of
land, and to sell the land to be
irrigated to farmers and to enter into
contracts with the purchasers thereof
to maintain the physical works, and to
divert, store and deliver, or where
storage is not used to divert and
deliver to the owner of the water
right at the land, the water for
beneficial use thereon. The property
right in the irrigation works is in the
irrigation company, and the water
right is appurtenant to the land and
belongs to the owner thereof.
This decision goes on to characterize the
owner of the irrigation works as an "agent" of
the owner of the land and water right and as
a "carrier" of the water.*
Unlike mutual ditches or irrigation
districts which existed only for the benefit of
their members, carrier companies were
commercial enterprises.56 In many cases they
were land sales companies. The provision of
water was important primarily because of the
increased selling price for the land.57
Conflicts between the profit interests of these
commercial enterprises and the inability of
irrigators to make adequate payments led to
litigation and state regulation in many
situations and, eventually, to the virtual
disappearance of this form of irrigation
water supply organization.
As mentioned, there is a substantial
body of case law seeking to define the
relationship between the water carrier and
the water user and, in particular, the
nature of the water rights that they
respectively hold The Colorado courts
were the first to address this issue and,
in the 1888 decision of Wheeler v.
Northern Colorado Irrigating Co. the
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that
the water appropriation made by a carrier
company depended for its "birth and
continued existence upon the use made
by the consumer.1158 In later Colorado
cases this relationship was described as a
kind of joint appropriative right. For
example, in Combs v. Farmers' Hitfi Line
C.&R. Co. the Colorado Supreme Court
said:
[WJhile the rights of the consumer
to the use of water are distinct
and independent of the rights of
the carrier, which transports the
water for hire, yet the rights of
the two combined constitute a
completed appropriation, and it is
the completed appropriation for
which the decree is rendered.
The decree embodies not only the
rights of the carrier, whatever they
may be, but also the rights of its
consumers.59
A 1913 federal district court decision
offered this summary of carrier ditch law
in Colorado:
(1) the owner of the carrying
ditch in making the diversion from
the natural stream acts solely as
the agent or trustee for him who
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applies the water to a beneficial use,
(2) gets no title in or right to the use
of the water and has no property in it
subject to disposal, and (3) he who
applies the water thus diverted to
beneficial use acquires a property
right in the use of the water thus
applied which he, and he only, can
sell, dispose of and convey by deed
separate and apart from the land to
which it has been applied or with land
to which it has been applied.60
In this interpretation, the carrier is simply
acting as an agent for the user in diverting
the water and holds no property interest in
its right of use. Moreover, under Colorado
law the user is free to transfer the water in
the same manner as any other appropriative
right.
This expansive view of the rights of the
user is tempered somewhat by language in
other cases pointing out that the user must
comply with the provisions of the contract
under which the water is delivered.*1 For
example, where a consumer used water
supplied by a carrier ditch on lands other
than those specified in the contract such use
was enjoined.62 The carrier may require users
to "exercise such rights under reasonable
regulations and limitations."63 If upon the
expiration of the contract supply term the
user fails to renew the contract he may lose
his right64 And, of course, he must make all
legal payments that are due.65
The Supreme Court of Nevada followed
a similar approach in the 1914 decision,
Prosole v. Steamboat Canal Co.*6 This case
involved the duty of a canal company to
continue to deliver water to a user in the
same manner as it had in the preceding 20
years. Apparently there was no formal
contract between the company and the user.
The Court found that the user held a legally
protectable interest in the water since it is
the act of applying water to beneficial use
that makes the diversion into "a complete
and valid appropriation."
The Nevada Court cited with approval
the rule set forth by the Arizona Supreme
Court in Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal
Co. that the carrier ditch is only the
agent of the water user in furnishing the
water through its system.67 The Court in
Slosser had concluded that, under Arizona
law, appropriative water rights for
irrigation can only be held by the owner
of the land on which the water is used.68
The Idaho courts have taken a
somewhat different view. Early decisions
recognized the right of a company or an
individual to appropriate water "for sale,
rental, or distribution, or for any
beneficial purpose."69 The validity of the
appropriation depends on actual beneficial
use of the water,70 but the "appropriation
of water carried in the ditch operated for
sale, rental, and distribution of waters
does not belong to the water users, but
rather to the ditch company."71
Nevertheless, the users have a "perpetual
right [to the water], subject to defect only
by failure to pay annual water rents and
comply with the lawful requirements as to
the conditions of use."72
Thus the legal relationship between
water carriers and water users, used by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ickes v. Fox to
characterize the federal .reclamation
system, has been the subject of
considerable discussion by state courts. In
all cases the rights of the water users are
given protection against arbitrary actions
by the carrier. There is considerable
variation, however, in the nature of the
water right found to be held by the water
user -- ranging from the fully transferable
right said to exist in Colorado to the
more limited right described in Idaho.
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It is arguable that the Ickes decision
represents a statement of federal law that
should be applied to analyze the water rights
relationship between the U.S. and water users
in other similar federal reclamation projects.
An alternative view would be that this water
rights relationship is a matter of state law and
must be analyzed individually for each project
The first approach is supported by the fact
that the U.S. Supreme Court in the Ickes
case made limited reference to Washington
state law and cited a federal district court
decision (from New Mexico) for its conclusion
that the user of water from a federal
reclamation facility holds a property right to
the use of the water even though the U.S.
holds the legal right to divert the water.
Moreover, in two subsequent decisions
the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically
reaffirmed the Ickes decision.73 Particularly
relevant is the case of Nevada v. United
States14 involving an effort by the U.S. on
behalf of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to
obtain a reserved water right on the Truckee
River in Nevada to maintain the fishery in
Pyramid Lake. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the government was bound by an earlier
adjudication of rights to use water from the
Truckee River under which the U.S. had
obtained appropriation rights for the
Newlands Project, a federal reclamation
project, and the tribe. In particular, the
Court held that the U.S. had only a "nominal"
interest in the water rights for the Newlands
Project and that the "beneficial interest in the
rights confirmed to the Government resided
in the owners of the land within the Project
to which these water rights became
appurtenant upon the application of Project
water to the land.*75. There is no mention of
Nevada law such as the Prosole case discussed
above, only of the Ickes decision. The U.S.
Supreme Court, at least, seems to regard this
issue as a matter of federal law.
To summarize, the U.S. Supreme
Court has analogized the water delivery
functions of federal reclamation facilities
to that of a water carrier. Even though
the U.S. may hold the state water rights
governing the diversion and use of the
water, it does so as an agent for those
who apply the water to a beneficial use.
In its carrier capacity, the U.S. may set
the terms of the water supply
arrangement, including the quantity of
water it will supply (by federal
reclamation law, limited to the amount
that can be beneficially used) and the
charges it will assess to repay some part
of the cost of constructing the facilities
and to pay for ongoing operation and
maintenance costs. So long as this water
is being applied to beneficial use in
conformance with the water supply
arrangement, the U.S. must continue to
meet its supply commitment. The water
right held by the user in these
circumstances, while subject to certain
contract obligations, has been called a
property right by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Section 3: Federal Legal Interests in
Transfers
Construction of a reclamation project
represents the commitment of substantial
federal resources. The project
authorization directs the construction of
specified facilities that will be used for
certain described uses. The U.S. enters
into a contract with an entity or entities
representing the landowners and others
who will use the water delivered from the
reclamation facilities. The primary
purpose of the contract is to specify the
obligation of the U.S. regarding provision
of water and the obligation of the
representing entity in paying a share of
the construction cost of the facilities and
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an operation and maintenance charge if the
U.S. operates the facilities.
Transfers of water supplied from Bureau
facilities may implicate federal interests in a
variety of ways. This section considers first
the interests associated with ownership of the
facilities and then the interests associated
with the use of water provided by these
facilities.
Interests in the Use of Federal Reclamation
Facilities
L Transfers involving uses not originally
contemplated
The purposes for which reclamation
facilities are authorized and constructed have
expanded markedly over the years. Originally,
irrigation water supply was the only purpose
recognized. Even in more recent times,
projects have been authorized for a limited
number of purposes. Thus transfers may be
proposed which involve uses of water not
originally considered at the time the project
was authorized. These transfers may require
some change in the use of the facilities
themselves. Are these new uses of
reclamation facilities precluded without
explicit federal approval?
Congress has never addressed the matter
of water transfers directly. As described
earlier, it has recognized the expanding uses
for which reclamation facilities may be built.
More specifically, it has authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to enter into
contracts for the use of facilities beyond those
originally intended. These statutes do not
appear to be directed at transfers of water
already being provided and used but, rather,
at allocation of water in reclamation facilities
not being used. The clearest example of this
authority is a single paragraph statute enacted
in 1920 which, subject to certain limitations
described below, authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to "enter into contract to
supply water from any project irrigation
system for other purposes than irrigation,
...."* A 1906 act authorizes the
Secretary to provide water to towns "in
the immediate vicinity of irrigation
projects . . . " which hold a preexisting
water right from the same water source as
the project77 And the 1939 Reclamation
Project Act, while generally concerning
new or supplemental projects, provides
the Secretary with general authority to
"enter into contracts to furnish water for
municipal water supply or miscellaneous
purposes: .. ..M78
The 1920 act places three substantial
limitations on contracts issued under its
authority: (1) the new contract must be
approved by the entity representing the
irrigation water users in its contract with
the U.S.; (2) there must be no other
practicable source of water supply; and
(3) deliveries of water under the contract
may not be "detrimental to the water
service" for the irrigation project or to the
rights of any prior appropriator.79 The
1906 Act applies only to nearby towns
with a preexisting water right.80 The 1939
Act provides that contracts issued under
its authority must not "impair the
efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes."81 While authorizing contracts
for purposes beyond those originally
intended, these statutes express a strong
concern for the protection of the
irrigation water users receiving water from
reclamation facilities.
Modification of reclamation facilities
to enable additional uses is authorized
under the 1911 Warren Act discussed
above, and the Water Supply Act of
1958.° The Water Supply Act recognizes
a federal role in developing water
supplies for municipal and industrial uses.
Storage for these purposes can be
j
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included in new facilities, a fact already well
established in the 1939 Reclamation Project
Act More importantly, modifications in
existing facilities necessary to make water
available for these uses can be made; but if
these modifications would "seriously affect"
the original project purposes or involve
"major" structural or operational changes,
approval of Congress is necessary.83
The case studies suggest that the U.S.
must specifically authorize transfers where the
proposed new uses of water are for purposes
not originally anticipated. For example, there
have been several transactions involving water
originally supplied from the Rio Grande
Project for irrigation use in Texas.84 These
transactions have resulted in water moving
from irrigation use to municipal use in the
city of El Paso. The arrangements made in
1962 and 1988 involved a new contract with
the U.S. These contracts are based explicitly
on the authority of the 1920 Act. Generally
they.involve the assignment of the rights to
receive irrigation water from the Rio Grande
Project by the landowners in favor of delivery
of this water for municipal use. Among other
things, the new contracts contain recitations
that they meet the conditions of the 1920 Act
regarding no detriment to irrigation service
and no other practicable source of water.
The Emery County Project in Utah was
planned and built for irrigation water supply.89
The 1962 repayment contract between the
Emery Water Conservancy District and the
U.S. spoke only in, terms of irrigation water
use. To permit Utah Power and Light to use
6,000 acre-feet of water for industrial
purposes - water that had not been
subscribed for by irrigators in the area, the
U.S., the Emery Water Conservancy District,
and Utah Power and Light entered into a
new contract in 1972. In the new contract,
the U.S. simply recognized industrial uses for
the project and justified this new use by
referencing the general authority under which
this project had been built (the Colorado
River Storage Project Act) which included
industrial uses as one of the purposes for
which projects could be built.
The Kendrick Project in Wyoming is
another example of a project authorized
only for irrigation purposes but from
which a water supply for municipal uses
has been established.86 Again, the U.S.,
the irrigation water user organization (the
Casper-Alcova Irrigation District), and the
new user (the city of Casper) entered into
a new contract. Legal authority for the
new contract (and therefore the new use)
was Section 9(c) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939 which authorizes the
Secretary to enter into contracts to
furnish water for municipal water supply.
Thus the U.S. construed this act as
authority to provide for new uses of old
reclamation facilities. The requirement in
the act that the contract not impair the
efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes was met by making the water
available to the city of Casper out of
efficiency improvements in the water
delivery system to the irrigation district so
the irrigators still received the same
quantity of water at their headgates.
In at least one case, new legislation
has provided the basis for new uses of a
reclamation project Proposed transfers
of water supplied by the Newlands Project
in Nevada from irrigation use to wetlands
maintenance in the Stillwater Wildlife
Management Area raised the question of
whether the project could be used for this
purpose.87 Again, irrigation was the only
authorized use of this project A 1989
Solicitor's Opinion had concluded that a
1956 act adding additional storage
features related to the Newlands Project,
which act recognized fish and wildlife
purposes, authorized this new use of the
Newlands Project. Congress laid this
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issue to rest in legislation enacted in 1990
which, among other things, specifically
authorizes the use of the Newlands Project
for a broad set of potential purposes
including fish and wildlife.
Cities adjacent to the Strawberry Valley
Project in Utah have expressed interest in
acquiring rights to use water from this project
for municipal purposes.88 As with the other
examples, this project was authorized only for
irrigation purposes. In response to a
proposal by the city of Spanish Fork to
obtain rights to project water, the Bureau of
Reclamation concluded that the new use
would require approval by the Secretary upon
a finding that the water was determined to be
"surplus" to irrigation needs in the project. A
subsequent proposal sought to avoid the need
for such a determination by characterizing the
arrangement as a "delivery" contract For
reasons that are not entirely clear, the
Bureau has determined that such a contract
would not involve a change of water use.
However, the Bureau has required that the
contract identify the individual water deeds
and land parcels involved.
The Provo River Project in Utah provides
a useful comparison with these examples.89
Originally envisioned as an irrigation project,
it evolved into a multiple purpose project
during the planning phase and, as approved
for construction in 1935, provided for a major
municipal use component. In anticipation of
increasing municipal use of project water,
mechanisms permitting this transformation,
including provisions in the repayment contract
with the U.S., were established at the outset
Consequently, the Bureau plays no role in the
considerable number of transfers that are
moving irrigation water to municipal use.
These examples suggest that transfers of
Bureau-supplied water involving a use of
water and therefore, presumably, a new use
of federal reclamation facilities not already
authorized will require U.S. approval. It
appears that a new contract with the U.S.
for this use of its facilities will likely be
necessary. A primary concern of the U.S.
will be to insure that the new use does
not impair the irrigation and other
existing purposes of the project.
Agreement by the organization
representing irrigation water users to the
new use is necessary under the 1920 Act.
It is not clear whether this agreement is
sufficient to satisfy the U.S. that the new
use will not harm the project's irrigation
purposes. Nor is it clear what else will
be considered by the U.S. in this regard.
Z Transfers for uses outside the
original project area
Federal reclamation projects are
authorized to provide service to users in
some geographic area. The project
authorization may specify a service area
but, more often, the service area must be
implied from other project-related reports.
In practice, the service area commonly
ends up being coterminous with the
boundaries of the organization
representing the water users.
Transfers of water use to new
locations within the service area are
unlikely to raise issues requiring U.S.
approval so long as the purpose of the
water use does not change. Transfers for
use outside of the project service area
raise questions similar to those raised by
changes to purposes of use not
contemplated by the original project
authorization. Since uses outside the
project service area were not anticipated,
must transfers involving such uses depend
on U.S. approval?
The city of Casper is not within the
service area for the Kendrick Project As
mentioned, the water from this project
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made available to the city is the subject of a
new contract involving also the Casper-Alcova
Irrigation District The U.S. referenced the
1939 Reclamation Project Act as authority for
this new contract involving both a type of use
not originally authorized as well as a place of
use outside the project service area.
Similarly, the city of £1 Paso is outside the
service area of the Rio Grande Project. In
this case, the 1920 Act served as authority for
the new contracts providing for the new type
and place of use.
Transfers of water to new uses outside
the original project service area appear to be
less common than transfer to types of uses
not originally authorized. In either case, a
new or amended contract with the U.S.
appears to be necessary. In the two examples
found in our case studies the new contracts
were based on different statutory authority.
3. Issues related to payment for the project
facilities
The U.S. has a direct interest in
recovering the construction costs of project
facilities designated as reimbursable. Federal
policy for the repayment of the cost of
reclamation facilities has shifted over the
years from full recovery of these costs
(without interest) to only partial recovery.
Wahl has calculated that irrigation water
users repay, on average, about 14 percent of
the full cost of reclamation facilities from
which their water is supplied.90 The subsidy
for other users is considerably less.
A primary purpose of the contract
between the U.S. and the organization(s)
representing users of water from a
reclamation project is to establish the total
payment obligation for the reimbursable share
of the project construction costs attributed to
the water supply for these users. As
discussed, a repayment contract anticipates
complete payment of this cost during the 40-
year life of the contract. Service
contracts need not provide for repayment
of total reimbursable costs during their
initial term and have been used in
situations such as the Central Valley
Project in California where the U.S.
believes total reimbursable costs cannot
yet be determined because additional
facilities are still planned for construction.
Payment requirements for classes of
users (e.g. irrigators, cities, industries) are
established in the contract between the
U.S. and the organization(s) representing
these users. The contracting entity takes
on responsibility for the payment of the
costs established in the contract The
precise manner in which the contracting
entity Gnances its payment obligation to
the U.S. is generally left up to the entity
to decide, but the U.S. must be satisfied
before signing the contract that the entity
will in fact be able to make the payments.
Transfers of water among the same
class of users receiving water from a
reclamation project should not alter the
repayment obligation established under
the original contract Transfers between
classes of users, however, may require
new financial arrangements with the U.S.
because of the different subsidy policies
that apply. More recent contracts in
which transfers of water were anticipated
have provided schemes for changing
payment obligations in such cases.91
Typically, however, there is nothing in the
original repayment contract that addresses
this matter.
The case studies reveal considerable
variation in approach. The transactions
providing for the use of Emery County
Project water by Utah Power and Light
(UPL) both involved payment obligations
to the U.S. radically different than the
payment obligations for the Emery
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County Conservancy District on behalf of the
irrigation water users.92 The first transaction,
which occurred in 1972 and involved the
allocation to UPL of 6,000 acre-feet of water
originally intended for irrigation use but not
subscribed for by irrigators in the area,
required UPL to pay the U.S. a total of $4.8
million over the 40 year contract period. By
comparison, under the original contract the
irrigators were responsible for paying about
$2.3 million for an annual average water
supply of about 22,100 acre feet. The second
transaction, which occurred in 1987, involved
the transfer of rights to water from the
project that had been acquired from irrigators
in the area. In addition to the cost of
purchasing the rights to about 2,500 acre-feet
of water from the irrigators, UPL agreed to
pay the U.S. a total of about $2.9 million.
In return for receiving water from the
Kendrick Project, the city of Casper agreed to
pay to the U.S. the remaining obligation of
the Casper-Alcova Irrigation District
($750,000) as well as a charge of $24 per year
for each acre-foot of water available to the
city.93 The city also is paying the cost of the
improvements that make the water available.
The transfers of Rio Grande Project
water to the city of £1 Paso have not
required any increased payments to the U.S.
Apparently this is because the payment
obligation associated with this water had
already been completed. Transfers of
Newlands Project water to the Stillwater
Wildlife Management Area do not involve
any change in the payment obligation for the
related reclamation facilities. These transfers
are being treated as straight changes of water
rights under Nevada law with the existing
payment obligation associated with the
original water right remaining with the
transferred water right. The Truckee-
Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights
Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 1990,
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to use
or extend federal reclamation facilities on
a non-reimbursable basis as necessary to
provide water to the wetlands.94
Repayment of the original
construction costs of the Deer Creek
Division of the Provo River Project is
shared equally on an acre-foot-basis by all
users of project water, whether for
irrigation or municipal purposes.95 The
plan and legal arrangements for this
project anticipated shifts of water use
from irrigation to municipal purposes.
Thus, transfers of water from irrigation to
municipal and industrial purposes are
deemed not to require an increase in the
payment obligation.
Several factors may be relevant in
considering the differences observed in
these examples. One consideration is
whether the total allocated portion of the
project construction costs has been paid
back to the U.S. As mentioned, in the El
Paso situation this fact was used to justify
no increased payments. A second
consideration is whether the transfer
requires a new contract with the U.S. If
no such contract is required, then very
likely no change in the payment for
project facilities is necessary unless
specified in the existing contract.
Assuming that a new contract is necessary
and that the reimbursable construction
cost of the facilities has not been fully
repaid, there remains the question of the
basis for establishing the new repayment
requirement. This issue is discussed at
length in chapter 3, below.
Water Rights-Related Interests
Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation
Act provides that state law governs the




Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as affecting or intended to affect or to
in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the
control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water used in irrigation,
or any vested right acquired
thereunder, and the Secretary of the
Interior, in carrying out the provisions
of this Act, shall proceed in
conformity with such laws . . .
Provided that the right to use of
water acquired under provisions of
this Act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall
be the basis, the measure, and the
limit of the right.96
In California v. United States" the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to
apply in two primary situations: first, the
water rights necessary to support the project
must be established in conformance with state
law; second, the distribution of water released
from reclamation storage facilities also must
follow state law.98
The United States holds the water rights
by which water is diverted and stored in most
of the reclamation projects in the western
states.99 For the water that is delivered from
reclamation facilities to beneficial users, the
U.S. holds the diversion water rights, as
suggested in Ickes v. Fat100, in a kind of
agency relationship. To the extent that water
delivered from reclamation facilities is applied
to a beneficial use in conformance with the
contract arrangement with the U.S., the user
may be considered to hold a legal right to
permanent supply of that water.
Trelease has distinguished between the
position of the U.S. as holder of the water
rights in "external" relationships (those
between the project appropriator and other
claimants of water) and "internal"
relationships (involving the Bureau as
distributor of water and the users of the
water).101 In these external relationships
the U.S. may be regarded as the
appropriator. In internal relationships the
Ickes decision suggests the user is to be
considered the appropriator.102
Under prior appropriation law in the
western states, the holder of a water right
may transfer ownership or use of the
right to another or may make changes in
the manner of use of the right subject to
state review.109 Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act suggests that state law
governs water rights. Reclamation law,
however, is silent on the question of
transfer of water rights.
The first court to directly consider the
transfer of water rights involving water
delivered from a federal reclamation
program concluded that state law should
apply.104 This case involved the
adjudication of water rights for the
Newlands Project from the Carson River
in Nevada. The federal district court
made it clear that the water rights based
on a supply of water from the Newlands
Project are vested in the irrigators who
have used the water on their lands under
legal arrangement with the U.S. Among
the issues considered was the failure of
the U.S. to formally change water rights
it had obtained from private appropriators
to establish a water supply for the project
In this context the Court stated:
A careful examination of the
Reclamation Act reveals no
explicit congressional directives
relating to the transfer of vested
water rights to the United States.
In fact, the conspicuous absence
of transfer procedures, taken in
conjunction with the clear general
deference to state water law,
impels the conclusion that
21
Congress intended transfers to be
subject to state water law.105
Thus, transfers of water to the U.S. to
establish a project water supply are to be
handled under state law. In a subsequent
part of the opinion, the court extended this
view and stated that any. changes in the place
of diversion , place of use, or manner of use
are to be handled under state law.106
An earlier court decision concerning the
Newlands Project had made it clear that
water should be delivered only to irrigators
whose lands were clearly identified as entitled
to receive water.107 Over the years some
users of Newlands water had moved the
water to lands not originally described in the
water right certificate or allotment contracts.
To come into compliance with this court
decision, these users filed applications with
the Nevada State Engineer to change the
place of use of the water. In a 1989
decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that
Nevada law applies to the transfer of water
rights held by landowners within the
Newlands service area.108 It based this
conclusion on Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act Consequently, pending
transfers of Newlands Project water from
irrigation to wetlands use are proceeding
under Nevada state law.
Still another court decision regarding the
Newlands Project considered whether federal
interests would be sufficiently protectable
under state law proceedings. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the notice and
participation provisions in Nevada law,
combined with the ability to appeal the State
Engineer's decision to the federal district
court, "provide full vindication of the
admitted federal interests in the operation of
federal reclamation projects.""*
These cases hold that users of water
delivered from the Newlands Project and
used in accordance with contract
arrangements hold a state law-based water
right As property, these water rights are
transferable according to state law. In
this situation no changes in the contract
between the U.S. and the representing
entity (the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District) were involved. U.S. interests
were determined to be adequately
protectable within the state review
process for water transfers.
Illustrations from case studies
Emery County Project
The case studies generally support this
view that the users of water supplied
from a reclamation project hold a water
right that may be voluntarily transferred
to another use.110 For example, in the
1987 transfer of Emery County Project
water to Utah Power and Light the utility
directly acquired lands and associated
water rights from the irrigators. Unlike
the Newlands case, however, the
individual rights did not go through the
Utah change of water rights process.
Rather, the U.S., which holds the water
rights for the project, filed the necessary
change of water right application with the
Utah State Engineer, noting the change
of use from irrigation to industrial and
other purposes, and the change of place
of use. A new contract with the U.S.
also was required because of the change
in the repayment obligation associated
with this new use of water.
Provo River Project
By comparison, the transfers within
the Provo River Project have occurred
without any state change of use
proceeding. The U.S. holds the diversion
and storage water rights for the project.
Transfers occur through the sale of shares
22
in the water user association or through the
sale of shares in irrigation companies which
hold association shares. No state change of
use proceeding has been considered necessary
because the water rights for the project
provided that "uses may from time to time
change from agriculture to municipal and
domestic or other uses which may require
additional rediversion and conveying works
and increased capacity of rediversion and
conveying works.""1 Moreover, the place of
use is identified as anywhere within the
boundaries of the water user association
which extends to parts of five counties.
Rio Grande Project
Transfers of Rio Grande Project water
from irrigation to municipal use in the El
Paso, Texas area involved agreements with
the individual landowners deemed to hold a
right to receive water. These transfers
required a new contract with the U.S. and the
representing entity. The contract limited
transfers to the water associated with two
acres of land or less per landowner without
approval of the district board. The transfers
were for a fixed term of years - 25 years in
the 1962 transaction and 75 years in the 1988
agreement No state change of use
proceeding was involved in these transfers.
BMI/Henderson Transfer
The transfer of Boulder Canyon Project
water from the entitlement held by Basic
Management, Inc. (BMI) to the city of
Henderson, Nevada involved a water supply
arrangement unlike that in the other cases.
BMI holds a "permanent service" contract for
water from Lake Mead."2 Under a 1954
contract, BMI had been supplying Henderson
with about 5,000 acre-feet of water.
Henderson sought to expand its supply to
about 15,900 acre-feet
BMI's municipal use allocation under
its contract with the U.S. totaled about
9,400 acre-feet per year, some of which
was already committed to other users in
addition to Henderson. To expand its
supply to Henderson, BMI would have to
provide water from the allotment under
its service contract that had never actually
been used. Moreover, it would have to
provide water to municipal use from its
allotment for industrial use. Because of
these factors, the Department of the
Interior opposed BMI's original plan to
simply extend and increase its contract
with Henderson.
The arrangement approved by the
Secretary involved an amendment to the
1969 contract by which BMFs water
entitlement is reduced from 41,266 acre-
feet per year to 23,158 acre-feet per year
Hor so much thereof as may be required
for beneficial use."10 In turn, BMI
assigned and transferred its interest in 15,
878 acre-feet per year from its Lake
Mead entitlement, including 6,449 acre-
feet per year of its municipal water
portion and 9,429 acre-feet per year of its
industrial water portion.114 The U.S.
agreed to deliver up to 15,878 acre-feet
per year to the BMI intake structure at a
charge of $0.50 per acre-foot plus an
additional $0.55 per acre-foot for
administrative costs.1" Finally, BMI
agreed to deliver the water through its
pipeline for $110 per acre-foot the first
year, increasing to $160 per acre-foot in
five years and continuing for the duration
of the contract116
The greater degree of federal control
over the form of this transaction probably
arises from the fact the water is from
Lake Mead. Under the Boulder Canyon
Act, the Secretary of the Interior
effectively controls all allocations of water
from federal facilities in this part of the
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Colorado River. Those with water
entitlements such as BMI may be given a
permanent right of service but transfer of
these entitlements to new uses is probably
subject to much greater control than in most
other non-Colorado River federal projects.
Proposed CAID/GID Transfer
A proposed transfer of Kendrick Project
water involving the Goshen Irrigation District
(GID), not discussed in the case study in
volume II, raises several interesting issues.
The Casper-Alcova Irrigation District (CAID)
holds rights to receive water from the
Kendrick Project in Wyoming to irrigate
23,000 acres of land."7 The U.S. holds the
storage rights while CAID holds so-called
secondary rights to the use of the stored
water. In 1989 the Goshen Irrigation District
(GID), located downstream from CAID on
the North Platte River, sought to work out
an arrangement with CAID whereby GID
would receive 25,000 acre-feet of water out
of the storage that provides water to CAID
in return for allowing an equivalent amount
of water to be stored in Kendrick reservoirs
the following year. The U.S. objected to this
transaction, primarily on the basis that it, not
CAID, controlled the use of water stored in
the Kendrick Project, and that any such
transaction could occur only under a contract
with the U.S. GID, supported by the state of
Wyoming, refused to enter into such a
contract, saying that CAID owned the water
rights and, under both federal and state law,
could determine the use of the water.
The litigation appears likely not to resolve
the fundamental substantive issues that have
been presented concerning who controls these
kinds of transfer decisions. This situation is
primarily useful as a hypothetical example in
which to consider these issues. A brief
analysis follows.
CAID unquestionably is the legal
holder of water rights to irrigate lands
within the district with water from the
Kendrick Project. In Nebraska v.
Wyoming™ the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly followed its holding in the Ickes
case that the U.S. is simply a carrier of
water to the users who hold the legal
right to the water beneficially used. As
noted above, in the various cases relating
to the Newlands Project the federal
courts have followed this approach and
have concluded that transfers are a matter
of state law. This would suggest that so
long as the proposed transfer conformed
to state law, the U.S. should not be able
to prevent it. Wyoming law authorizes
short-term transfers upon approval by the
State Engineer and approval was
obtained.
Had the transfer simply involved water
that CAID otherwise would have used in
the same year, the above analysis should
apply. However, the water to be supplied
would have come out of storage in the
Kendrick Project reservoirs. CAID still
used its normal annual entitlement At
best this is water from the carryover
storage which the Kendrick Project relies
on to supply water to CAID. The
storage rights held by the U.S. for the
Kendrick Project are relatively junior and
may not be in priority in many low flow
years. By filling the Kendrick reservoirs
in high flow years, water can be held that
may be necessary to supply CAID in low
flow years.
Originally the Kendrick Project was
expected to support irrigation on
considerably more acreage than has in
fact been the case. In a sense the U.S.
still holds this supply for uses yet to be
determined. Just how much of the water
in storage is directly attributable to




there for other purposes is uncertain.
Consequently the legal control of this water
is uncertain.
An arrangement by which GAID
transferred only water that was identified as
part of the related carryover storage would fit
more closely with the legal recognition that
has been given to the rights of water users
taking water from BOR projects under a
water carrier-type arrangement CAID must
then either be prepared to forgo the future
use of this water, work out an exchange
agreement with the transferee whereby the
water provided will be replaced in the
following year or years, or hope that there
are sufficiently high flows in the following
years to fill the reservoirs anyway.
Central Valley Project
Transfers of water from the Central
Valley Project (CVP) in California, the
largest reclamation project in the West, have
been the subject of intense interest The
Bureau of Reclamation has permitted short-
term transfer of water to occur under certain
conditions: (1) the transferor must have
"excess" water available from its allotment;
(2) the transfer can only be for one year;
(3) the transferee must also have a contract
with the U.S. to receive CVP water; (4) the
transfer must not violate federal reclamation
law; (5) the transferor may not profit from
.the transaction; and (6) transfers between
certain field diversions are prohibited.119 Only
one permanent transfer involving a change of
purpose of use of water, however, has been
permitted.120
Water supply for irrigation from the CVP
is provided under water service contracts
authorized by Section 9(e) of the 1939
Reclamation Project Act. There is some
question whether the nature of the water
right held by the user under these contracts
is different from that held under the Section
9(d) repayment contract. In both cases
the U.S. commits to what may be a
perpetual supply of water.121 Contractors
in the CVP had expressed concern that
their water supply might be cut off at the
end of their contract term. In Ivanhoe
Irrigation District v. McCracken,m the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that the
renewal provisions in the 1956 act
responded to this concern.
Section 9(e) contracts, however, have
been compared to "utility" water supply
arrangements.123 The laws of a number of
western states have recognized supply
arrangements under which the users are
not deemed to have obtained a water
right.
For example, California law recognizes
"public use" water suppliers. The legal
basis for this category originated in an
1879 constitutional provision stating that
the use of all water appropriated for sale
or rental is deemed a "public use" and is
subject to state regulation.124 The
California Supreme Court provided the
following distinction between public use
and private use:
In the case of a public use the
beneficiaries do not possess rights
to the water which are, in the
ordinary sense, private property.
A public use "must be for the
general public, or some portion of
it, and not a use by or for
particular individuals, or for the
benefit of certain estates."
[citation omitted]... The right of
an individual to a public use of
water is in the nature of a public
right possessed by reason of his
status as a person of the class for
whose benefit the water is
appropriated or dedicated. All
who enter the class may demand
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the use of the water, regardless of
whether they have previously enjoyed
it or not"5
A subsequent decision noted that public use
contracts are not attached to the land as an
appurtenance in the way a water right would
be.126 So long as the land is within the area
to be served, however, it has a permanent
right of service.
In California these supply arrangements
became subject to regulation by the Railroad
Commission (now the Public Utilities
Commission). This result was confirmed in
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District v. Paulson.137
In this opinion the court described the user's
right in the following way:
[N]o private estate can be created in
property devoted to a public use, and
a consumer of water cannot have a
water right in the sense of a private
freehold interest in the real estate of
the distributing company;... his right
is simply a right of service.128
In the Clark treatise on Water and Water
Rights this summary is provided of the
protections afforded the user supplied by a
water company in California:
He is entitled to have his water
supply continued unless there is a
shortage of water for which the
company is not responsible. There is
a suggestion that the water must be
fairly apportioned among all
consumers when there is a scarcity of
water or perhaps even when the
demand for water is increased by new
consumers. Moreover, by agreement
with the water company, the water
may be dedicated permanently for use
on particular land; however, this does
not technically create an appurtenant
water right or give the consumer a
permanent preferential right over
other subscribers. Also, of course,
rates charged may be extensively
regulated by the State Public
Utilities Commission.129
Texas law allows water companies to
supply users on a contract basis. The
courts have held that the supplier is in
fact the owner of the appropriate right
and that the user is merely the customer
of the company.130 By statute, the
company may convey a permanent water
right to the irrigator but apparently this
is rarely done.131 The user has a right of
continuing supply upon the terms of the
contract.
To summarize, under the water
service model the appropriate* provides
water to users under a contractual or
utility arrangement deemed not to vest an
appropriate water right in the user.
However, a number of duties attach that
protect the rights of the user. Primary
among these is the right of continued
service. Depending on the state and the
type of supply arrangement, additional
regulation may occur, including control of
the rates charged for service.
No courts have considered the nature
of the water rights associated with 9(e)
contracts.132 Assuming this is a matter of
state law under Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act, a determination of this
question could vary according to the
state. Alternatively, the differences in the
two types of contracts may be viewed as
relevant only for the different options
they provide for payment of the
construction costs of project facilities.
Since the water supply commitment under
either arrangement is essentially
permanent, the nature of the water right
itself may not depend on the type of
contract This line of analysis is
'1
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supported by the act that reclamation law
authorizes the conversion of 9(e) contracts to
9(d) contracts.133
Our analysis of California law in relation
to the water supply arrangements from the
CVP suggests that the users may in fact hold
a water right even though they are supplied
on the basis of water service contracts.
However, some provisions in these contracts
appear to substantially limit long-term
transfers of water. Thus, Bureau of
Reclamation policy regarding such transfers is
especially critical to transfers in the CVP.
Other Considerations in Reclamation Law
As discussed, Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act defers to State law in
matters of water appropriation and
distribution. There are two provisos in this
section of the Act that must be considered in
relation to transfers: the appurtenancy
requirement and the beneficial use
requirement. The effect of the 1982
Reclamation Reform Act also must be
considered.
Appurtenancy
The first proviso of Section 8 is that the
right to use water provided under the
Reclamation Act "shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated nat What does
"appurtenant" mean in Section 8? There is
no definition of the term in the Reclamation
Act. And there is no "plain meaning" of the
term. As a result, a court would be
compelled to interpret what Congress must
have meant when it conditioned the use of
project water on appurtenancy. In so doing,
it may make reference to the legislative
history of the Reclamation Act and to indicia
of contemporary meaning of nappurtenancytt.m
The legislative history contains sparse
reference to "appurtenancy," but that which
exists provides some limited support for
the proposition that Congress intended
that, once project water was applied to a
particular tract of land, the water was
inseparable therefrom. First, the report
of the Committee on Irrigation and Arid
Lands states that n . . . the character of
the right which is contemplated under the
act is clearly defined to be that of
appurtenance or inseparability from the
lands irrigated .... M.136 Second, Rep.
Mondell (from Wyoming), who carried
the legislation from the Committee on
Irrigation and Arid Lands and who was a
primary sponsor in the House of
Representatives, began floor consideration
of the measure with a lengthy opening
statement which includes the following
passage:
The water having been beneficially
applied and payment having been
made under the provisions of the
bill, the water right would become
appurtenant to the land and
inalienable therefrom .. .
The settler or landowner who
complies with all the conditions of
the act secures a perpetual right
to the use of a sufficient amount
of water to irrigate his land, but
this right lapses if he fails to put
the water to beneficial use and
only extends to the use of the
water on and for the tract
originally irrigated. These most
important provisions of the law
prevent all the evils which come
from recognizing a property right
in water with power to sell and
dispose of the same elsewhere and
for other purposes than originally
intended. This is an advance over
the water usage of most of the
States, and it is not denied that
making water rights appurtenant
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to the tract irrigated will in some
cases work hardship, but it is believed
that it is much better to risk the
individual hardships which will
inevitably occur under a provision of
appurtenance than to risk the evils
certain to result from unlimited
authority to transfer water rights.137
These remarks evince the intention to
deny a landowner the right to transfer project
water and to do so even in the face of state
law to the contrary. If the court finds Rep.
Mondell's concept of appurtenancy
controlling, transfers away from the land to
which it was originally applied are unlawful.
There are several reasons why a court
would not likely adopt Rep. Mondell's
interpretation. First, the words of one
legislator, even a sponsor, do not control the
meaning of a federal statute.138 The reason
for this policy is that there is no way to
ascertain whether these words are what the
rest of Congress intended. And while it is
true that the report of the House Committee
from which the legislation emanated
mentioned the "inseparability" of project
water from "lands irrigated", this explanation
hardly passes for the detailed explanation of
"appurtenancy" ofwhich members of Congress
can be presumed to have had full
understanding. In addition, Rep. Mondell's
remarks were not made during debate-in fact
there was no debate on what was meant by
"appurtenancy" in Section 8.
Second, Rep. Mondell indicated during
debate that we are urging no new
experiment and exploiting no new theories
.. . [in] the principles which underlie this
measure, the polices which it outlines, the
detail of administration which it provides.
There is in it no new thing."139 If so, his
concept of "appurtenancy" may not have been
intended to be at odds with contemporaneous
concepts of appurtenancy in western state
water law, even though "appurtenancy11
appears as a proviso to the general
deference to state law.
The fact that a court could not be
certain that Rep. Mondell's version of
appurtenancy is what Congress intended
will impel it to interpret congressional
intent by reference to contemporaneous
concepts of appurtenancy.
"Appurtenancy" is a term that was at the
time of the enactment of the Reclamation
Act used widely in western water law. A
court seeking guidance as to what the
term meant (and, thus, how it was
understood by Congress) would likely
refer to "Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights", the standard reference on water
rights of the time.140
Kinney defines "appurtenances" as
"things belonging to another thing as
principal and which pass as incident to
the principal thing, but which did not
belong to it immemorially."141 The
question that Section 8's appurtenancy
proviso raises for transfers, then, is
whether, if interpreted by reference to
contemporaneous concepts, Congress
intended to require that, once project
water was supplied to a particular tract of
land, there really be an "inseparable" link
between the water and that land.
Kinney is clear that "appurtenancy"
did not connote inseparability in the
linkage between water and land. Thus,
he states: "Although a water right may be
appurtenant to a certain tract of land, it
is the subject of property, and may be
transferred either with or without the
land."142 This is true, he says, even when
legislatures overtly attempted to provide
for such inseparability.143 In this context
Kinney addresses the appurtenancy
provision of Section 8 as follows:
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" . . . there is nothing in the nature
and character of a water right
acquired under the Arid Region
Doctrine of appropriation which
makes it, upon any principle of law
that can be conceived, an inseparable
appurtenance to any particular tract of
land, so that a sale or transfer of the
right would work an abandonment,
and vest no right in the grantee.
Upon the other hand, the inherent
rights guaranteed under our
constitutions and law to own, hold
and dispose of all or any portion of
our property, either as a whole or in
parts, permits the sale and transfer of
a water right separate from the land.
This principle was undoubtedly
recognized by Congress in passing the
National Reclamation Act (cite
omitted), where, in Section 8, it is
provided that the Secretary of the
Interior, in carrying out the provisions
of the Act, shall proceed in
conformity with the laws of the
respective States and Territories; and,
in the same section is the proviso,
"That the right to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this
Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated," etc. As will be noticed the
proviso does not state what "land
irrigated," nor does it attempt to make
the water an inseparable appurtenance
to any land. It certainly cannot be
contended in the face of the whole of
this section, that a person in either
the states of Wyoming or Idaho, who
had fully paid for a water right under
the provisions of the Act, and where
the law of those States recognize the
validity of a sale and transfer of a
water right separate and apart for the
land to which it was first applied, can
not sell his right, or transfer the water
claimed thereunder to some other
tract of land. The same may be said
relative to the water rights
acquired under the Act in other
States under the principles stated
above (cite omitted.)1**
Thus, Kinney concluded that Congress
(whatever Rep. Mondell intended) could
not have intended to make project water
inseparable from the land because to do
so would be inconsistent not only with
contemporaneous western water law but
also with "our constitutions."
In interpreting "appurtenancy" under
Section 8, a court would also likely seek
the guidance of the Department of the
Interior.145 While the department has not
issued a definition of "appurtenancy," it
has acted for many years as if the term
has the meaning in Section 8 accorded to
it by Kinney.146 The case studies
undertaken for this report show a wide
range of transfers of project water,
including transfers from irrigation to
municipal and industrial uses. Many of
these transfers would obviously be
unlawful under Rep. Mondell's concept of
"appurtenancy11. The fact that the
department has approved them is
indication that the department has not
adopted that concept. In addition, a staff
attorney in the Office of the Mid-Pacific
Regional Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior stated informally that
"appurtenancy" is not a restriction on the
place of use of Central Valley Project
water. Rather, it was solely a
congressional directive that early federal
reclamation contracts be granted only to
owners of land that would be irrigated
with project water, rather than
speculators.147 This is a reasonable
interpretation of Congressional intent in
Section 8 and, thus, one entitled to
deference by the courts.
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One federal court has addressed the
meaning of "appurtenancy" in Section 8. In
El Paso County Water District v. City of El
Paso,148 an issue before the court was whether
water provided by the bureau for irrigation
could be used for municipal purposes without
violating the appurtenancy provision. The
court held that this municipal purpose,
established under Texas law, overcame the
appurtenancy requirement because Section 8's
larger purpose was to defer to state control
over project water allocation.14* The problem
with this holding is that the "appurtenancy" in
Section 8 (whatever it means) seems clearly
to be intended to be a condition on the
deference to the states."0
Finally, a court might determine to review
current notions of appurtenancy under state
law for guidance as to the meaning of
"appurtenancy" in Section 8. The theory
under which a court might refer to current
state law is that Congress, with knowledge
that the investments authorized in the
Reclamation Act would have an air of
permanence about them, could not have
continued to bind future generations to Mr.
Mondell's concept of "appurtenancy11 or any
other concept of "appurtenancy" in 1902 if
conditions changed. Thus, a court in the
1990s would feel justified in looking to state
notions of appurtenancy for guidance. If it
did refer to current state definitions of
"appurtenancy", it would find what Kinney
found in 1902: With only minor exceptions,
state law does not render inseparable any
connection of water to land to which it was
initially applied.131
It is unlikely that Rep. Mondeil's concept
of "appurtenancy" in Section 8 would be
found by a court to be controlling.152
However, as his remarks cannot be
completely assumed away, they may
unnecessarily impede transfers of project
water. As indicated in Chapter 5, the authors
of this report believe that the Department
should take affirmative steps to resolve
the remaining ambiguity surrounding
Section 8 "appurtenancy."
Beneficial use
The second proviso of Section 8 states
that "beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right [to use
project water.]"153 The beneficial use
standard is the law of all reclamation
states.154 Thus, application of the
standard found in Section 8 to project
water transfers would be required under
state law, unless Congress intended
"beneficial use" to mean something other
than that which is found in state law. It
follows that, barring such an intent, the
beneficial use proviso of Section 8 does
not constitute an impediment to project
water transfers beyond any impediment
that respective state beneficial use
standards might present to these
transfers.155 This section explores the
meaning of "beneficial use" in Section 8,
a topic that has led to controversy for
some projects in the transfer context.156
There is no legislative history
suggesting that Congress intended the
beneficial use standard of Section 8 to
mean anything other than what that
standard means in the respective western
states. One court has addressed the
question of congressional intent in the
standard. In Alpine /, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that
"While there were provisions of federal
law which were intended to displace state
law ... beneficial use itself was intended
to be governed by state law."157 In this
case the court affirmed a district court de
novo determination of beneficial use
within the Newlands Project under
circumstances in which the court had
declined to be bound by a Nevada statute




However, the court found that the statute
may never have applied to Newlands
irrigators and, in any event, had been
repealed. Thus, the Court of Appeals held
that the District Court was authorized to
depart from the Nevada statute and to make
a de novo determination even in the face of
the fact that Congress had intended
"beneficial use" in Section 8 to be governed
by state law. Had Nevada had a "special rule
of law" that applied to the Newlands
irrigators, the court implied, it would have
been proper to have applied that law in the
implementation of the Section 8 standard.158
While most western states are clear as to
what kinds of uses constitute "beneficial use,"
many states have not defined with precision
the quantities of water that can be said to be
"beneficially used" in each of these uses.
Where there are gaps in the definition of
"beneficial use" in state law, the bureau will
have a role in providing definition to the
term in furtherance of the Section 8 standard.
The circuit court opinions in both Alpine I
and Alpine IP* make it clear that this role is
not only authorized under Section 10 of the
Reclamation Act but that the Bureau cannot
avoid exercising it if state law is silent on a
particular aspect of beneficial use.
Reclamation Reform Act
Another set of potential problems for
transfers of project water relates to
application of the Reclamation Reform Act
of 1982.160 The RRA was intended to
modernize the ownership restrictions of
reclamation law as well as to apply new,
higher repayment requirements to certain
classes of growers that are triggered by
contract amendments. The RRA does not
directly address transfers. However, it may
act as a disincentive to a transfer where the
transfer requires an amendment to a contract.
Under the RRA, contractors may
elect to avail themselves of more liberal
land ownership restrictions than those
appearing in the Reclamation Act,161 but,
if they do, they must pay charges for
project water that recoup, at a minimum,
full O&M costs for landholdings less than
960 acres and "full cost" (capital, interest
and O&M) for holdings in excess of 960
acres.162 These rates apply automatically
after any water service or repayment
contract is renewed.10 In addition, upon
a contract amendment for any purpose
which enables a contractor to receive
"supplemental or additional benefits," the
RRA requires payment of full O&M costs
for all project water as a minimum.164
Thus, if a transfer prior to contract
renewal requires a contract amendment
and that amendment is deemed to
constitute a "supplemental or additional
benefit," growers who have not been
reimbursing the United States for O&M
costs-and the case studies show that
some growers, particularly in the CVP,
fall into this category-will have to pay
charges equal to at least such costs on all
project water, not just that which is
transferred.
The degree to which these provisions
of the RRA are a disincentive to a
transfer depends on several factors,
including if and when a contractor's
contract is to be renewed (and, thus, cost
of service charges apply anyway), whether
the contractor or individual growers
within the contractor's service area have
already elected to begin to pay full O&M
costs, and how far apart full O&M rates
and cost of service rates are from
contract-based charges.165 For example,
many Bureau contracts in the CVP
executed for the purpose of providing
water for irrigation uses only would need
amendment to permit transfers to M&I
uses. The question is whether these
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amendments would constitute a ''supplemental
or additional benefit" On this matter,
Bureau regulations state as follows:
All contract amendments will be
construed as providing supplemental
or additional benefits except those
amendments which do not require the
United States to expend significant
funds, to commit significant additional
water supplies, or to substantially
modify contract payments due the
United States.166
Under irrigation-only contracts, transfer could
occur by one of two means: (1) by amending
the irrigation contract to include M&I uses,
or (2) by reducing the irrigation deliveries
under the original contract and simultaneously
executing a new contract with the M&I
purchaser of water.167 The Bureau has not
made clear the conditions under which it will
consider such amendments as conferring
supplemental or additional benefits,
particularly if profit is allowed in the
transfer.168
A policy which construed contract
amendments to permit transfers (such as
those in category (1) above and in category
(2) when profit was allowed) as providing
supplemental or additional benefits would
clearly discourage transfers. On the other
hand, this section of the RRA was aimed at
getting districts to pay water rates that
covered at least the government's O&M costs
for delivering the water. The Bureau will
have to weigh the conflicting goals of cost
recovery and promoting more efficient water
use in administering the RRA regulations.
At a minimum, the Department should
consider clarifying its policy and, potentially,
revising its RRA regulations as well.
Bureau regulations also provide that
transfers of water on an annual basis from
one contractor-district to another will not be
considered to provide supplemental or
additional benefits provided that:
(1) both districts have contracts
with the United States, (2) the
rate paid by the district receiving
the transferred water is the higher
of the applicable water rate(s) for
either district, and provided that
the rate paid does not result in
any increased operating losses to
the United States above those
which would have existed in the
absence of the transfer and the
rate paid does not result in any
decrease in capital repayment to
the Untied States below that
which would have existed in the
absence of the transfer, and (3)
the recipients of the transferred
water pay a rate for the water
which is at least equal to the
actual O&M costs or the full-cost
rate in those cases where, for
whatever reason, the recipients
would have been subject to such
costs had the water not been
considered transferred water.1®
Thus, under certain circumstances,
transfers between contractors (which may
include a new M&I contractor)
implemented on an annual basis will not
be construed to be a "supplemental or
additional benefit1*
These regulations were written,
however, prior to the time that the
Department adopted a policy in which
profit was to be allowed on transfers.
Therefore, it is not clear whether allowing
profit would be considered a
"supplemental or additional benefit."
Also, regardless of the content of the
RRA-related regulations on contract
amendments, the Bureau can otherwise
subject transfers requiring contract
■\
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changes to repayment and other requirements
as a matter of administrative policy.
Bureau regulations also state that:
Acquisition of irrigation water from
federally financed facilities by
exchange shall not subject the users of
such water to Federal Reclamation
law and these regulations if no
material benefit results from the
exchange, to the recipient from the
federally financed facilities.170
This regulation is designed to avoid
discouraging the transfer of project water by
exchange, rather than a one-way transfer, by
providing that an entity receiving water by
exchange will hot be subject to the land and
other restrictions of reclamation law. The
problem with this regulation is that it is hard
to see why an entity would execute an
exchange agreement for project water if it did
not perceive that it would receive "material
benefits'1 from the exchange.
Finally, the regulations also provide that
the Secretary can designate other contract
amendments as exceptions to the
"supplemental or additional benefit" rule.171
Summary
Federal legal interests in transfers are
most clearly implicated by transfers requiring
some change in the contract arrangement
involving the use of federal reclamation
facilities. In particular, transfers for water
uses not originally contemplated may require
federal approval. Transfers affecting project
operations are likely to require federal
approval. Certainly, transfers requiring
modification or addition to facilities will
require approval The federal interest is in
protecting and maintaining the viability of the
facilities which it has built and continues to
own. In addition, the U.S. has an interest in
assuring that it can continue to fulfill
contract commitments it has made to
users who are helping to pay for the
facilities.
While there is some uncertainty with
respect to water service contracts, it
appears that users receiving water under
contract from reclamation facilities hold a
water right under state law. The
transferability of that water right should
be governed by state law. Of course,
these rights are subject to contracts with
the U.S. which may place limitations on
transfers. As discussed, these limitations
have to do with the federal interests in
the project and not in the users' water
rights themselves. The need to better
define the federal role in transfers led to
the 1988 Principles statement by the
Department of the Interior and the
subsequent Bureau Criteria and Guidance
-- the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: Existing Federal Transfer
Policy and Guidelines
Section 1: Content of the Department's
Water Transfer Policy
Although the Bureau of Reclamation had,
from time to time, approved voluntary water
transfers before 1988, the federal
government's principal administrative actions
regarding transfers are the issuance of the
Department's December 1988 Principles and
the adoption of the Bureau of Reclamation's
Criteria and Guidance, issued in March 1989
(reproduced in Appendices I and II
respectively to this report). For convenience,
we refer to these documents collectively as
the Department's water transfer policy or the
Bureau's water transfer policy. These policy-
related statements, issued in response to the
growing interest in the Western states in
water transfers and in response to reports and
resolutions issued by the Western Governors'
Association in 1986 and 1987, represent major
steps in facilitating transfers of Bureau-
supplied water.
This chapter is intended to provide an
overall assessment of the administrative
actions of the Bureau of Reclamation related
to water transfers. First we address the
general content of the Bureau's water transfer
policy and some questions that have been
raised about it, proceeding from the most
general to the more specific. This discussion
includes a number of recommendations for
clarifications or extensions of the principles,
criteria, and guidance (e.g., clarification of
repayment terms applicable when water is
transferred from irrigation to municipal and
industrial use).172 An assessment of the
success of the policy should necessarily
consider not only the documents themselves,
but the Bureau's track record in implementing
the policies contained therein, which is the
topic of the final section of this chapter.
The Department's water transfer
policy acknowledges that transactions
involving water rights and water supplies
are increasing in frequency in the West
and that the federal government, as
owner of Bureau of Reclamation facilities,
can assist in meeting local or regional
water needs through voluntary transfers.
The policy indicates that the federal
government will adopt a role of trying to
facilitate voluntary transfers involving
federal facilities, provided certain basic
conditions are met. Among these
conditions are that: (1) the transfer must
be in compliance with applicable state and
federal law, (2) there are no adverse
third-party consequences (or any adverse
consequences must have been mitigated
to the satisfaction of the affected parties),
and (3) the transfer does not adversely
affect project operations, contractual
obligations, and financial returns to the
U.S. The policy also indicates that the
Department will work with appropriate
authorities to mitigate any adverse
environmental effects of a proposed
transfer. Although the policy does not
explicitly use the term "profit" or
"economic incentive," it does state that
the Department of the Interior will
refrain from burdening the transaction
with additional costs, fees, or charges,
except those actually incurred in
implementing a transfer. The policy also
notes that, even on federal projects,
changes in type or location of use must
be accomplished under state law
procedures governing water rights. In
fact, the policy emphasizes that "primacy
in water allocation and management
decisions rests principally with the States."
The general stance taken in the policy is
one of a facilitator of transfers proposed
by other parties, rather than as an
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initiator of transfers, although some
exceptions are specified in the policy: when
a transaction would be part of an Indian
water rights settlement or other water rights
controversy or when the acquisition of water
rights would substitute for some other
expenditure of federal funds.
The Bureau of Reclamation Guidance
provided some additional detail and
clarification for each of the principles
established in the Department's policies (refer
to Appendix II to this report). For example,
the Guidance mention the authority of the
Warren Act for providing storage and transfer
of nonfederally supplied water for irrigation,
and the authority of the Reclamation Project
Act of 1939 for storage and transfer of water
for M&I purposes. In particular, the
guidance document provides clarification on
the financial terms and economic incentives
for transfers.
We believe that the basic concepts behind
the Department's water transfer policy are
essentially sound-facilitating voluntary
transfers related to federal facilities, providing
an income incentive, relying on the
underpinnings of state water law, providing
for protection of third-party impacts, and
assuring appropriate compliance with the
National Environment Policy Act.
Furthermore, a number of outside parties,
such as the Western Governors' Association
and the Western States Water Council, were
involved either directly or indirectly in the
development of the policy, and so there is a
wide degree of understanding of its basic
thrust
Section 2: Some Issues
As noted elsewhere in this report and its
appendices, however, there are a number of
questions that have persisted since the
issuance of the policy that deserve
clarification, either by changes in wording in
the policy itself or by providing more
detail in the supplementary guidelines.
The lack of clarity on these points has
meant both that members of the public
that might be interested in transferring
water are unclear as to the Bureau's
intentions and that staff of Bureau of
Reclamation offices themselves are
unclear as to the contents of the policy
and/or are unwilling to implement it.
Among the most persistent general
questions asked and the principal
uncertainties are the following.
Is the policy still in effect?
The Department of the Interior has
not issued or intended any retraction of
its principles. Likewise, the Bureau of
Reclamation's administrative guidelines,
issued through a memorandum from the
Commissioner's office, remain in force.
Moreover, in a 1990 conference speech,
the Department of the Interior's Assistant
Secretary for Water and Science, John
Sayre, specifically indicated that the 1988
and 1989 policies remain in effect.173
Given that there has been some
uncertainty within the Bureau on the
continuing applicability of the water
transfer policy, the Bureau could do more
to communicate with and train its own
staff on the new policy (see section on
implementation, below).
Does the policy allow increased
income or "profit"?
Principle 6 states that
Unless required explicitly by
existing law, contracts, or
regulations, DOI will refrain from
burdening the transaction with
additional costs, fees or charges,
except for those costs actually
incurred by DOI in performance
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of its functions in a particular
transaction.174
This principle indicates that the Department
would not seek to "tax" the "profit" from a
transaction. Nevertheless, the Principles have
been criticized as being unnecessarily vague
on the profit issue. For example, some have
pointed out that whereas Principle 6 indicates
that no additional charges will be imposed by.
the Department, it does not explicitly say that
the profit between the seller and the
purchaser is allowable - though such an
inference could be drawn from the rest of
the document175
The Bureau of Reclamation's Criteria and
Guidance issued in March 1989 to "assist in
the implementation of the December 16,
1988, Principles" contains what are perhaps
clearer statements regarding the profit
question. For example, the guidance under
Principle 5 includes the statement that "the
fact that [the water] was developed by virtue
of a subsidized Federal project or program
should not, in and of itself, be a barrier to
the transaction." More specifically, the
criterion under Principle 6 states that "the
financial terms negotiated between entities do
not concern the Department of the Interior."
Additional guidance is provided that "to the
maximum extent possible, financial or
economic disincentives to the transfer or
exchange are to be avoided . . . The
disincentives to be avoided can be
characterized as charging a percentage of any
'profit' that might be envisioned as the
difference between appropriate costs, and the
market value of the water." Taken in
concert, these documents appear to make
clear that the Bureau of Reclamation will
allow profit between transferring parties.
Assistant Secretary Sayre provided
additional confirmation of this interpretation
of the Department of the Interior's policy on
profit from water transfers in his conference
presentation, mentioned above: "A ...
question often asked about Interior's
water transfer policy is 'Does the policy
allow profit to trading parties?' The
answer is yes, it does, provided the
appropriate Federal costs are paid." His
subsequent elaboration on this point
reaffirms the clarifications contained in
the Bureau of Reclamation's May 1989
Guidance document and reiterates that
the Bureau of Reclamation
will not impose any additional
costs on the transfer beyond the
following: (1) those already
required by Reclamation law -
such as the removal of the
interest subsidy when water is
transferred from irrigation to
municipal and industrial use; and
(2) any new costs imposed by
implementing the transfer, such as
additional pumping or conveyance
costs incurred because the water
is delivered to a new location.
The "profits" issue is a complicated
one. The U.S. built reclamation facilities
using general tax revenues. The direct
beneficiaries of these facilities, especially
irrigators, have returned only a fraction
of the real cost of these facilities to the
U.S. Treasury. There is understandable
concern about allowing those who have
enjoyed substantial subsidized benefits
from these facilities to further benefit
from transfer of water the facilities
provide.
Yet it is widely recognized that
financial incentives will be essential to
induce transfers in many, perhaps most,
situations. Therefore, those who believe
transfers are a valuable means of meeting
changing water needs in the western





If profits are to be permitted, should
there nevertheless be some kind of tax
imposed - either on the dollars earned or on
the water transferred? Congress, in fact, is
considering such a tax in connection with
transfers from the Central Valley Project.
Senate bill 484, The Central Valley
Improvement Act, proposes that 25 percent
of the "net proceeds'* from any transfer shall
go into a "Central Valley Project Restoration
Fund," to be used for mitigating the adverse
effects of the CVP on fish and wildlife
resources. Alternatively, 25 percent of the
water to be transferred may be dedicated to
fish and wildlife purposes.176
The July 1987 report of the Western
Governors* Association (WGA), Water
Efficiency: Opportunities for Action, discusses
the profit question in some detail. It
examines various options for imposing
additional taxes on the transfer of federally
supplied water, including a fixed percentage
of the sale price, a fixed percentage of the
increase in the value of the water, a fixed
rate per acre-foot, taxing a transfer only
where the gain is large (exceeding some
threshold amount), reallocating project costs
based on the transfer, and imposing a
municipal and industrial (M&I) rate on water
transferred from irrigation to M&I use. The
report rejects most of these options as either
too cumbersome to implement or as unduly
restricting transfers.
Fees that are based on a percentage of
net income, while economically efficient in
concept, may be impractical to implement
because of the difficulty of obtaining all the
data to make the net income determination.
In addition, collecting such data is likely to
result in a good deal of government
intervention into the financial matters of the
negotiating parties. As a result, the WGA
report recommended adoption of a policy
under which the M&I rate is charged for
transfer of water from irrigation to M&I use
and study of whether the use of cost
reallocation is feasible.
In Markets for Federal Water, Richard
Wahl examines some of the same options
and reaches a similar conclusion.
Furthermore, he notes that the "financial
gains and losses [from water transfers] are
subject to normal tax treatment through
income and capital gains taxation" and
that the
transactions that • are likely to
involve the greatest income gains -
transfers of water from irrigation
uses to municipal and industrial
use — would be subject to one
direct form of surcharge by
[Reclamation law]: the payment
of interest charges and the
removal of "ability to pay"
limitations.177
Wahl also notes that a good deal of the
income gain associated with the federal
water supply was granted through the
original Bureau contract for irrigation use,
rather than from the potential to transfer
water. He also cautions that
additional income arising because
water can be transferred to new
uses is probably not directly
attributable to the original federal
subsidy, but rather to population
growth or the siting of power
plants or other water-using
facilities.... Once one accepts that
the value of water in an irrigation
use has already resulted in an
income gain to the original owner,
then there is little basis for
distinguishing between federally
developed and privately developed




In summary, these analyses indicate that
there are already two legislated forms of
"taxation" on water transfers - (1) income and
capital gains taxes on those that ultimately
benefit and (2) an increase in rates paid to
the Bureau for transfers from irrigation to
M&I or hydropower use, which are likely to
be the transfers with the greatest income
gains. The forgoing discussion also indicates
that if there were to be any additional tax
levied on water transfers, it would be
desirable for it to be small (e.g. a small flat
fee per acre-foot, such as $5 per acre-foot or
less, or a small percentage of the sale price,
say less than 5%), so as not to discourage
agricultural-to-agricultural transactions.
In an appendix to this chapter we review
a number of transfer examples in relation to
the profits issue. Most but not all of the
examples are from our case studies.
Generally, with the important exception of
the Central Valley Project, these examples
indicate that the Bureau has allowed profits
to be included or, at least, has not prevented
such profits.
In addition to the general question of
whether profit is allowed on transactions,
there are several specific questions as to what
formulas the Department would apply in
assessing its charges on water converted from
irrigation to M&I use.
What formula wfll be used for the rates
charged on transfers from irrigation to
municipal and industrial or hydropower
uses?
As a matter of reclamation law, when
water becomes used for M&I or hydropower
purposes instead of irrigation purposes, the
interest-free repayment and ability-to-pay
subsidies (use of power revenues to pay
irrigation costs beyond the irrigator's
estimated ability to pay) no longer apply.
This requirement is reiterated in the Bureau's
criterion under Principle 6 that:
"Repayment subsidies of the original use
are not transferable to different types of
use." Still, there is considerable latitude
as to how the Bureau of Reclamation
might treat this basic requirement in the
context of water transfers. Would it
charge interest only from the date of the
transfer, or would it also try to recoup
past interest (between the time the
project was constructed and the date of
the transfer)? What interest rate would
the Bureau of Reclamation use -
historical rates applicable when project
repayment was established, or current
government borrowing rates, which are
probably considerably higher? Would the
M&I users be expected to pay a rate
based solely upon a pro rata share of the
remaining contractual obligation of the
irrigation district, or upon the pro rata
share of the possibly larger irrigation
allocation (in other words, would power
users be relieved of their obligation to
pay irrigation costs for that portion of the
water transferred from irrigation use)?
Answers to these questions would
appear important in the water transfer
context for two reasons. First, given the
number of factors that could vary, the
charges payable by M&I purchasers could
differ widely if all of these terms were left
up to negotiation on a case-by-case basis.
Second, markets operate more efficiently
when prices are known. Therefore, in
order to facilitate the transfer process, it
would be desirable for the Bureau to
make the M&I rates known (or at least
the procedures for calculating them),
rather than leaving all of these terms
open to negotiation on a case-by-case
basis. This is especially true where the
increases in dollar values from transferring
water are expected to be small, such as in
some agriculture-to-agriculture transfers.
In these cases, the interested parties may
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not be willing or able to spend much time or
expense in negotiating prices with the Bureau
of Reclamation.
The Bureau of Reclamation Criteria and
Guidance on water transfers appear to answer
..many of the above questions on financial
terms, but to leave some open. The Bureau's
guidance under Principle 6 indicates that "a
change in use from irrigation to municipal
and industrial purpose would require a
change in the repayment of costs to include
interest during construction and interest on
:^the investment, but only for the remaining
-years in the payout period." One can infer
from this guidance that interest charges will
.. not accrue for the time period before the
water is converted to M&I use (except for
the construction period). This interpretation
is confirmed by point 2 of the guidance under
Principle 6: "It is not the intent of this water
transfer policy to recover subsidies originally
allocated to that block of transferred water
during the time it served the irrigation
purpose." Second, one can infer that since
the subsidies of the original use are not
transferable to the new use, the M&I costs
would be based not just upon the irrigator's
contractual obligation, but upon a pro rata
share of the unpaid costs allocated to
irrigation (this can be a much larger amount
on projects where hydropower revenues are
scheduled to assist in repaying irrigation
construction costs). Additional guidance
, under point 2 of Principle 6 confirms this
.interpretation: "Any repayment of principal
,. above the level that would have been repaid
by the irrigators (i.e., the power assistance
amount) should be reflected in a reduction in
the amount to be repaid through power
:.. assistance."179 Also, these same provisions of
the Guidance indicate that interest charges
would be amortized over the project's
^.remaining repayment period, which would
exclude amortization over longer periods.
Discussions with Bureau personnel
indicate that these provisions in the
Guidance are consistent with reclamation
law and prior practice. For example,
project costs are normally repayable
within a fifty-year period of a project's
inservice date.180 In any event, because
transferred water is water already under
contract, the project's repayment period
would normally have been previously
established.181 Therefore, the costs of any
water transferred to M&I use would have
to be paid by the already established
payout date.
Second, not charging for interest
forgone while water was in irrigation use
is an established practice. Procedures for
calculating M&I rates are well-established
on large projects where reallocation of
water from irrigation use to municipal and
industrial use was contemplated in the
original contracts, such as the Central
Valley Project in California and the
Central Arizona Project182 For example,
in the Central Arizona Project, it was
foreseen that a substantial portion of the
project's irrigation water supply would
eventually be used for municipal use by
Arizona's growing urban areas. The
Bureau of Reclamation's procedure for
modifying the repayment due for M&I
use is based on the outstanding capital
balance - there are no charges for
interest forgone. Similarly, in the Central
Valley Project in California, several
contracts allow water districts to take
water as either irrigation or municipal and
industrial water. The procedure for
calculating water rates for each end-use
utilizes the unpaid balance of costs
allocated to that function and the
projected number of acre-feet of future
deliveries. Therefore, the procedure does
not result in any charges for interest
forgone.183 On these two projects,
transfers of small amounts of water from
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irrigation to M&I use would have a nearly
imperceptible effect on the project's
established M&I rate. Therefore, for small
transfers or temporary transfers, the existing,
project M&I rates would probably be used.
For permanent transfers involving larger
amounts of water, an appropriate reallocation
of costs from irrigation to M&I use would
likely take place. This is consistent with
established procedures in these two projects
that, at periodic intervals, water supply costs
and projected deliveries are redetermined for
irrigation and municipal and industrial use.
The new allocations and projected deliveries
are then used to determine the new water
rates.
The Criteria and Guidance documents are
less explicit on guidance as to precisely what
interest rates will be used when irrigation
water is transferred to municipal and
industrial use or on precisely how the interest
charges will be calculated on that part of the
capital cost previously assigned for repayment
from hydropower revenues. Guidance under
point 2 of Principle 6 indicates that n[a]
current repayment interest rate for the
interest bearing obligations will be utilized,
unless otherwise provided by law." The
meaning of "current repayment interest rate"
is not entirely clear. It could be interpreted
as the current cost of government borrowing,
but, outside of the RRA formula for "full
cost," that rate is seldom used for repayment
For example, repayment rates for municipal
and industrial water in the Central Valley
Project are based on a weighted average of
project interest rates during the years of
construction. This may well be the meaning
of "current repayment interest rate." On
projects where M&I water was not being
delivered, there may not be any "repayment
interest rate" in existence.
The Upper Colorado Regional Office of
the Bureau of Reclamation (headquartered in
Salt Lake City, Utah) is one that has devoted
attention to several of these repayment
questions and has used a wide range of
formulas for determining interest charges
and payments due on conversions of
water from irrigation to municipal and
industrial use. Examining some of the
cases in this region illustrates the range of
possible methods and their financial
implications.
In the 1987 transfer between
irrigation districts in the Emery County
Project and the Utah Power and Light
Company, the Bureau used a "debt-
servicing" concept to calculate the charge
for irrigation water converted to
municipal and industrial use. Under this
approach, the Bureau charged interest on
the irrigation allocation from the date of
project construction up to the date of the
transfer (a practice that would not be
undertaken under the current water
transfer guidelines). As might be
expected, interest computations extending
over a long time period resulted in
relatively high water charges. The charge
to Utah Power and Light was $2.9 million
for about 2,600 acre-feet of water
transferred, equivalent to about $1,115
per acre-foot as a one-time charge or
about $99 per acre-foot annually
(amortized at an interest rate of 8% for
30 years). This charge was considerably
higher than the annual rate of $20 per
acre-foot paid to the Bureau in the
earlier 1972 transfer between the same
parties.184
The interest rates used in the debt-
servicing calculation in 1987 were the
Treasury borrowing rates applicable each
year, but, interestingly enough, the
interest charges were hot compounded.
The Bureau performed an alternative
calculation using compounding, which
resulted in an outstanding balance of $4.9
million, some 70% more than the $2.9
40
million that resulted when simple interest was
used. When the $4.9 million figure was
presented in negotiations with Utah Power
and Light, the utility threatened to abandon
the transaction. In other words, the charges
in this case were more the result of
negotiation than a fixed method of
calculation. The difference between the two
values also indicates that even slight changes
in methodology can lead to large differences
in the amounts to be charged for conversion
to municipal and industrial use.
The debt-servicing concept resulted from
a Reagan Administration initiative to seek
greater levels of cost recovery for government
services. Subsequent events in the Upper
Colorado Region indicate that Bureau of
Reclamation policy there on the charges for
converting water to M&I use has changed.
The region has returned to charging for
conversions under the "rollover11 concept used
in the 1972 Emery County exchange. Under
this concept, no interest is charged from the
project's inservice date to the date of the
transfer (consistent with the current water
transfer guidelines). Interest is charged after
the transfer at the project's authorized
interest rate. Also, as is standard
Reclamation practice, interest charges during
the construction period (which are excluded
from irrigation repayment) are considered
part of the construction costs upon
reallocation to M&I use.
The rollover concept was also applied to
recent reallocations of San Juan Chama
project water from irrigation to mumcipal and
industrial use:
In the [San Juan Chama Project case],
interest on investment does not accrue
on the reimbursable obligation during
the period from completion of
construction until it is contracted for
as M&I water. This determination is
based on the fact that the water in
storage was intended for irrigation
units, which subsequently proved
to be infeasible and which were
dropped from the construction
program. . . . The water
allocated to those irrigation units
was made available for municipal
use.185
In this case, water was initially allocated
to irrigation, but it had never been placed
under contract.
Conversion formulas based on this
same basic approach are incorporated into
the Definite Plan Reports for the Dolores
and the Dallas Creek Divide Projects.186
There is, however, one difference
between the rollover formula applied in
(1) the San Juan Chama case and (2) the
Definite Plan Reports for the Dolores and
Dallas Creek Divide Projects [hereinafter
formulas S and D, respectively]. In
formula D, the calculation is performed
by amortizing the unpaid capital amounts
existing as of the project's inservice date,
resulting in a per-acre-foot amount which
remains fixed over the life of the
project187 By contrast, the per-acre-foot
charge under formula S generally depends
upon the year in which the conversion
takes place, with the charge increasing
each year until the end of the repayment
period. This can be explained by the
different way that each method handles
power assistance on the project (i.e., that
portion of power revenues which are used
to pay irrigation costs above the
irrigators' ability to pay).188 Normally
power revenues are applied to irrigation
repayment in the final years of
repayment Under formula S, the power
assistance per acre-foot remains as a fixed
amount in the unpaid balance. As a
result, conversion to M&I use later in the
project's repayment period means that the
fixed amount must be repaid over a
41
shorter time period (by the new M&I water
users), resulting in higher charges per acre-
foot In other words, because formula S is
based on the unpaid irrigation allocation, it
places the entire burden of the unpaid power
assistance on the new M&I users. In
contrast, formula D makes M&I users
responsible for power assistance only for
those years that water is in M&I status. For
example, if water is converted from irrigation
use to M&I use in year 30 of a 40-year
repayment period, then three-quarters of the
original power assistance is still paid from
hydropower revenues, but M&I users become
obligated to pick up the remaining one-
quarter.
These cases from the Upper Colorado
Region illustrate the variability in charges that
can result from different formulas for
converting water from irrigation to M&I use.
However, they also support our previous
observation that the provisions of general
Reclamation law fairly well circumscribe the
rate that will be charged. In particular, there
is a strong basis in Reclamation law and
practice for basing the charges on the costs
allocated to irrigation (rather than just the
remaining balance in the irrigation contract),
incorporating interest during construction, and
amortizing the unpaid balance over the
remaining repayment period at the project
interest rate. This discussion also indicates
that, in the future, the Bureau would not
charge interest between the project's inservice
date and the date water is converted to M&I
use.
To summarize this discussion, there are
already precedents in Reclamation policy and
procedure for basing the repayment formula
for water transferred to M&I use on the cost
allocated to irrigation and on the existing
repayment period. The Bureau's water
transfer policy appears to follow these
precedents. The interest rates that would be
utilized for conversions to M&I water are
already established on large projects, such
as the Central Valley Project in California
and the Central Arizona Project.
However, on smaller projects the interest
rates that would be utilized may not be
clear to prospective M&I purchasers. We
recommend that the Bureau clarify the
interest rate determination either through
establishing a Bureau-wide procedure in
an addendum to its transfer guidelines or
by requiring that regional or project
offices make a determination of the
interest rates to be used and make this
information available to interested parties.
A still better alternative would be for the
Bureau to make available in each region
a schedule, by project, of the water rates
that would apply to transfers of irrigation
water to municipal and industrial or
hydropower use. This requirement would
not necessarily have to cover all Bureau
projects, but should apply to all of those
where transfers are occurring or are likely
to occur.
With regard to calculating interest
charges on irrigation capital costs formerly
designated for repayment from
hydropower revenues (irrigation
assistance), we believe that the formula
adopted in the Definite Plan Reports for
the Dolores and Dallas Creek Divide
Projects for conversion from irrigation to
M&I use (formula D) has merit and
should be considered for wider adoption
by the Bureau.1* As noted, formula D
prorates the amount of power assistance
that M&I users must assume based upon
the years of M&I use, thereby resulting in
a charge for M&I conversions that does
not vary each year. Not only does this
approach appear equitable, but it also
results in a procedure that is more easily
communicated to outside parties (since
the conversion rates do not change each
year). Also, as explained in the next





impact of the anomaly posed by conversions
of water to M&I use near the end of the
irrigation repayment period.
What payments would be required for
water transferred from an irrigation
district when the district's contractual
obligations have been paid, or when they
will be paid within the near future?
One additional question is what payment
conditions would apply to conversion of
irrigation water to municipal and industrial
use (or hydropower use) at or the end of the
project repayment period For example, if an
irrigation district's contractual obligation was
fully paid and it desired to transfer water to
municipal and industrial use, would additional
revenues be due to U.S? Secondly, would
different conditions, such as prepayment, be
allowed in the case of an irrigation-to-M&I
transfer taking place shortly before payout?
Would the Bureau of Reclamation allow M&I
entities to amortize any additional payments
required over a period extending beyond the
end of the original repayment period? Policy
clarification in this area is important given the
large number of projects that are nearing
completion of their repayment periods.
Although the Bureau Criteria and
Guidance are not explicit on these questions,
one can infer from the guidance under
Principle 6 (cited above) that the full balance
of capital costs must be repaid by the end of
the already established repayment period, no
matter how close to the end of that period
the conversion took place. Discussions with
Bureau personnel indicate that this
interpretation would be consistent with
standard Bureau of Reclamation practice. As
noted in the previous section, the principles
guiding project repayment are that irrigation,
municipal and industrial, and hydropower
payment must be made within 50 years of the
project's inservice date. Therefore, the
repayment for other project water uses,
including any crediting of hydropower
revenues to irrigation repayment, would
normally be simultaneous with the
completion of irrigation repayment.
Correspondingly, there is no basis for
assessing additional construction charges
on irrigation water transferred to M&I
use after the project's established
repayment period-the project completed
its repayment obligation while functioning
as authorized by Congress.
Some might make a counterargument
that some of the water has now changed
use to municipal and industrial use and
that even after the standard repayment
period is complete, the federal
government should recoup interest
charges forgone. However, it is unlikely
that the Bureau would institute such a
policy since, as discussed in the preceding
section, there is substantial precedent in
existing administrative practice and law
for not charging for past interest.
A related question concerns the
precise repayment provisions that might
apply when an irrigation district transfers
water to municipal and industrial use
shortly before (say within one to five
years) before the irrigation district's
contractual obligation is scheduled to be
completed. Under the Bureau's
Guidance, a pro rata share of the
district's unpaid contract balance, as well
as a portion of scheduled power
assistance (see discussion of formulas D
and S in the previous section), would
become due within a relatively short time
period. The unpaid balance on the
irrigation contract would be relatively
small on an acre-foot basis, even after
interest charges were included. However,
the power assistance could be
considerable, especially if the entire pro
rata share had to be paid by M&I users
(formula S). The fact that it would be
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payable within the original contractual
repayment period could result in a sizable
financial payment due within a relatively short
period of time.
As noted above, under the Bureau's
general contracting authorities and policies,
there is no basis to further extend the
repayment period for the converted water.
Of course, potential purchasers would have
the opportunity to obtain longer-term
borrowing on the private market in order to
finance the water purchase. However,
potential purchasers of the irrigation district
water could avoid these charges completely by
merely waiting until the end of the irrigation
district's repayment period before acquiring
water.
This situation does present a somewhat
unfortunate anomaly in economic incentives.190
Ideally, if an M&I entity needs water, either
for current or projected future use, it would
like to secure tenure over the water without
a waiting period so as to protect against other
purchasers that might also approach the
selling district One possible approach is for
the M&I entity to try to work out an
agreement with the irrigation district that it
will receive water at the end of the district's
repayment period.
Prepayment of irrigation district charges
by an M&I entity, however, appears to be
problematic as a vehicle for securing tenure
of irrigation water at reduced charges. There
does not appear to be any reason why the
federal government should agree to
prepayment of irrigation charges, because, if
the purpose was to transfer water to M&I
use before the end of the irrigation
repayment period, the government would be
forgoing M&I revenues.191
This discussion reveals that the two-tier
rate structure for irrigation and M&I water in
Reclamation law is not an economically
efficient one. In some cases it may affect
the timing of water transfers, delaying a
transfer to M&I use until the lower,
irrigation obligation has been satisfied.
Where such instances arise, they certainly
open up the possibility for negotiation
between the Bureau of Reclamation and
the buying and selling districts. However,
since the Bureau of Reclamation has no
existing authorities for transferring water
to M&I entities at less than an M&I rate,
the result of any negotiations would
require legislation and would receive
Congressional scrutiny.
Does the policy allow transfer to fish
and wildlife and recreational uses and
under what financial terms?
The current Bureau of Reclamation
Criteria and Guidance on water transfers
provide that water can be transferred to
any beneficial use. They also require that
the federal government is to be no worse
off financially after a transfer. For
example, if water is transferred from
irrigation to traditionally nonreimbursable
uses, such as maintenance of fish and
wildlife habitat, then at least the irrigation
rate must be paid. In the words of point
4 of the guidance under Principle 6:
An exchange in which there would
be a change in use from
reimbursable function to a
nonreimbursable function (e.g.,
irrigation to anadromous fishery)
will require special negotiations.
In lieu of special legislation,
specific contractual obligations will
be identified to ensure that
repayment to the Federal
Government after the exchange
will be no less than the conditions
that existed prior to the exchange.
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This rule was adopted in the Guidance for
the sake of simplicity and ease of
administration: it was felt that if a transfer
was to result in a lower total repayment for
a project, it might be necessary to secure
Congressional approval on a case-by-case
basis.
Now that the Bureau's water transfer
policy has been in place for a few years, it is
worth re-examining this aspect of the Bureau
guidance. For one thing, a case can be made
for nonreimbursability of fish and wildlife uses
of water, at least in those cases where it is
difficult to identify a particular group of
beneficiaries. For example, maintenance of
habitat for migratory waterfowl may bring
some benefits in the locale of the habitat
itself, but a significant fraction of the benefits
■ may accrue elsewhere along the flyway. For
this reason, the Bureau could indicate its
willingness to seek Congressional
authorization for allocating conserved or
purchased water to fish and wildlife uses, with
the costs being borne by the general taxpayer.
Such a policy would not rule out cases where
state and local governments or private
organizations, such as duck clubs or fish and
wildlife organizations, would purchase water
from existing uses. Rather, the policy would
be a supplement to state and local actions.192
This policy would provide a role for the
Bureau of Reclamation in seeking out water
conservation and transfer opportunities and
opportunities to devote such water to public
uses of water. Furthermore, such a role for
the Bureau would appear to be consistent
with the new water management emphasis set
forth in the agency's Assessment '87 report.
One of the principal conclusions of the report
was that: "[opportunities to address water
quality and environmental matters should be
included in the reshaping of the Bureau from
a construction orientation to a resource
management orientation."193
We recommend that the Bureau of
Reclamation add a principle to its water
transfer guidelines indicating that in cases
where there are widespread public
benefits from enhancing fish and wildlife
habitat or instream flow, the Bureau will
consider conservation and transfer of
water for these purposes, with the costs
of such activities divided among federal
and non-federal interests in a manner
appropriate to the particular
circumstances.
Section 3: Relationship Between the
Bureau's Water Transfer Policy and
Interpretation of Reclamation Law
Among the principal purposes of the
water transfer policy were (1) to indicate
the Department's willingness to facilitate
beneficial transfers and (2) to clarify the
criteria that the Department would utilize
in reviewing and approving transfers.
However, the Criteria and Guidance fail
to provide direction with regard to
Reclamation law in at least two important
respects.
First, the Criteria and Guidance do
not provide any clarity on the meaning
and application of the various legal
vehicles that may be utilized if a new
contract is necessary for effectuating
transfers. These vehicles include the
Town Sites Act of 1906, the Warren Act
of 1911, the Miscellaneous Purposes Act
of 1920, and the Reclamation Project Act
of 1939.194 A reference to these vehicles,
or a brief summary of each, would be a
useful addendum to the transfer policy.195
In particular, there is a need to state
clearly when a new contract will be
necessary and to define the considerations
that will attach to the contract. The
standard for determining impairment to
existing irrigation purposes of the project
needs to be made more clear.
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Second, the interpretation of the
Department's water transfer Guidance clearly
depends, in some cases, upon the
Department's interpretations of certain
provisions in Reclamation law. A number of
these provisions are discussed in Chapter 2
(e.g., appurtenancy and beneficial use). It is
probably more appropriate to resolve these
legal questions through a detailed Solicitor's
opinion than in the Guidance themselves.
But the lack of legal clarity does reduce the
effectiveness of the Guidance.
Section 4: Implementation of the
Department's Water Transfer Policies
In this section, we take the current
content of the Department's Principles and
the Bureau's Guidance as given and ask
whether the Bureau has done a good job of
putting them into practice. Of course there
may be some linkage between the content of
the policy and its successful implementation.
As suggested above, where details and
interpretation of the policy are unclear, the
potential result is more complicated
implementation, or even a reluctance to
implement. Our general assessment of the
Bureau's implementation of the water transfer
policy presents a mixed picture-the Bureau
has done a good job in many of the cases
examined in this study, but not in all. In all
of the situations we encountered, except the
Central Valley Project (CVP) in California,
Bureau personnel familiar with the transfer
policy appeared willing to implement it, even
though not all of them might personally agree
with it In this sense, the Guidance are
serving their function of standardizing policy
within the organization.
Distribution of Bureau guidelines and
understanding by Bureau personnel
The Bureau's water transfer Guidance was
issued by the Commissioner to all of the
Bureau's Regional Directors in March of
1989. In the course of our case studies,
we generally found that regional staff
dealing with contract and transfer matters
were aware of the policy documents.
However, project offices present a
different picture. Although staff in
project offices were generally aware of
the Department's water transfer
principles, some had not received the
Bureau's Guidance, even though they
were located in geographical areas where
water transfers involving federal projects
were occurring or were under discussion.
We believe this indicates a serious
shortcoming in the Bureau's internal
communications.
To correct this problem, we believe
that the Bureau should make certain that
all of its project offices have received the
Guidance and that contracting personnel
and others that deal with water transfer
matters are familiar with them. In
addition, because the policy is relatively
new, we believe that it would be
appropriate for the Bureau to provide
training and discussion sessions dealing
with the new policy and its
implementation. These sessions could
involve not only explanation of the
policies and pertinent provisions of
Reclamation law, but also discussion of
problems in implementation (refer to the
section below on "ongoing evaluation and
development"). If possible, these training
sessions should involve members of the
Regional and Washington, D.C., Solicitor's
offices, since some of the questions that
arise in implementation are matters of
Reclamation law. It might also be
appropriate to involve local legal experts
to provide insight into state water law and
its interaction with federal law and policy.
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Ongoing evaluation and development
Any policy, no matter how well crafted, is
likely to merit review and further
development. Specific problems in
implementation are likely to arise that were
not evident at the time the policy was first
drafted. For example, the Bureau's policy
documents give no specific guidance as to
what to do in cases where a contractor
desires to transfer water that is under
contract, but that has never been put to
beneficial use (such as in the BMI/Henderson
transfer in Nevada). In some cases, differing
state laws may dictate that the Bureau will
apply different interpretations of its policies
in different states, but to the extent possible
it would be desirable for the Bureau to have
a uniform response to unresolved policy
questions from one region to another.
Therefore, we recommend that the
Bureau hold periodic meetings for review and
future development of its water transfer
policy. These meetings could also serve the
function of sharing experiences from one
region to another. As noted above, it might
be possible to combine this activity with the
training sessions referred to in the previous
recommendation.
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Water rentals in the system of federal
storage reservoirs on the Upper Snake River
in Idaho stretch back to the 1930s and were
explicitly recognized in the Bureau of
Reclamation's contracts with water users.
There is a district-administered cap on the
price that can be charged for selling water
from the bank, but a modest mark-up is
allowed. In 1987, the second of two
transactions between irrigation companies in
the federal Emery County project and the
Utah Power and Light Company was finalized
(an earlier exchange occurred in 1972). This
transaction involved payments of about $600
per acre-foot to individual farmers to acquire
2,576 acre-feet of water and the associated
lands. In the same transfer, the Bureau of
Reclamation received increased payments of
over $1000 per acre-foot for converting the
water contract to municipal and industrial use.
The City of Casper, Wyoming, paid off the
nearby Casper-Alcova Irrigation District's
repayment obligation and is paying for canal
lining on portions of the district's fifty-nine-
mile canal and 190-mile lateral system in
order to reduce seepage. The transaction is
intended to provide the city with 7,000 acre-
feet of water. During the 1976-77 drought in
California, the Bureau of Reclamation
operated a water bank in which some 45,000
acre-feet of water changed hands for total
payments of $2.2 million. Procedures for
administering the bank allowed water users
not only to recover their costs, but also the
value of their lost crop production and
certain other revenues forgone. In the Ft.
Collins area, there is a highly organized
market operating in the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, in which
water from the Colorado Big Thompson
Project is transaction at market value.196
In the Central Valley Project in
California, the Bureau has allowed
transfers, but not at a profit. This policy
is an administrative one in the sense that
the prohibition is not contained in Bureau
contracts with water users. By contrast,
the contracts themselves in the Central
Arizona Project (CAP) place a limit on
the profitability of water transfers. The
principal contract in the CAP is with the
Central Arizona Water Conservancy
District (CAWCD), which in turn
subcontracts with about 70 municipalities
and 20 irrigation districts. Each of the
subcontracts contains a provision under
which water can be transferred, but any
revenues received "in excess of that
[amount] which the subcontractor is
obligated to pay" under its contract with
CAWCD must be paid to CAWCD for
application against CAWCD's contractual
obligation to the U.S. Presumably this
would allow profit after that contractual
obligation is fulfilled, but under the
current arrangements the profit incentive
would be greatly reduced.
More Recent Examples
In the following discussion, we
examine some more recent transfers
where profit was allowed, and some
examples where transactions were
modified, probably for legitimate reasons.
Finally, we look at one project (the
Central Valley Project in California)
where there has been little progress in
implementing the Department's Principles
or the Bureau's guidance.
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Transfers between Imperial Irrigation
District and the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California.
Perhaps the most dramatic recent examples
of water transfers are the agreements reached
between the Imperial Irrigation District and
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California. Imperial diverts about 3 million
acre-feet of Colorado River water annually,
which represents more than 20% of the total
diversions from the river. Both Imperial and
Metropolitan sought to involve the
Department in rendering a legal opinion
against the other dealing with the "profit"
issue. At issue was the price that Imperial
could charge for its conserved water, over and
above the cost of conservation. Although the
Department was in the process of examining
the legal issues, it never did render a formal
opinion, but encouraged the parties to work
out an agreement. In the fall of 1988,
Metropolitan and Imperial reached an
agreement under which Metropolitan will pay
Imperial to fund conservation measures within
the irrigation district with the goal of
salvaging 100,000 acre-feet of water annually
for diversion to Metropolitan's service area.
Metropolitan will pay Imperial $92 million for
construction of the conservation facilities, $3.1
million annually for operation and
maintenance, and $23 million in five annual
installments for indirect costs. These "indirect
costs" could well leave some profit to
Imperial.
Hie 1968 water transfer agreement in the
El Paso area. In November 1988, the El
Paso County Water Improvement District No.
1 entered into an agreement to respond to
the increasing amount of land being
subdivided both inside and outside the city
limits of El Paso. For this purpose a new
authority was created, the El Paso County
Lower Valley Water District Authority, with
the power to sell water outside the El Paso
city limits, as well as to El Paso. This water
transfer agreement is signed by the
irrigation district, the newly created
authority, the city of El Paso, and the
Bureau of Reclamation. Under this
agreement, the Authority will seek
assignment of rights to project water from
individual landowners. The initial term of
the assignments will be for 75 years, and
they will be irrevocable during that term.
The assignments are automatically
renewable after that time, unless notice is
given six months prior to expiration. So
far, the Authority has obtained about
2,400 acres of assignments. Under each
assignment, the owner is relieved of the
responsibility of paying water charges
assessed against the land by the district,
and these become the responsibility of the
authority. Recently, the Authority
initiated a program in which it will also
pay back-taxes on parcels in exchange for
the assignment To date, there have been
no assignments with income gains over
and above the benefits of tax-relief. The
Authority does not have to pay the
Bureau of Reclamation any higher rate
for the water transferred from the
irrigation district because the irrigation
district has already paid off its entire
repayment obligation.
Salt River Settlement In some cases,
the Department is an actual participant in
the market for water rights, particularly in
Indian water rights settlements. The Salt
River Pima Maricopa Indian Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1988 authorized the
Secretary to acquire 22,000 acre-feet of
water from Colorado River contractors
whose contracts predate the Central
Arizona Project. This water is being
purchased on behalf of Phoenix,
Scottsdale, Mesa, Tempe, Glendale,
Chandler, and Gilbert The Wellton-
Mohawk Irrigation District in Arizona
agreed to provide the federal government
with this quantity of water. The water is
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to be obtained by the purchase of 2,000 acres
of land and certain other measures, such as a
reduction in deliveries to other portions of
the district and reduced application rates.
The Bureau intends to pay market value for
the land retired, which would include the
agricultural value of the water. As of March
1991, the Bureau of Reclamation had signed
option contracts for the water and the
municipalities had placed $9 million in escrow
for the Bureau of Reclamation to make the
purchases.197 In addition, the 1988 legislation
provided the district an exemption from the
acreage limitation and "full cost" pricing
provisions of the Reclamation Reform Act of
1982, an exemption which would be of
financial benefit to some owners in the
district.
Proposed Harquahala Irrigation District
buyout Another proposed transfer in
Arizona, also associated with an Indian water
settlement, is the purchase of water deliveries
by the United States from the Harquahala
Irrigation District, southwest of Phoenix,
Arizona. Under the proposal discussed in the
summer of 1990, the U.S. would pay a market
price for reacquiring the Central Arizona
Project water deliveries, and the water would
be permanently reassigned to Indian uses for
settling the water claims of the Ft McDowell
tribe or other tribes in the Phoenix area.198
Reallocation of Water to the Gty of
Henderson, Nevada. The transfer in southern
Nevada between Basic Management,
Incorporated (BMI) and the city of
Henderson, discussed in Chapter 2, is an
example in which the Bureau of Reclamation
modified the original proposal of the
transferring district The Bureau disallowed
BMTs proposed contract for additional water
with Henderson, as well as a request from
BMI to be authorized to purvey its remaining
unused water to other entities in southern
Nevada. In BMI's case, the Bureau did not
believe that allowing an entity to become the
contractor for reselling water never put to
use was consistent with the goals of the
Department's Principles.199 The Bureau
believed that BMI had ample time since
the initiation of its 1969 contract (as had
previous permittees since the initiation of
diversions in 1942) to place its full
entitlement to beneficial use.
However, the Bureau did allow a
reassignment of water to Henderson to
take place. This was accomplished by (1)
reducing the contractual entitlement of
BMI, (2) executing an "assignment and
transfer of entitlement to delivery" from
BMI to Henderson, and (3) executing a
new Bureau contract with Henderson. In
effectuating the assignment, BMI
permanently relinquished any control over
the assigned water, as they had sought
under their original proposal. One of the
benefits to Henderson of the agreement
is that it preserves the 1942 priority date
for the water, based on the original state
permits.
Under the agreements, Henderson
pays about $6 per acre-foot to the Bureau
for the water. The amount paid by the
city to BMI for the assignment and
delivery through the BMI pipeline is $110
per acre-foot, increasing by $10 per acre-
foot for every two years until the year
2000. There is an additional escalator
clause indexed to water rates in Clark
County. These price terms are subject to
renegotiation in 2015. Reportedly, these
financial terms are the same as those in
the original, disallowed sales agreement.200
Depending upon what future
transactions take place, the distinction
between BMI's original request for
subcontracting and the approved
reassignment may be more of form than
of substance. For example, if BMI is
allowed to reassign all of the remaining
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unused water under its contract and to
negotiate its own financial terms for doing so,
then its financial returns may be nearly the
same as if it had been allowed to subcontract
the unused water. Under the reassignment
procedure, however, BMI appears to lose
some control over subsequent use of the
water and payments for it after the term of
the new Reclamation contract with the
transferee. In the case of the Henderson
assignment, though, given that BMI owns the
delivery pipeline, it can have considerable
influence over the new financial terms when
contracts for the reassigned water expire.201
A Special Look at the Central Valley Project
in California
The cases in this study indicate that the
Bureau of Reclamation has been willing to
allow parties to realize some form of income
gains from transfer activities under a wide
variety of circumstances and in many
locations, including southern California.
However the Central Valley Project in
California is a large exception. Traditionally,
the Bureau of Reclamation has allowed
transfers of water between districts in the
project, but only at the current contract rates,
not at a profit302
In May 1990, the Mid-Pacific Regional
Office of the Bureau of Reclamation took
some steps to implement the December 16,
1988, voluntary water transactions policy
directive of the Department of the Interior
and the Commissioner of Reclamation's
March 1989 Criteria and Guidance. It
developed a Draft CVP Water Transfer Policy
Option Paper for discussion with districts
receiving CVP water. The policy option
paper acknowledged that the current transfer
policy of the Mid-Pacific Region was not in
conformance because of the Region's
"restriction on districts transferring water out
receiving more revenues than the costs of the
transaction." The draft also acknowledged
that: "Both the Secretary's policy and new
California water law envision the
permanent transfer of water from one
user and from one function or use to
another and that money, in an amount
sufficient to generate the transfer, would
be exchanged in the transfer process."
The draft went on to propose a policy
under which the Bureau would "not limit
the price a transferring district can charge
for its water supply."
According to regional Bureau of
Reclamation staff, this proposed policy
was not finalized. The draft policy paper
was issued during a drought year and
after the time when most districts had
already made decisions about what crops
they would grow and how they would
allocate their limited supplies of water.
Because of these factors, the districts
asked the Bureau to postpone any further
discussion of the draft policy paper until
the end of the growing season when they
would have more time to consider its
implications. The Bureau agreed to this
request.
In May of 1990, estimates of water
availability in the Sacramento River basin
were revised upward. Under the
agreements about allocation of CVP
water in times of shortage, Sacramento
River water rights contractors stood to
have their supplies increased. It was also
realized that since many of these
contractors had already made their
planting decisions, they might have extra
water available to transfer to other
contractors to reduce the impacts of the
drought. In light of this, on June 8, 1990,
the Bureau issued a set of 1990 Water
Transfer Guidelines, applicable only to
Sacramento River water rights contractors
desiring to transfer water. Although the
guidelines do not state so specifically,
Bureau personnel confirm that they were
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meant to operate under the existing "no
profit" policy.
We know of no other regional office that
has made an attempt to issue guidance
specific to its region. Also to its credit, this
region has allowed a number of transfers,
although not at a profit. The Bureau's
Sacramento staff indicated that they intended
to further revise its May 1990 policy option
document and to discuss it with Bureau
contractors in the winter of 1990/91, possibly
soliciting formal comments before finalizing
the policy. In any event, this means that the
water transfer policy remains unimplemented
in one of the Bureau's major projects more
than two years after the Department issued
its water transfer principles and more than
one and a half years after the Bureau issued
its Guidance memorandum.
We recommend that the Mid-Pacific
regional office carry through with its intention
of finalizing its water transfer policy. We also
recommend that the Commissioner's office
monitor this activity and provide assistance
where needed.
An additional issue concerns the
repayment provisions that would apply to
districts transferring water within the Central
Valley Project (CVP) of California. Bureau
contracts require the permission of the
contracting officer to assign a portion of the
water.203 A unique question arises in the
CVP because many of the current contracts
there fail to cover operation and maintenance
expenses, let alone contribute to the
repayment of capital. Therefore, in granting
permission to transfer water (particularly
transfer at a profit), it would be reasonable
for the Bureau to require that a district bring
its repayment up to current standards.
However, the implications of such a policy
are that even if a district desired to transfer
a small percentage of its water, it might face
a strong disincentive because it would have to
pay higher costs on the water it did not
transfer, as welL
According to the Department of the
Interior's Regional Solicitor in
Sacramento, the Bureau has considerable
discretion as to the conditions it could
impose to secure the approval of the
contracting officer to transfer water. In
establishing a long-term policy, the
Bureau would have discretion to select
one of several pricing options as a
condition to transfer water, including (1)
requiring the transferring district to pay
cost of service (O&M plus capital) on just
the transferred water, (2) requiring the
district to pay operation and maintenance
costs on all of the district's water, or (3)
requiring the district to pay cost of service
on all water supplied to the district. The
rationale for any of these options would
be that if a district is to receive increased
income on water provided at federal
expense, the district should at least be
paying its share of federal expenses.
Option (1) would not provide much of a
disincentive for transfers because the
current cost of service rates are relatively
low, and the value of the transferred
water to the purchaser would likely
exceed this rate. Option (3) could be a
strong disincentive to transfer water. For
example, if a district wanted to transfer
only 2% of its water, it would have to
raise its payments to cost of service on all
of its water. Only a small number of
contractors currently pay cost of service,
although most will have their contracts
renewed at this rates during the 1990s. It
would be a policy judgment by the
Bureau as to whether it believed so
strongly about the need to bring contracts
up to current standards, that it would
impose this restriction. As discussed
above, because of the O&M repayment
requirements of P.L. 99-546, Option (2)
would not impose a strong disincentive.204
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Another alternative would be for the Bureau
to apply a different requirement to cases
where it allowed profit on a transfer. For
example, if a district transferred water at no
profit, then it might be required to pay O&M
costs on all of its water, but if it transferred
'water at a profit, then it might be required to
pay cost of service on all of its contract water
(or on just the transferred water).
Conclusions on Implementation of Bureau
Policy
One would like to know if the issuance of
the Department of the Interior's transfer
policy has made any difference: whether as
a result of the policy, the Bureau of
Reclamation is allowing profit as an incentive
to transfer water and whether the amount of
transfer activity has increased. Unfortunately,
such a before-and-after analysis may not be
so simple. For one, even before the policy
was issued or under development, one can
point to some water transfers where profit
was allowed (discussed above).205 More
importantly, however, starting about three
years before the Department issued its
transfer policy, Departmental officials
indicated in addresses to water marketing
conferences (and elsewhere) their willingness
to facilitate transfers on a case-by-case basis.
Within the Bureau of Reclamation during this
same period, several drafts of the water
transfer Guidance were circulated to the
Regional Directors for comments. Therefore,
Bureau of Reclamation practice in facilitating
water transfers is probably best interpreted as
evolutionary over this period, rather than as
having a distinct change in December of
1988. Furthermore, many water transfers
take some time to negotiate, so it may be
some years before the full impact of the
transfer policy can be observed.
However, as the above cases illustrate,
the implementation the Department's policy
presents a mixed picture. One can point to
many cases where the Bureau of
Reclamation has facilitated transfers and
has allowed increased income, including
cases where the Department has
participated as a purchaser of water to
complete an Indian water settlement.
However, it is not clear that all field
offices of the Bureau understand the
policy well, especially given that some of
the offices visited in this study had not
received the Bureau's own internal
guidelines which clarify some of the
questions commonly raised concerning
"profit" and other matters. Furthermore,
although they have taken some
preparatory steps to do so, the
administrators of the Central Valley
Project, one of the Bureau's major
projects, have not implemented the
transfer policy, even though more than




The federal reclamation system has
developed over a period of nearly 90 years.
A substantial body of statutory law also has
developed during the period in support of the
reclamation program. In a real sense each of
the 189 projects that the U.S. has built
around the West is unique, governed by its
own body of authorizations, contracts,
operating plans, and other arrangements.
The complexity and individuality represented
in this reclamation system make general
recommendations problematic.
Nevertheless, we believe our research
indicates a clear need for actions to be taken
to clarify and improve federal policy and
procedure regarding voluntary transfers of
Bureau-supplied water. The Interior
Department's 1988 Principles statement and
the subsequent Bureau Criteria and Guidance
represent an important first step in this
direction. The following recommendations
call for certain changes and additions to this
policy as well as improvements in its
implementation. Several broader
recommendations are aimed at the
Department of the Interior and at Congress.
Section 1: Bureau of Reclamation
1. Develop criteria for determining when
transfers require a new or amended contract
Involvement by the U.S. in transfers
appears to depend on whether the contract
under which water from federal reclamation
facilities is provided must be amended or
whether a new contract is necessary. The
Bureau should provide general guidance
concerning the factors likely to cause the
need for such contract changes. Factors will
include whether the transfer involves a use of
water not presently authorized in connection
with the facilities and whether the transfer
requires a change in the payment
obligation associated with the use of the
water.
2. Clarify when Congressional
authorization is required for transfers.
Generally the case studies suggest that
the Secretary of the Interior can
authorize new uses of project facilities by
issuing a new contract for the use under
the 1939 Reclamation Project Act or the
1920 Miscellaneous Purposes Act.
However, the first of the Department's
Principles states that Congressional
authorization may be required. There is
no explanation of when Congress must
get involved and when the Secretary may
act under existing authority. We
recommend that the Bureau provide
clarification of the factors that require
Congressional involvement.
3. Clarify the considerations that will
apply in determining whether a proposed
transfer can occur without diminution of
service to existing users of water from a
project
New contracts for uses of water under
the 1920 and 1939 Acts referred to above
may not be issued if they will be
detrimental to water service (1920 Act) or
impair the project's efficiency for
irrigation purposes (the 1939 Act). The
second of the Department's Principles
limits transfers that it will facilitate to
those that will not cause "diminution of
service." Neither the Bureau's Criteria
and Guidance nor the case studies
provide much help in determining the
meaning of these phrases. It appears that
Bureau practice has been to seek
approval of the transactions from the
entity holding the original contract for
water delivery from the project. Such a
de facto policy appears to give the
I
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contractor a veto power over any such
transactions. We recommend that the Bureau
provide clarification concerning what
constitutes diminution of service and what will
be required to insure that such diminution
does not occur.
4. Clarify the formulas to be applied for
changes in payment requirements.
The cases reviewed in our report illustrate
the variability in charges that can result from
different formulas for converting water from
irrigation to M&I use. However, they also
support our observation that the provisions of
general Reclamation law fairly well
circumscribe the rate that will be charged. In
particular, there is a strong basis in
Reclamation law and practice for basing the
charges on the costs allocated to irrigation
(rather than just the remaining balance in the
irrigation contact), incorporating interest
during construction, and amortizing the
unpaid balance over the remaining repayment
period at the project interest rate. This
discussion also indicates that, in the future,
the Bureau would not charge interest
between the project's inservice date and the
date water is converted to M&I use.
We recommend that the Bureau clarify
the interest rate determination either through
establishing a Bureau-wide procedure in an
addendum to its transfer Guidance or by
requiring that regional or project offices make
a determination of the interest rates to be
used and make this information available to
interested parties. An alternative would be
for the Bureau to make available in each
region a schedule, by project, of the water
rates that would apply to transfers of
irrigation water to municipal and industrial
use. This requirement would not necessarily
have to cover all Bureau projects, but should
apply to all of those where transfers are
occurring or are likely to occur.
With regard to calculating interest
charges on irrigation capital costs formerly
designated for repayment from
hydropower revenues (irrigation
assistance), we believe that the formula
adopted in the Definite Plan Reports for
the Dolores and Dallas Creek Divide
Projects For Conversion from Irrigation
to M&I use (formula D) has merit and
should be considered for wider adoption
by the Bureau. As noted, formula D
prorates the amount of power assistance
that M&I users must assume based upon
the years of M&I use, thereby resulting in
a charge for M&I conversions that does
not vary each year. Not only does this
approach appear equitable, but it also
results in a procedure that is more easily
communicated to outside parties (since
the conversion rates do not change each
year).
5. Clarify the formulas to be used for
paid-out projects.
An increasing number of Bureau of
Reclamation projects will be completing
their repayment obligations in the next
two decades. Therefore, it is important
to clarify what formulas are to be used
for transfers on projects that are near the
end of their repayment periods.
Although the Bureau Criteria and
Guidance are not explicit on these
questions, one can infer from the
guidance under Principle 6 that the full,
balance of capital costs must be repaid by
the end of the already established
repayment period, no matter how close to
the end of that period the conversion
took place. Correspondingly, there is no
basis for assessing additional construction
charges on irrigation water transferred to
M&I use after the project's established
repayment period - the project completed
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its repayment obligation while functioning as
authorized by Congress.
6. Clarify the federal role in assessing third-
party effects associated with transfers.
The Department Principles assert broadly
that the Department will facilitate
transactions only when they involve no
adverse third party effects or when third party
issues are addressed in a state forum or are
otherwise mitigated. Beyond effects on other
users of water from the project, it is not clear
what kinds of third party effects are to be
considered. There is a suggestion that these
are effects that would be considered under
the water right transfer process in the state
where the transaction would occur. However,
there is also the suggestion in the Guidance
that there are third party issues as a matter
of federal law or policy. Moreover, the
Principles state that third party effects are to
be mitigated "to the satisfaction of the
affected parties."
Clearly the U.S. has a responsibility to
insure that transfers involving its facilities not
adversely affect others who have a federally
protected interest in the use of these
facilities. This includes those who are
receiving water from the project, those with
legal rights to generate hydroelectricity from
the project, and federally protected
environmental interests. We recommend that
the Bureau provide additional guidance in
identifying these third-party interests and in
establishing standards and procedures for
addressing possible adverse consequences.
The guidance document acknowledges the
need for the Bureau to comply with federal
law including the National Environmental
Policy Act. Beyond this obvious fact, there is
no guidance concerning the federal
requirements that might apply in considering
the environmental effects of proposed
transfers. Do federal considerations apply
only to changes in the facilities that might
be associated with the transfer or do they
extend to the effects of changes in the
water use itself? If they apply to water
use, how do these considerations relate to
state transfer review requirements?
7. Clarify the effect of the Reclamation
Reform Act (RRA) on transfers.
The RRA aims at controlling the use
of water supplied from reclamation
facilities on large farms. Changes in
existing contracts necessitated by transfers
can trigger certain RRA requirements.
Additional guidance is needed to clarify
when the RRA will apply to contract
changes associated with transfers,
particularly concerning the question of
"supplemental or additional benefits."
8. Develop programs aimed at facilitating
transfers to fish and wildlife purposes.
Bureau guidance provides for transfers
to any purpose but requires that the
federal government be "no worse off
financially" as a result. This suggests that
payments associated with Bureau-provided
water which might be transferred from
irrigation to fish and wildlife uses would
have to stay at the same level. In cases
where there are particularized benefits,
interested private or public entities may
be willing to make these payments. In
other situations, especially where the
benefits are more diffuse or general, such
an option may not be available. We
recommend consideration of at least
partly Bureau-funded programs to
facilitate transfers of water to fish and
wildlife purposes. For example, water
saved through conservation activities
within Bureau projects could go to these
uses. As mentioned, Congress is
considering a "tax" on transfers involving
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water from the Central Valley Project to
enhance instream flows.
9. Improve staff awareness and
understanding of federal water transfer policy.
The Department's water transfer policy
has been in place more than two years. Yet
the policy seems not to have imprinted itself
very clearly on the Bureau. We found
Bureau personnel who asked if the policy was
still in effect and had only a vague idea of its
content.
. To this point the Bureau has not given
transfers much attention as a program area.
We believe the Bureau should more actively
embrace its role in water transfers and should
communicate the importance of this role to
its personnel. We further recommend the
use of special training sessions for Bureau
personnel who may be associated with
transfers, especially those in the contracting
area and in field offices.
10. Initiate a process for evaluation and
development of Bureau guidance.
This report suggests a number of areas in
which we believe Bureau guidance concerning
transfers could be improved. We urge the
Bureau to establish a process by which its
guidance document can be reviewed in light
of experience to date and in relation to the
conclusions of this report. In particular, we
believe there would be much value for
Bureau personnel from different regions to
compare approaches and experience in an
effort to develop greater consistency. This
process should provide for ongoing review
and evaluation and a mechanism to make
necessary changes.
Section 2: Department of the Interior
1. Initiate a broad-based review of
existing and potential future uses of
reclamation facilities.
Reclamation facilities provide
opportunities across the West to meet
emerging water needs. We recommend
that the Department initiate a study of
the existing uses of these facilities and
opportunities for meeting present
commitments while making water available
for additional uses. We suggest
consideration of opportunities with
respect to the water already committed as
well as for water not presently committed.
As a general matter we believe that water
presently in consumptive use should be
available for new uses primarily according
to decisions made by the water users
themselves. In this regard, federal
interests and concerns need to be made
clear — a task that can be better done by
considering the full potential of the
reclamation system. Existing commitments
may be able to be better met through
innovative approaches that give the users
the incentive to better manage their water
supply (for example, the use of storage
rights instead of fixed delivery rights). In
addition, there are opportunities for using
conservation improvements that could
make water available for other uses.
As noted under recommendation 6 of
Section 1 (Bureau of Reclamation), there
is a rationale for Bureau-funded transfers
of water to fish and wildlife programs,
where the benefits are often diffuse and
there is no easily identifiable group of
beneficiaries to charge. Conservation
improvements could also be a source of
water for such public purposes. An even
more immediate and less expensive means
of providing water for these public
purposes, as well as environmental
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mitigation and enhancement, would be the
use of uncontracted water from federal
reclamation facilities. To that end, we
recommend that the Department and the
Bureau undertake an assessment of the
option for the use of water stored in
reclamation facilities, but not committed to
consumptive uses.
2. Seek clarification of certain legal issues.
The report has identified a number of
areas where federal reclamation law may
affect transfers. We recommend that the
Department request clarifying opinions from
the Solicitor's Office or seek clarification
from Congress if necessary. These include
the effect of the appurtenancy and the
beneficial use language in Section 8 of the
1902 Reclamation Act, the meaning of
"detrimental to the water service for such
irrigation project" and "not impair the
efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes" in the two laws authorizing
contracts for non-irrigation uses of
reclamation facilities, and whether the Ickes
decision regarding the water rights position of
those applying Bureau-supplied water to
beneficial use applies to all projects and
contracts or whether service contracts imply
a different kind of status for water users
affecting their ability to initiate transfers.
Section 3: Congress
1. Consider enactment of a systemwide water
transfer policy for transfers involving
reclamation facilities.
Congress has begun to consider water
transfer issues in the context of individual
reclamation projects. Specialized
considerations may make it necessary for
Congress to continue to address transfer
issues on a project-by-project basis. In
addition, Congress should consider
establishing a general framework within which
transfers may occur which clarifies areas
of uncertainty addressed in this report
and defines federal interests to be
satisfied in relation to any such transfers.
As an initial step, Congress could
request a report from the Department of
the Interior regarding its water transfer
policy, the background to this policy, an
evaluation of its implementation, and
other specific matters. Alternatively, or in
addition, Congress could initiate its own
study of these matters. The issues
identified in this report could provide
much of the agenda for those studies.
2. Provide a mechanism by which
transfers of project water to fish and
wildlife purposes can be made
nonreimbursable.
Congress should make it clear that all
reclamation facilities may be used for fish
and wildlife-related purposes regardless of
the specific purposes for which they were
originally authorized. In addition,
Congress should make transfers of project
water to fish and wildlife purposes free of
the obligation to pay the related cost of
the facilities where the benefits are
general in nature.
3. Extend the Warren Act to M&I and
other purposes.
In some cases, transfers may be
facilitated by use of reclamation facilities
for transfer of nonproject water where
there is surplus capacity. The Warren
Act provides a mechanism for utilization
of these facilities in connection with a
water supply for irrigation. Congress
should amend the Warren Act to extend
utilization of reclamation facilities, where
feasible, for storage and conveyance of
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31. 16 U.S.C. § 460/-12 (1988).
32. 43 U.S.C § 511 (1988).
33. 43 U.S.C. §423d (1988).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1988).
35. Solicitor's Memorandum Opinion, M-28771 (October 10, 1936), "In Re the Public Irrigation District
for the Pine River Project, Colorado," cited in 1 U.S. Dep't of Interior, Federal Reclamation and
Related Laws Annotated, at 379 (1972).
36. 43 U.S.C § 485h (d) (1988).
37. 43 U.S.C. § 485h (e) (1988).
38. 43 U.S.C. § 485h (d)-(e) (1988).
39. A. Golze\ Reclamation in the United States 247 (1961) [hereinafter Golze*].
40. 43 U.S.C § 485h(c) (1988).
41. 43 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
42. 43 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
43. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Division of Energy and Resources, to Commissioner, Bureau
of Reclamation, "Application of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 to Contracts Executed Pursuant to
the Warren Act of 1911" (Aug. 28, 1985). More than 400 contracts have been issued under the
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apparent authority of the Warren Act. According to this memorandum, many of these contracts should
not have been based on the Warren Act and some are probably outside the authority of reclamation
law. I
1
44. Wahl, supra note 6, at 156.
45. Richard Wahl reviewed a sampling of 34 contracts and identified similarities and differences found ]
in a number of provisions. Id. at 156-73.
46. Ex post analysis has shown that, in most cases, the increase in land value has fallen short of project I
costs. See Wahl, pp. 30 and 41. v *
47. 1866 Mining Act, 43 U.S.C § 661 (1988); Desert Land Acts, 43 U.S.C § 321 (1988). rl
48. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1988).
49. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). ]
50. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
51. Id. at 90. ^
52. Id. at 95. }
53. Id. at 94-95.
54. 296 F. 536, 545 (D.N.M. 1923), affd 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1925). j
55. Id. at 545.
56. See R. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Water 23-38 (1983). *
57. As Arthur Maass points out, land developers often sought to get out of the water supply business \
as quickly as possible. In California, these private water companies commonly evolved into irrigation v ]
districts. Maass, Water Law and Institutions in the Western United States: Comparison with Early
Developments in California and Australia, Contemporary Developments in Australia, And Recent Legislation $■»
Worldwide, Western Water Policy Project Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 7 at 8-9 (Natural I
Resources Law Center 1990). ;"
58. 10 Colo. 582, 588, 17 P. 487, 490 (1887). . 1
59. 38 Colo. 420, 431, 88 P. 396, 399-400 (1907).
60. Pioneer Irr. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Yuma County, Colo., 236 F. 790, 792 (D. Colo. 1916),
affd 251 F. 264 (8th Cir. 1918).
61. See City and County of Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44 (1913): nA consumer supplied
with water by contract from a ditch owned and operated by a carrier company in a sense is an
appropriates from the stream supplying the ditch, but does not occupy the exact status of an
independent appropriator directly from the stream, as his rights are limited by the terms of his contract,
so far as valid, with the ditch company, as well as other limitations which the law, from the nature of
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the relation between the carrier company and a contract consumer from its ditch company, inspires."
Id, 138 P. at 47 (citations omitted).
62. .Wright v. Platte Valley Irr. Co., 27 Colo. 322, 61 P. 603 (1900).
63. Id, 61 P. at 606.
64. City and County of Denver v. Brown, 138 P. at 47: "On the expiration of his contract, he may be
entitled to have it renewed, unless inhibited by a valid provision therein; but, if a legal demand for that
purpose is not made, he is in the same position as though he had never taken water from the ditch."
65. Id
66. 37 Nev. 154, 140 P. 720 (1914).
67. Id, 140 P. at 723 quoting from Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332
(1901): "A corporation thus organized for the purpose of furnishing water for agricultural purposes, to
be used by others in priority of contract with it, becomes the mere agent of the latter, and, under the
statute, may divert from a public stream water which the latter may acquire and use for purposes of
irrigation."
68. Slosser, 65 P. at 338: "We hold that the ownership and possession of arable and irrigable land are
essential, under the statutes, for the acquisition of the right of appropriation of water from a public
stream for purposes of irrigation."
69. Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idaho 773, 45 P. 134, 135 (1896).
70. Hard v. Boise City Irr. Co., 9 Idaho 589, 76 P. 331 (1904).
. 71. Farmers Co-Operative Ditch Co. v. Riverside Irr. Co. 14 Idaho 450, 94 P. 761, 763 (1908).
72. Id
73. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 324 U.S. 589 (1945) - an interstate apportionment action involving the
North Platte River - the Court simply affirmed that deliveries of water from federal reclamation
facilities for which the U.S. held the state-granted water storage right was based on state water rights
held by the water users.
74. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
75. Id at 126.
76. 43 U.S.G § 521 (1988).
77. 43 U.S.C. §567(1988).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1988). Interestingly, in each case the language speaks in terms of providing
water (or water rights) for these different purposes rather than allowing the use of reclamation facilities
for these purposes. The argument here is that this reference was simply a shorthand statement and was
not intended to create a water-supply function different from that established under the 1902 Act.
79. 43 U.S.C § 521 (1988).
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80. 43 U.S.C § 567 (1988). . *
81. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1988). ]
\
82. The Warren Act has been described above in Chapter 2, Section 1. It is codified at 43 U.S.C. §§
523-524 (1988). The Water Supply Act of 1958 is codified at 43 U.S.C § 390(b) (1988). ]
83. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (1988).
84. See "Facilitating Voluntary Transfers of Bureau of Reclamation-Supplied. Water Vol. II," (Natural I
Resources Law Center 1991) [hereinafter Bureau of Reclamation, Vol. II], "New Mexico Case Studies."
85. See Id. "Emery County Project, Utah." !
86. See Id,, "Kendrick Project, Wyoming."
87. See Id., "Newlands Project, Nevada." j
88. See M,"Strawberry Valley Project, Utah." .
89. See Id., "Provo River Project, Utah." *
90. Wahl, supra note 6, at 42. I
91. Examples include the contract for the Central Arizona Project (see Bureau of Reclamatioa VoL II,
supra note 80, "Arizona Case Studies") and the contract for the Dolores Project in Colorado. These and [
other examples are discussed in some detail below in Chapter 3. j
92. See id. "Emery County Project, Utah." ?
93. According to the contract, this charge is to help repay the capital costs of the Kendrick Project •
allocated to its irrigation function. The contract states that the service charge "is based on amortizing
the pro rata share of the allocated cost of the Kendrick Project to irrigation over a 32 year repayment I
period with interest at 9.352 percent." Water Service Contract Among the United States, The Casper- , f
Alcova Irrigation District, and the City of Casper, Wyoming, § 9b (April 15, 1982).
94. Pub. L. No. 101-618, § 206(a)(3)(A), 104 Stat. 3294, 3308-09. I
95. At the time the original contract for repayment was established (1936), the inclusion of interest
charges for municipal water was not yet part of reclamation law. This distinction in treatment between
repayment charges for irrigators and for municipal users was included in the Reclamation Project Act of
1939. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h (c)-(d) (1988).
96. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (Codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1988)). . j
97. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
98. Id. at 665-667.
99. According to Wahl, the U.S. holds the storage rights to about 84% of the water in reclamation
projects in the West.- Wahl, supra note 6, Table 6-2 at 174. Only in Oregon, Oklahoma, Colorado,
Texas, and Kansas is the percentage of storage rights held by the U.S. less than 50%.
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100. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
101. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 Rocky ML L Rev. 464, 476 (1960) [hereinafter Trelease].
102. Trelease argues that this view should not necessarily be extended to Warren Act contracts or to
Section 9(e) contracts under the 1939 Reclamation Project Act. Id. at 478-81.
103. See MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 Okla. L. Rev. 119 (1990).
104. United States v. Alpine Land and Res. Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980) ("Alpine T) affd as
modified in U.S. v, Alpine Land and Res. Co., 697 F. 2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983).
105. Alpine I, 503 F. Supp. at 884.
106. Id. at 892-93.
107. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 265 (D.D.C. Supplemental
Opinion 360 F. Supp 669 (1973)).
108. U.S. v. Alpine Land & Res. Co., 878 F. 2d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1989).
109. U.S. v. Alpine Land and Res. Co., 697 F. 2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983). Direct review of the State
Engineer's decision by a federal court is, of course, not the usual procedure. It applies here because of
the decree of the district court which allows for appeal of change applications to the federal district
court for the District of Nevada. This provision is not contested by any appellee. Id.
110. As mentioned in the preceding section, the transfer may be limited by contract provisions
restricting the type of use, place of use, and repayment obligations.
111. Provo River Project Proof of Appropriation for Water Rights Application No. 12230, at 39 (filed
June 25, 1936).
112. Originally, BMI held certificates of appropriation from the state of Nevada to divert 45 cubic feet
per second (cfs) of water out of Lake Mead for industrial purposes and 12 cfs for municipal use. Under
Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1060 (1928) Congress transformed this
appropriation into a service contract for up to 41,266 acre-feet of water.
113. Boulder Canyon Project, Contract to Amend Contract No. 14-06-300-2083, Contract for Delivery
of Water to Basic Management, Inc., Section 3(c) (May 22, 1990).
114. Boulder Canyon Project, Assignment and Transfer of Entitlement to Delivery of Colorado River
Water from Basic Management, Inc., to the City of Henderson, Nevada (May 22, 1990).
115. Boulder Canyon Project, Contract with the City of Henderson, Nevada, for Delivery of Colorado
River Water (May 22, 1990).
116. Water Delivery Contract Between the City of Henderson and Basic Management, Inc. (May 22,
1990).
117. See Bureau of Reclamation VoL n, supra note 80, "CAID case study."
118. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
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119. Gray, Water Transfers in California, 1981-1989, in The Water Transfer Process, Vol. II, Ch. 2 at 23-
24 (Natural Resources Law Center 1990). An average of about 375,000 acre-feet of water per year
moved among users in the CVP on this basis. Id
120. This involved the Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District and the city of Lindsay.
121. In 1956, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to include in 9(e) contracts a provision for
renewal "under stated terms and conditions mutually agreeable to the parties." 43 U.S.C. § 485h-l(l).
The 1956 law also authorized the Secretary to provide for conversion of 9(e) contracts to 9(d) contracts
if he determines that the remaining reimbursable construction costs can probably be repaid within the
contract term. 43 U.S.C. § 485h-l(2) (1988).
122. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
123. See, e.g., Trelease, supra note 97, at 479-81(Section 9(e) contracts may be "utility" supply
arrangements under which the irrigator does not get a water right).
124. See discussion in Fresno Canal & Irr. Co. v. Park, 129 Cal. 437, 62 P. 87 (1900).
125. Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 139 Cal. 22, 72 P. 395, 398 (1903).
126. Leavitt v. Lassen Irr. Co., 157 Cal. 82, 106 P. 404 (1909).
127. 75 Cal. App. 57, 242 P. 494 (1925)
128. Id, 242 P. at 499.
129. J. Castlebeny, R. Davis, R. Hornsberger & R. Swenson, Waters and Water Rights § 343.1 (R.
Clark ed. 1970) (citation omitted) [hereinafter dark].
130. Willis v. Neches Canal Co., 16 S.W. 2d 266, 269 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
131. dark, supra note 131, at 408 n. 73.
132. In Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of 9(e) contracts and noted that Congress, in 1956, had provided for the indefinite extension of
such contracts thereby providing a potentially permanent commitment of water service.
133. 43 U.S.C. § 485h-l(2) (1988).
134. 43 U.S.C § 372 (1988). '
135. See 4 G. Sands, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (4th edition, 1984).
136. H.R. No. 1468, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1902).
137. 35 Cong. Rec 6679 (daily ed. June 2, 1902) (statement of Rep. Mondell).
138. Chrysler v. Brown. 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979). However, notwithstanding this general rule, the
Circuit Court's opinion in United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. cites Mr. Mondell's remarks
with favor:
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As described by Rep, Mondell, a water right under the Reclamation Act "only extends
to the use of water on and for the tract originally irrigated11; there is no general
"property right in water with power to sell and dispose of the same elsewhere and for
other purposes than originally intended."
35 Cong. Rec. 6679 (1902). 697 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied sub nom. Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., 464 U.S. 863 (1983), later proceeding, 878 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1989), later proceeding 887 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied sub nom. Truckee-Carson Irr.
Dist. v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 60 (1990). [hereinafter Alpine II].
139. 35 Cong. Rec, 6677 (daily ed. June 3, 1902) (Statement of Rep. Mondell).
140. Q. C Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights and the Arid Region
Doctrine of Appropriation of Waters (2nd ed. 1912).
141. Id, § 1005 at 1786.
142. Id., § 1006 at 1789.
143. Id, § 1005 at 1786.
144. Id
145. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when a statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, an
interpretation by they agency charged with its administration is entitled to great deference. Chevron .
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 at 843 (1984).
146. One exception to the Bureau's implicit position on "appurtenancy" is in Arizona where, as the case
study shows, the Bureau appears confused regarding whether water from Bureau projects in this state
may be severed and transferred from the land. However, the confusion does not derive from any
ambiguity in "appurtenancy" under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act but from concern whether
Arizona's version of appurtenancy, which under certain situations can make water appurtenant to lands
in the basin in which it arises, should govern transfers under the notion of state primacy.
147. Interview with James Turner, Office of the Mid-Pacific Regional Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior (June 21, 1990).
148. El Paso County Water Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 133 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Tex. 1955)
ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 820 (1957).
149. Id, at 904.
150. Another argument offered to remove the cloud of Rep. Mondell's concept of appurtenancy from
transfers is that Congress has impliedly repealed the appurtenancy provision of Section 8, in particular,
in the Reclamation Project Act of 1939. In this statute Congress authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to contract for the supply of water to M&I users. Thus, in expressly authorizing the allocation '
of water to uses other than irrigation, Congress is said to have repealed Section 8's appurtenancy
requirement. The problem with this argument is that it does not address the substance of Rep.
Mondell's remarks. His remarks only express a policy against an original farmer effectuating a
reallocation of project water by voluntary transfer. They do not infer that the Secretary cannot
effectuate a reallocation administratively. Thus, the Secretary may, himself, reallocate water from
irrigation to other uses without being at cross purposes with Rep. Mondell's remarks. In other words,
reallocation of project water from irrigation to municipal and industrial uses may be effectuated without
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transfers. Finally, courts prefer to avoid holding that a statute has been repealed by implication.
Rather, they try to find a way in which two facially contrary statutes may be reconciled harmoniously
without repeal. In this instance, the policy of permissive reallocation embodied in the Reclamation
Project Act may be implemented through administrative reallocation without repealing a restrictive
concept of appurtenancy.
151. See W. Governors' Ass'n Water Efficiency Working Group, Water Efficiency: Opportunities for
Action, app. A (July 6, 1987).
152. For another analysis of the effect of the appurtenancy provision of Section 8 on transfers that
comes to the same conclusion as this analysis, see Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to
Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 13 Ecology L. Q. 4 (1987).
153. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1988). *
154. A portion of the water used in some reclamation states, notably California, Oregon and
Washington, is allocated according to old riparian rights and the "reasonable use" standard that applies
to these rights. However, the reasonable use standard does not appear to apply to significant quantities
of project water.
155. Some concepts of beneficial use could impede project water transfers. For example, if
conservation of project water is not a beneficial use of that water under state law and, instead, a
contractor or grower would be deemed to have abandoned water that had been conserved, transfers of
conserved project water would be discouraged Some western states (notably California and Oregon)
have clarified their laws to include conservation as a beneficial use of water. Others have not done so.
156. Transfers of CVP water have been impeded by confusion over whether California or federal law [
governs beneficial use. Confusion also exists regarding whether there is a federal definition of beneficial I
use attending water supplied from the Colorado River under the Boulder Canyon Project Act
157. U.S. v. Alpine Land & Res. Co., 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1983). \
158. Id. An important exception to the deference to state definitions of beneficial use under Section 8 *
probably exists in the case of water provided by the Bureau from the Colorado River under the Boulder f
Canyon Project Act. Distribution of water from the Colorado River is governed by the "Law of the *
River", which permits the Secretary of the Interior to condition use of river water notwithstanding
provisions of state law to the contrary. But even here the Bureau might choose to use the appropriate ' |
state definition of beneficial use as a matter of comity. . i
159. 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983); 887 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1989). i »
160. Reclamation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, title II, § 201, 96 Stat. 1263 (1982) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C § 390aa (1988)). [Hereinafter RRA]. $
161. Section 5 of the Reclamation Act, among other things, restricts the provision of project water for • • *
irrigation to tracts not exceeding 160 acres owned by any one landowner who must reside on or in the
neighborhood of such land. Reclamation Act of 1902, Ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat 389 (1902) (codified as r)
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 392 (1988). The RRA deleted the residency requirement. 1
162. 43 U.S.C. 390ee (1982). For a complete explanation of the provisions of the RRA that may j
create disincentives to transfers see pp. 84-102 of "The transferability of water provided by the State \
Water Project and the Central Valley Project: A report to the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program",
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Brian E. Gray, Bruce C. Driver and Richard W. Wahl, July 26, 1990. The material in this section on
the RRA is taken from those pages.
163. 43 U.S.C. 390cc (1988).
164. 43 U.S.C § 390ee (1988).
165. Construction of Small Projects, Pub. L. No. 99-546, title III, § 302, 100 Stat 3053 (1956) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 422(a) (1988)). Pub. L. No. 99-546 is special legislation that applies only the
Central Valley Project. It requires the accrual of interest on contractor O&M deficits incurred after
October 1, 1985. As a result, growers not already paying full O&M rates under the RRA are faced with
the financial equivalent thereof for O&M deficits incurred since 1985. This fact materially reduces the
disincentive to transfers of the "supplemental and additional benefits" proscription of the RRA, provided
that the Bureau avoids imposing rates that exceed full O&M charges.
166. Rules And Regulations for Projects Governed by Federal Reclamation Law, 43 C.F.R. § 426,
426.5(a)(3)(ii) (1990).
167. This was the method used in the transfer between the Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District and
the City of Lindsay.
168. In the Lindsay-Strathmore transfer, no profit was allowed. The Bureau did not consider the
amendment to the irrigation contract to constitute a supplemental or additional benefit because, even
though the district payments were changed, the district was receiving a reduced amount of water.
169. Id § 426.5(a)(3)(ii)(F).
170. Id. § 426.18(b)(l)(B)(2).
171. Id. § 426.
172. There is a more detailed discussion of the need to clarify the repayment terms because this topic,
unlike the legal issues, is not discussed elsewhere in the report. The legal issues are treated in detail in
Chapter 2.
173. John Sayre, remarks at the Conference "Water Marketing 1990: Moving from Theory to Practice,"
at the University of Denver (Nov. 15, 1990). (This speech is reproduced in Appendix III to this report.
174. First, its preamble begins with references to the increasing frequency of water transfers, including
"direct sales" and "lease" of water rights. These are terms commonly understood to involve profit or
increased income. Although this language is applied to water transfer activity in general, the preamble
goes on to place transactions involving Departmental water facilities within this overall transfer
environment. In fact, Principle 5 states that "the fact that the transaction may involve the use of water
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered during evaluation of a
proposed transaction." This principle is restated in the press release accompanying the principles as
"water transfers involving federally developed water will be treated no differently than any other
proposed transfer."
This press release language and the language of Principle 5 suggests that transfers of
Reclamation water can avail themselves of the same lease and sale institutions as privately developed
water. Furthermore, Departmental staff involved in the drafting the principles indicate that Principle 5
was intended to specifically address the fact that just because federal
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subsidies were used to develop the water, this fact should not remove the water from the category of • *
water that is transferred, leased, or sold. Finally, the preamble indicates that the principles were
designed to be responsive the Western Governor's Association request for a policy to facilitate transfers. ]
One key feature of the WGA report was a recommendation that profit be allowed. j
175. First, its preamble begins with references to the increasing frequency of water transfers, including ,
"direct sales" and "lease" of water rights. These are terms commonly understood to involve profit or j
increased income. Although this language is applied to water transfer activity in general, the preamble
goes on to place transactions involving Departmental water facilities within this overall transfer
environment In fact, Principle 5 states that "the fact that the transaction may involve the use of water ■']
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered during evaluation of a 1
proposed transaction."
176. Drought in California: Arousal of the Market? VoL 5 Water Strategist at 11 (April 1991). J
177. Wahlat 185.
178. Id. at 183. ■•■*
179. Presumably "the reduction in the amount to be repaid through power assistance" would imply an 1
equal increase in the amount to be paid by M&I users for the transferred water. j
180. The inservice date may vary for different units of a larger project (such as the Central Valley »
Project in California) or for blocks of water placed under contract at different time periods (such as in <
the Columbia Basin Project in Washington).
181. The repayment period for the project is not always established by contract. For example, the CVP I
contracts run for 40 years, but the repayment period extends much longer, until 2030. The CVP *
repayment period was established through a ratemaking policy adopted by the Secretary in 1988. The
contracts will be renewed based upon rates calculated to achieve repayment of capital costs by that date. 1
182. In smaller projects, projects supplying only a few water districts, or projects not delivering M&I
water, there are not likely to be well-established procedures for determining what rate should be charged >
for water converted from irrigation to municipal and industrial use. I
183. In addition, there is one legislative situation that is somewhat analogous. The RRA of 1982 had
the goal of removing federal subsidies from irrigation water delivered to land in a farm over 960 acres. f 1
The "full cost" formula in the act makes no assessment for past interest charges: it is based on the ~J
unpaid capital balance. Also, neither the interest or ability-to-pay subsidies apply to such land.
184. The charge in 1987.was higher even though the outstanding balance for irrigation repayment was j
lower than in 1972.
■ $
185. Memorandum from Acting Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, Washington, D.C, to Regional \
Director, Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 13, 1989) (discussing resolution of interest- *
charge issues on the basis of negotiation for repayment contracts for the San Juan Chama Project water
supplies). r]
186. The irrigation contracts on these projects do not incorporate these formulas. Rather, in each
contract a specific dollar amount is established for conversions from irrigation use to M&I use ($150 per
acre-foot in the Dolores Project and $82.50 per acre-foot in the Dallas Creek Divide Project). However,
the contracts indicate that these values are subject to adjustment by the Bureau at the time when the
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actual conversion to M&I water takes place, and regional Bureau of Reclamation staff indicate that their
current intention would be to apply the rollover, calculation contained in the Definite Plan Reports.
187. If there is additional construction at some later date, then a separate increment would be added
based on the same formula.
188. The charges under formulas S and D would be the same if there were no power assistance.
189. We realize, however, that the Bureau may want to draw a distinction between cases where
irrigation water is contracted and under use (such as envisioned in formula D) and the cases where the
water never was put to use in irrigation, such as in the San Juan Chama case. In the San Juan Chama
reallocation, there may be a good rationale for charging M&I users for all of the interest costs, since no
irrigators actually received benefits from the water.
190. Adoption of formula D would go some distance toward decreasing the anomaly.
191. The RRA indicates that prepayment of irrigation costs is not a method by which an irrigation
district can avoid acreage limitation. Therefore, even if a prepayment agreement was worked out under
which all of an irrigation district's charges were paid, the district would presumably still be subject to
acreage limitation until the end of its original repayment period.
192. For additional discussion of public and private roles in acquisitions of water for instream flow, see
Wahl, Acquisition of Water to Maintain Instream Flows, 1 Rivers 195 (1990).
193. Assessment '87, supra note 4, at 2.
194. The case studies in this report indicate that a number of transfers have utilized either the
Miscellaneous Purposes Act (e.g. El Paso County Improvement District No. 1 to Lower Valley Water
Authority) or the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (Casper-Alcova Irrigation District to City of Casper
Wyoming). Chapter 2 contains a more complete discussion of Reclamation law.
195. More complicated legal questions surrounding the applicability of each of these laws to different
situations or the precise distinctions among these authorities might suitably be treated in a Solicitor's
opinion.
196. These historical examples also point up the difficulty of defining "profit" Was it profit if water
J users in California were paid an amount exceeding their water cost, intended to reflect the agricultural
and other income they gave up? Was it a profit to users in the Casper-Alcova District to have an
outside entity pay for their canal lining? Would the fees paid to water lawyers and water brokers to
implement a transaction in the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District be considered profit, or
expenses?
197. Az: BuRec Signs Options for 22,000 affor the Salt River Pima - Maricopa Indian Settlement 3, Water
Intelligence Monthly 2 (March 1991).
198. The project lands will be acquired in a separate, but parallel transaction by Phoenix-area cities.
These cities plan to eventually use the underlying groundwater to support urban growth.
199. The Bureau of Reclamation's position in this case was evidently based, in part, on the Bureau's
interpretations of Colorado River Law and Nevada law. The results might have been different in other
locations. For example, New Mexico law provides a forty-year period for proving up municipal and
industrial water rights.
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200. Interior's Policy of Voluntary Water Transactions: The Two-Year Record? 4 Water Strategist 1 (Jan. v'
1991). ^
201. This example illustrates the more general difficulty of separating out the price for the use of |
delivery facilities from the price for the underlying water entitlements.
202. More specifically, the Bureau used to require that the higher of the contract rate of the two j
districts be paid to the Bureau. However, in some cases this meant a revenue loss to the Bureau. This
situation can arise because many contract rates currently fail to cover operation and maintenance costs.
If the purchaser had the higher of the two contract rates, but that rate was farther below the actual cost : j
of delivering water than in the selling district, then the transfer would result in a net loss of federal s
revenue. For that reason, in writing the regulations to implement the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,
the Bureau requires that a transfer not result in any additional revenue losses to the U.S. 1
203. As noted in the discussion of applicability of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 in Chapter 2
(and the case study in volume II on the Central Valley Project), some water transfers might require r-i
contract amendments. Many such amendments could be considered as providing supplemental or [
additional benefits and thereby requiring repayment of O&M costs on all contract water. Probably the
principal type of amendment that might be required would be amendment of an irrigation-only contract
in which the contractor wanted to transfer some of its water to a non-irrigation use. How many
contracts would fall into this category was not investigated in this study. Even on these contracts,
however, it might be possible for water transactions to be executed by implementing (1) a reduction in
deliveries under the irrigation-only contract and (2) a new contract with the M&I entity. If the transfers ]
were executed in this manner, it is not certain whether they would be considered to provide supplement |
or additional benefits. In effect, however, the requirement to increase repayment levels to cover
operation and maintenance costs is already imposed, regardless of amendment, by P.L. 99-546. ,
Therefore the disincentives for transfers requiring contract amendments in the RIIA itself may be small. I
Because of the repayment problems on many CVP contracts, the Bureau would likely want to increase *
the repayment requirements whether a contract amendment was required or not.
204. For a more detailed discussion of these points, and the applicability of the RRA to water transfers ]
in the Central Valley Project, see Gray, Driver, and Wahl, The Transferabflity of Water Provided by the
State Water Project and the Central Valley Project: A Report to the San Joaquin Valley Drainage \
Program at 84-104 (1990). \
205. However, this practice was by no means universal, as indicated by the administrative prohibition on









Office of the Secretary
For Release December 16, 1988 Contact: Mitch Snow (202) 343-4811
INTERIOR RELEASES POLICY ON WESTERN WATER MARKETING
The Department of the Interior will serve as a facilitator for water
marketing proposals between willing buyers and sellers under a new policy
released today by Assistant Secretary for Water and Science. James W.
Ziglar.
"Although the Bureau of Reclamation will continue to have a role in
building water projects with state and local partners, water transfers are
an increasingly important means of meeting western water needs," Ziglar
said in announcing the policy. "Transfers have the potential for improving
the efficiency of already developed water projects, which is a major goal
of the Bureau."
Ziglar noted that the Western Governor's Association, a recent management
assessment of the Bureau of Reclamation, and many private parties involved
in potential transfers of water have called for the development of such a
policy. "The Department, through the Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of
Indian Affairs, operates one of the largest water supply systems in the
world. Because an increasing number of proposed transfers would involve
federal facilities under the control of the Department, we have developed a
set of guidelines to promote consistency in dealing with such proposed
transfers."
The Department's policy is based on seven basic principles:
o Primacy in water allocation and management decisions lies with the
States.
o The Department will become involved only in water transfers which
potentially affect federal projects or federally owned water rights.
o Departmental approval is contingent upon mitigating or avoiding
adverse third-party effects.
o The Department will not suggest specific transactions unless such
transactions would be involved in an Indian water rights settlement,
solution of other water rights controversies, or could provide a
dependable supply that otherwise would involve the expenditure of
federal funds.
(more)
o Water transfers involving federally developed water will be treated
no differently than any other proposed transfer. ^
o The Department will not burden proposed transactions with costs '
exceeding those actually incurred. Interior will ensure that the
government is financially, operationally, and contractually in the 1
same or better position once a transfer is made. ■■}
o The Department will consider necessary measures to mitigate any n
adverse environmental impacts that may be created by a proposed : ]
transfer.
"These principles provide the basic policy framework we need to deal with j
the increasing number of requests for assistance in facilitating water *
transfers. They also allow the flexibility we will need to consider the
individual circumstances of each proposed transfer," Ziglar said. ]
The policy will go into effect immediately.
-DOI- ]
«
Note to editors: A complete copy of the Department of the Interior . !






DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTIONS
THAT INVOLVE OR AFFECT FACILITIES
OWNED OR OPERmTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
PREAMBLE:
Transactions that involve water rights and supplies are occurring pursuant
to State law with Increasing frequency in the Nation, particularly in. the
Western United States. Such transactions Include direct sale of water
rights; lease of water rights; dry-year options on water rights; sale of
land with associated water rights; and conservation Investments with
subsequent assignment of conserved water.
The Federal Government, as owner of a significant portion of the Nation's
water storage and conveyance facilities, can assist State, Tribal, and
local authorities in meeting local or regional water needs by improving or
facilitating the improvement of management practices with respect to
existing water supplies. Exchanges in type, location or priority of use
that are accomplished according to State law can allow water to be used
more efficiently to meet changing water demands, and also can protect and
enhance the Federal investment 1n existing facilities. In addition, water
exchanges can serve to improve many local and Indian reservation economies.
001's interest in voluntary water transactions proposed by others derives
from an expectation that, to an Increasing degree, DOI will be asked to
approve, facilitate, or otherwise accommodate such transactions that
involve or affect facilities owned or operated by Its agencies. The DOI
also wishes to be responsive to the July 7, 1987, resolution of the
Western Governors' Association, which.was reaffirmed at the Association's
July 12, 1988, meeting, that the DOI "develop and issue a policy to
facilitate water transfers which Involve water and/or facilities provided
by the Bureau of Reclamation."
The following principles are Intended to afford maximum flexibility to
State, Tribal, and local entitles to arrive at mutually agreeable
solutions to their water resource problems and demands. At the same time,
these principles are Intended to be clear as to the legal, contractual, and
regulatory concerns that DOI must consider 1n its evaluation of proposed
transactions.
For the purpose of this statement of principles, all proposed transactions
must be between willing parties to the transaction and must be 1n
accordance with applicable State and Federal law. Presentation of a
proposal by one party, seeking Federal support or action against other
parties, will not be considered in the absence of substantial support for
the proposal among affected non-Federal parties.
December IE, 1988 •
VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTION PRINCIPLES
1. Primacy in water allocation and management decisions rests principally ]
with the States. Voluntary water transactions under this policy must
be in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws. 1
2. The Department of the Interior (001) will become involved in
facilitating a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it n
can be accomplished without diminution of service to those parties I
otherwise being served by such Federal resources, and when:
(a) there is an existing Federal contractual or other legal j
obligation associated with the water supply; or '
(b) there 1s an existing water right held by the Federal government ]
that may be affected by the transaction; or *
(c) it 1s proposed to use Federally-owned storage or conveyance ]
capacity to facilitate the transaction; or ]
(d) the proposed transaction will, affect Federal project operations; j
and i
(e) the appropriate State* Tribal* or other non-Federal political . ?
authorities or subdivisions request DOI's active involvement. \
3. 001 will participate 1n or approve transactions when there are no
adverse third-party consequences* or when such third-party consequences |
will be heard and adjudicated In appropriate State forums* or when such *
consequences will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected
parties. . j
. j
4. As a general rule* DOI's role will be to facilitate transactions that
are 1n accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed -.*
by others. In doing so, DOI will consider the positions of the j
affected State* Tribal, and local authorities. DOI will not suggest a
specific transaction except when it Is part of an Indian water rights
settlement, a solution to a water rights controversy, or when it may
provide a dependable water supply the provision of which otherwise J
would Involve the expenditure of Federal funds. Such a suggestion
would not be carried out without the concurrence of all affected non-
Federal parties. •
5. The fact that the transaction may Involve the use of water supplies i
developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered
during evaluation of a proposed transaction.
December 16, 1988
6. One of DOI's objectives will be to ensure that the Federal government
is in an acceptable financial, operational, and contractual position
following accomplishment of a transaction under this policy. Unless
required explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, DOI
. will refrain from burdening the transaction with additional costs,
fees or charges, except for those costs actually incurred by 001 in
performance of its functions in a particular transaction.
7. DOI will consider, In cooperation with appropriate State, Tribal and
local authorities, necessary measures that may be required to mitigate







DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTIONS
THAT INVOLVE OR AFFECT FACILITIES
OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
PREAMBLE:
Transactions that involve water rights and supplies are occurring pursuant
to State law with increasing frequency 1n the Nation, particularly 1n the
Western United States. Such transactions Include direct sale of water
rights; lease of water rights; dry-year options on water rights; sale of
land with associated water rights; and conservation investments with
subsequent assignment of conserved water.
The Federal Government, as owner of a significant portion of the Nation's
water storage and conveyance facilities, can assist State, Tribal, and
local authorities in meeting local or regional water needs by improving or
facilitating the Improvement of management practices with respect to
existing water supplies. Exchanges in type, location or priority of use
that are accomplished according to State law can 'allow water to be used
more efficiently to meet changing water demands, and also can protect and
enhance the Federal investment in existing facilities. In addition, water
exchanges can serve to improve many local and Indian reservation economies.
DOI's interest 1n voluntary water transactions proposed by others derives
from an expectation that, to an Increasing degree, DOI will be asked to
approve, facilitate, or otherwise accommodate such transactions that
involve or affect facilities owned or operated by Its agencies. The 001
also wishes to be responsive to the July 7, 1987* resolution of the
Western Governors1 Association, which.was reaffirmed at the Association's
July 12, 1988, meeting, that the DOI "develop and Issue a policy to
facilitate water transfers which involve water and/or facilities provided
by the Bureau of Reclamation.1
The following principles are Intended to afford maxima flexibility to
State, Tribal, and local entitles to arrive at mutually agreeable
solutions to their water resource probleas and demands. At the same time,
these principles are Intended to be clear as to the legal, contractual, and
regulatory concerns that DOI must consider in Us evaluation of proposed
transactions.
For the purpose of this statement of principles, all proposed transactions
must be between willing parties to the transaction and must be in
accordance with applicable State and Federal law. Presentation of a
proposal by one party, seeking Federal support or action against other
parties, will not be considered In the absence of substantial support for
the proposal among affected non-Federal parties.
December 16, 1988
VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTION-PRINCIPLES
1. Primacy in water allocation and management decisions rests principally
with the States. Voluntary water transactions under this policy must
be in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws.
2. The Department of the Interior (DOI) will become involved in
facilitating a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it
can be accomplished without diminution of service to those parties
otherwise being served by such Federal resources, and when:
(a) there is an existing Federal contractual or other legal
obligation associated with the water supply; or
(b) there is an existing water right held by the Federal government 1
that may be affected by the transaction; or 1
(c) It is proposed to use Federally-owned storage or conveyance ]
capacity to facilitate the transaction; or \
(d) the proposed transaction will affect Federal project operations; i
and . ' \
(e) the appropriate State, Tribal, or other non-Federal political
authorities or subdivisions request OOI's active involvement. I
3. 001 will participate in or approve transactions when there are no
adverse third-party consequences, or when such third-party consequences j
will be heard and adjudicated 1n appropriate State forums, or when such *
consequences will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected
parties.
4. As a general rule, 001's role will be to facilitate transactions that
are 1n accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed \
by others. In doing so, 001 will consider the positions of the j
affected State, Tribal, and local authorities. 001 will not suggest a
specific transaction except when it Is part of an Indian water rights t
settlement, a solution to a water rights controversy, or when it may j
provide a dependable water supply the provision of which otherwise
would Involve the expenditure of Federal funds. Such a suggestion
would not be carried out without the concurrence of all affected non- j
Federal parties. -
5. The fact that the transaction may Involve the use of water supplies i
developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered
during evaluation of a proposed transaction.
December 16, 1988
6. One of DOI's objectives will be to ensure that the Federal government
is in an acceptable financial, operational, and contractual position
following accomplishment of a transaction under this policy. Unless
required explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, 001
will refrain from burdening the transaction with additional costs,
fees or charges, except for those costs actually Incurred by 001 1n
performance of Its functions in a particular transaction.
7. 001 will consider. In cooperation with appropriate State, Tribal and
local authorities, necessary measures that may be required to mitigate
any adverse environmental effects that may arise as a result of the
proposed transaction.
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Memorandum
To: Regional Director, PH, MP, LC, UC, GP
Attention: 100
From: Commissioner ^ C^L1"* r^f
Subject: Principles Governing Voluntary Water Transactions That Involve or
Affect Facilities Owned or Operated by the Department of the
Interior (Water Policy)
The subject principles were Issued by Assistant Secretary Ziglar on
December 16, 1988. A copy of the principles Is enclosed.
Criteria and guidance for the principles are also enclosed for your use in
evaluating specific proposals that may be presented to you for consideration.
The principles and the accompanying criteria and guidance are being provided
to ensure that Reclamation evaluate each individual proposal on its own
merits.
These principles Identify and promote a policy of resource management that is
consistent with the Administration's theme of stewardship. Existing
procedures and authorities for contract negotiation, renegotiation, evaluation
of water rates, or other items addressed In the criteria and guidance are to
be used In the evaluation and execution of the documents necessary to
facilitate the proposed exchanges*
Enclosures
cc: Commissioner, Attention: W-1000 (7654-MIB) (w/encl),
v4W120 (7456-MIB) (w/encl)
Deputy Commissioner, Attention: D-1000
(w/encl)




To assist in the implementation of the December 16, 1988, principles, the
following criteria and guidance are provided. It is anticipated that each
specific proposed voluntary water exchange will be unique, and that it should
be evaluated on its own merits under the overall guidance of this policy
statement.
Principle 1, Primacy in water allocation and management decisions rests
principally with the States. Voluntary water transactions under this policy
must be in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws.
Criterion: Does the proposed exchange comply with applicable State and
Federal laws?
Guidance: Apparent conflicts with State laws or water rights will be
reconciled with the appropriate State agency. State laws
generally provide procedures for transferring water rights, and
should be the primary mechanism for protecting the sellers/
lessors of water, as well as third parties.
Proposed transactions that involve a new use not specifically
authorized as a Federal project purpose, or that propose a place
of use not within the Federal project service area, nay require
authorizing legislation. The primary responsibility for such
legislation will rest with those entities proposing the
transaction.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) will become involved in
facilitating a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it can be
accomplished without diminution of service to those parties otherwise being
served by such Federal resources, and uhen:
1. There is an existing Federal contractual or other legal obligation
associated with the water supply; or
2. There is an existing water ri^xt held by the Federal Government that
may be affected by the transaction; or
3. It is proposed to use federally-owned storage or conveyance capacity to
facilitate the transaction; or
4. The proposed transaction will affect Federal project operations; and
5. The appropriate State, tribal, or other non-Federal political
authorities or subdivisions request DOI's active involvement.
Criterion: Does the proposed action involve water that is encumbered by an
existing Federal contractual obligation?
If revision of existing water service or repayment contracts is
required to facilitate an otherwise desirable water exchange
proposal, negotiations for those changes will be initiated
expeditiously under the guidance of these principles and the
appropriate legal authorities pertaining to the subject water.
Criterion: Does the proposed action potentially affect a Federal water right?
r*ijrfanr»« in those instances where the United States' water rights nay be
be affected by a water transaction, DOI will work to facilitate
the transfer so long as its rights or the rights of its
contractors are protected or adequately compensated, in the
evaluation of a proposed action, effects on existing water rights
should be an initial consideration. If the proposed action would
appear to involve lengthy and costly legal procedures in either
the State or Federal courts, this information should be provided
to the proposing parties. The policy does not provide far the
avoidance of State and Federal laws and procedures in the
establishment of water allocations and water rights.
Criterion: Does the proposed action propose the use of Federal
storage/conveyance capacity?
Federal facilities may be used to store/transfer both federally
and nonfederally supplied water. The Warren Act provides the'
basis for storage/transfer of nonfederally supplied water for
irrigation. Storage/transfer of nonfederally supplied water for
municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes can be accomplished
generally under the authority of section 9(c) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939.
Except by mutual consent of affected parties, contracts for
additional storage/conveyance vill take into account existing
Federal contracts, conveyance capacity and piuject obligations
which must be honored as a first priority.
Approval to transfer water cannot obligate the Federal Government
to incur extra nonreimbursed expense to store water or to convey
it to a new location*
Approval to transfer water will not establish any riajit to future
transfers beyond those expressly provided for in negotiated
Use of storage/ccnveyance will require a supporting contract to
use federally built storage/conveyance systems.
Charges vill be set to recover normally allccable storage,
delivery, or extra costs incurred by the U. S.
If any additional pumping power is needed to effect a given
transfer, the transfer entities mist provide or pay for such
power, and nay have to secure it from non-Federal sources.
Proposals may involve the Corps of Engineers' facilities or
projects. In these cases, consideration of their concerns will be
included in the evaluation of the specific proposal.
Criterion; Does the proposed action affect existing Federal project
operations?
Guidance; With a change in type, location, or priority of use, the potential
for effects on the authorized purposes and project operations must
be investigated. For example, such effects could result from
changes in operation of a reservoir or delivery system, that might
change minimum stream flow or power generation. If these
potential effects are identified, avoidance of these consequences,
or mitigation of such consequences to the satisfaction of the
affected party, is necessary.
As stated in the guidance area 2. (b), DOI will work to facilitate
the proposed transfer so long as its (water) rights or the (water)
rights of its contractors are protected or adequately
and in guidance area 2. (c), except by mutual consent of affected
parties, contracts for additional storage/conveyance will take
into account existing Federal contracts and project obligations.
Power interference charges or similar compensation measures will
be the responsibility of those entities proposing the transaction.
In addition to the evaluation of effects on existing project
operations, and authorized project beneficiaries, the following
general issues must also be addressed:
1. Third party effects. See Principle 3.
2. Documentation for compliance with NEEA. See Principle 7.
3. Land d
If the proposed action is a change in location of use for
irrigation water, land ^**"»* fittnfrA**) is necessary to ensure
i ii iii ii
,
that the land s capable of susta ning rrigation act vities
without damage to the land or water resource. Demonstration
that sufficient payment capacity exists during the term of
the transfer may also be required. The level of detail,
amount of original work, and depth of analysis, will be
determined on the merits of each situation.
4. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.
If the existing contract must be changed to allow the
proposed exchange, the discretionary provisions of the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, must be considered. For
futher guidance on gypl^iw &*} or ^miriofM*i benefits and
the amendments to existing contracts, refer to the
Solicitor's memorandum dated May 20, 1988, "Interpretation of
Section 203 (a) of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 and
Sections 105 and 106 of Public law 99-546." Additional
guidance is contained in the Acreage limitation Rules and
Regulations on contracts, additional and supplemental
benefits, and water transfers.
Criterion; Does the proposed action stem from a request by a State, tribe or
non-Federal agency?
Guidance: DOI will continue its policy of providing technical assistance to
State, tribal or local agencies. A positive and expeditious
technical assistance/consultation program will continue within
available budget resources.
The specific involvement of DOI necessary to accommodate the
requested exchange will determine the type of Reclamation
involvement. Existing procedures for approving new or amendatory
contracts should be followed.
Principle 3. 001 will participate in or approve transactions when there are no
adverse third-party consequences, or uhen such third-party consequences will be
heard and adjudicated in appropriate State forums, or when such consequences
will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected parties.
Criterion: Concerns for third party effects must be addressed from both the
State and the Federal perspective. Any consideration of the
"public trust doctrine" is left to the State.
Guidance: Concerns for authorized project functions and operations were
addressed in Principle 2. This principle addresses the concerns
far "third party* effects. Third parties are identified as those
entities who may have some identifiable interest in the exchange,
and would have a legal standing in an adjudication process in an
appropriate State forum, ihe identification of these entities,
the validity of their ccnoaum, and the appropriate satisfaction
of their concerns rests with the States and their adjudication
Principle 4. As a general rule, DQX's role will be to facilitate transactions
that are in accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed by
others. In doing so, DOI will consider the positions of the affected State,
tribal, and local authorities. DOI will not suggest a specific transaction
except when it is part of an Indian water rights settlement, a solution to a
water rights controversy, or when it may provide a dependable water supply, the
provision of which otherwise would involve the expenditure of Federal funds.
Such a suggestion would not be carried out without the cxrcurrence of all
affected non-Federal parties.
Criterion: Does the proposed action displace the need for expenditure of
Federal funds?
Guidance; Within Reclamation's resource management program, opportunities
will be explored to achieve management objectives through the use
of voluntary exchanges of water. The intent of this policy is to
ensure that voluntary exchanges of water are considered as
alternatives in water resource management within Reclamation's
planning, operation, and other resource development programs* For
example, a water exchange may be considered as an alternative to
construction of a storage or delivery facility that otherwise
would or could require Federal investment.
Criterion: Does the proposed action provide for an opportunity for the Indian
tribe or community to benefit economically from the lease or
transfer of water rights that may be secured under a settlement
with the Federal Governnent or with non-Federal parties?
Guidance: It is a common situation that the water rights available to Indian
tribes represent a significant portion of their resource base. It
also is a common situation that the use of those water resources
for agricultural purposes is marginally feasible, and that local
water demands by non-Indians are such that the lease or transfer
of the tribal water resources can be a mutually beneficial
transaction.
DOI will facilitate transfers, in its capacity as a trustee, for
an Indian tribe to the extent that it results in assisting local
water users in resolving their water resource TiwTvujFinpnt problems
within appropriate State lav* The specific authorities involved
will be determined on a case specific evaluation of the water
rights, Federal and State lava, and the specific nature of the
proposed transaction.
Principle s. The fact that the transaction nay involve the use of water
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered
during the evaluation of a proposed transaction.
Criterion: Is the water to be transferred, exchanged, leased, sold, etc.
available by virtue of a Federal Rsclsnation project?
Guidance: If the Federal Governnent is not made worse off financially by the
transaction, if the proposed transaction has been approved fay the
State and local authorities, and if the proposed transaction
complies with Federal and State law; then it may be in the public
interest to allow federally developed water to be employed. The
fact that it was developed by virtue of a subsidized Federal
project or piuyidin should not, in and of itself, be a barrier to
the transaction.
On the other hand, DOI should seek the most appropriate source for
water to be transferred, exchanged, leased, or sold without regard
to presently available supplies from Federal projects.
Principle 6. One of DOI's objectives will be to ensure that the Federal
Government is in an acceptable financial, operational, and contractual position
following accomplishment of a transaction under this policy. Unless required
explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, DOI will refrain from
burdening the transaction with additional costs, fees, or charges, except for
those costs actually incurred by DOI in performance of its functions in a
particular transaction.
Criterion; The financial terms negotiated between entities do not concern
DOI.
Repayment subsidies associated with the original type of use of
the water are not transferable to a different type of use of the
water.
Exchanges cannot result in a reduction in the present worth of
the outstanding obligations remaining to be repaid to the Federal
Government. <
If the proposed exchange would involve the execution of a contract
with a "new" entity, that entity must have sufficient legal
authority to enter into such a contract and be able to perform all
functions required by the contract.
Any additional costs associated with the transfer shall be
advanced or repaid in a manner negotiated by the entities
involved.
A distinction must be Bade between financial terms between the
entities proposing the exchange and Federal repayment
considerations associated with the water. Financial tens between
the nonrFoderal entities are extraneous to the repayment
considerations cHfnwBfri herein.
1. The costs or subsidies associated with the original use
are not transferable to a different use of the water.
2. A change in use from irrigation to municipal and
industrial purpose would require a change in the repayment of
costs to include interest during construction and interest on
investment, but only to the extent of the remaining years in
the payout period. It is not the intent of this water
transfer policy to recover subsidies originally allocated to
that block of transferred water during the time it served the
irrigation purpose.
A short-term transfer should recognize the repayment of the
appropriate cost, with the repayment interest rate,
calculated for the year of the transfer, after which the
irrigation rate would be reestablished.
A current repayment interest rate for the interest bearing
obligations will be utilized, unless otherwise provided by
law.
Any repayment of principal above the level that would have
been repaid by the irrigators (i.e., the power assistance
amount) should be reflected in a reduction in the amount to
be repaid through power assistance.
3. An exchange involving change in location and contracting
entities, but not a-change in use (i.e., irrigation to
irrigation) could Involve the continuation of the repayment
subsidies.
4. An exchange in which there would be a change in use fran
reimbursable function to a nonreimbursable function (e.g.,
irrigation to anadromous fishery) will require H
ii li f i i
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negot ations. In eu o spec al leg slation, specific .
contractual obligations will be identified to ensure that
repayment to the Federal Government after the exchange will
be no less than the conditions that ««H<rf-<»* prior to the
exchange.
5. To the mayiTnm extent possible, financial or economic
disincentives to the transfer or exchange are to be avoided.
The additional costs to the water users, as Hi«rMqaa^ in
these principles, (i.e., NEEA documentation, power
interference charges, recalculation of water rates, or
incremental pumping costs) axe all required by existing law,
contracts, or regulations, ttiile these are costs to the
water user, they are not the disincentives that are to be
avoided.
the disincentives to be avoided can be characterized as
charging a percentage of any "profit11 that miojit be
envisioned as the difference between appropriate costs, and
the market value of the water.
Principle 7. DOI will consider, in cooperation with aHpa.14jj.lata State, tribal
and local authorities, necessary measures that may be required to mitigte any
adverse environmental effects that may arise as a result of the proposed
transaction.
Criterion; Is approval of the transaction subject to NEPA requirements?
8
Documentation for compliance with NEPA oould range from a
categorical exclusion to an environnental inpact statement. The
type of documentation required will be a function of the specific
action being proposed. Any Federal KEPA compliance costs
associated with the transfer shall be advanced or repaid in a
manner negotiated fay DOI and the entities involved.
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Assistant Secretary John M. Sayre
• Thank you for the kind introduction and the invitation to speak. I'm always glad to be
back home in Denver.
• In keeping with the theme of this conference, I want to talk to you today about the
"theory" behind our water transfer policy at the Department of the Interior, as well as what we
have done to implement it In short, I will focus on four items:
1. The history of how we got to where we are today, and why,
2. An overview of the Interior Department's current water transfer policy;
3. Examples of water transfers involving the Department; and
4. What additional steps the Department might take in this area in the future.
• As you are aware, since 1902 the Bureau of Reclamation has played a significant role in
settling and developing the arid Western States. The Bureau's role underwent internal
reassessment and revision in 1987 - about which I will have more to say later.
• Today, Reclamation controls major storage and conveyance facilities in the Western
States. Each year these facilities supply about 30 million acre-feet of irrigation water, 3 million
acre-feet of water for municipal and industrial uses, and another million acre-feet for additional
uses.
• The Bureau also operates 51 hydroelectric facilities which generate 48 billion kilowatts of
electricity each year.
• Reclamation delivers irrigation water to about 10 million acres of farmland. Although
this represents only about 20 percent of the irrigated acreage in the West, it may
under-represent the potential importance of the Bureau of Reclamation in water transfers.
• This is because the Bureau controls major storage and conveyance facilities in several
States, such as the Central Valley Project in California and the Central Arizona Project.
• Let me turn to a discussion of how our water transfer policy evolved.
• Work on the Department's policy formulation began informally in the mid-1980's. Given
the growing interest in the West in water transfers, we started the groundwork for understanding
these developments and responding to them. Concurrently, the Western Governors' Association
was working on the same subject, and our two organizations eventually got together.
• In 1985, the Western Governors' Association established a Water Efficiency Task Force. }
• This Task Force held a series of forums with water resources experts and practicing
professionals. The result of this process was a report entitled, "Western Water: Tuning the ]
System." In July 1986, the WGA adopted a resolution endorsing the report and its [
recommendations.
• Among the findings and recommendations of the report were the following: 1
1. "Water use efficiency may be enhanced either through water marketing or through |
government administration of reallocation. Marketing is the preferable choice of procedures ]
because it is voluntary, is flexible, generates much of its own data and automatically
communicates the value of alternative uses." /■$
2. Transfers of water, exchanges, and salvage and conservation of water can help meet
western water needs cost-effectively and add new wealth to the region." ?
i
3. The Bureau of Reclamation must make a transition from an agency whose workload
has been constructing large water projects to an agency that assists the West to make better use .,
of the waters the Bureau already provides. It can facilitate this transition by providing support \
for voluntary transfers of Bureau-provided water." '
• These recommendations resulted in the establishment of a Water Efficiency Working ■
Group in the fall of 1986 with representatives from the Governors' offices, the Interior ;
Department, and the Western States Water Council.
• Their deliberations produced a second WGA report, entitled, "Water Efficiency: *
Opportunities for Action." It contains a detailed review of Federal Reclamation law regarding
the transfer of federally supplied water. This report was adopted by the Governors at their :"
annual meeting in July 1987. l
• An important recommendation in this second WGA report was: ?
. i
• The Department of Interior should develop and issue a policy statement facilitating
voluntary transfers, that is, those transfers which involve water and/or facilities provided by the ]
Bureau of Reclamation." *
• In December 1988, Interior responded. It issued a set of principles designed to guide <
Bureau of Reclamation review and approval of proposed transfers. ]
• The issuance of a policy statement was considered important because it clarified the "
transfer process. ;
• Two points of the policy are key. The first is that water transfers are an increasingly
important means of meeting western water needs. Second, the Department of the Interior will
serve as a facilitator for water marketing proposals between willing buyers and sellers.
• Keeping in mind these basic tenets, Interior set out seven principles in its 1988 water
transfer policy. Let me go through them here.
1. Primacy in water allocation and management decisions lies with the States.
2. The Department will become involved only in water transfers which potentially
affect Federal projects or federally-owned water rights.
3. Departmental approval is contingent upon mitigating or avoiding adverse third-party
effects.
4. The Department will not suggest specific transactions unless such transactions would
be involved in an Indian water rights settlement, solution of other water rights controversies, or
could provide a dependable supply that otherwise would involve the expenditure of Federal
funds.
5. Water transfers involving federally developed water will be treated no differently
than any other proposed transfer.
6. The Department will not burden proposed transactions with costs exceeding those
actually incurred. Interior will ensure that the government is financially, operationally, and
contractually in the same or better position once a transfer is made.
7. The Department will consider necessary measures to mitigate any adverse
environmental impacts that may be created by a proposed transfer.
• Let me pause at this point to make two clarifications - points about which we are
sometimes asked at the Department regarding our water transfer policy. The first question is
"Is the policy still in effect?"
• Yes it is. The basic Departmental principles were issued in 1988, and the Bureau of
Reclamation's more detailed "criteria and guidance" to implement them followed in 1989. These
transfer principles are consistent with the new water management mission set out in the Bureau
of Reclamation's Assessment '87 report.
• A second question often asked about Interior's water transfer policy: "Does the policy
allow profit to trading parties?"
• The answer is, yes, it does, provided the appropriate Federal costs are paid. Let me
elaborate on this important point, because the December 1988 Principles addressed the profit
question somewhat obliquely. Principle 6 states that:
"Unless required explicitly by existing law, contracts, or regulations, Interior will refrain
from burdening the transaction with additional costs, fees or charges, except for those costs
actually incurred by Interior in performance of its functions in a particular transaction."
• This principle indicates that the Department would not seek to "tax" the "profit" from a HJ
transaction. Principle 6 does not use the term "profit" directly, because, from a strictly legal 1
perspective, most water districts are not profit-making entities.
• Therefore, the use of the word "profit," while being a popularly understood term, might J
not be technically defensible.
• The Bureau of Reclamation's "Criteria and Guidance" was issued in May 1989 to assist J
in the implementation of the December 16,1988, policy. The guidance contains clearer
statements regarding the profit question. '|
J
• It makes clear that the Bureau of Reclamation will allow profit between transferring
parties, and will not impose any additional costs on the transfer beyond the following: (1) those ?|
already required by Reclamation law - such as the removal of the interest subsidy when water is |
transferred from irrigation to municipal and industrial use; and (2) any new costs incurred by
implementing the transfer, such as additional pumping or conveyance costs incurred because the -. ^
water is delivered to a new location. |
• Let me turn to how Interior is implementing the policy. One step the Bureau of , »
Reclamation took was developing and issuing the more detailed criteria and guidance I I
mentioned.
'■■■%
• These criteria and guidance are intended to provide field-level assistance to Bureau |
personnel involved in water transfer activity. I have brought a few copies of the guidance *
document, as well as the Department's principles, for those who may not have seen them, or
copies can also be obtained by contacting the contracting personnel in any of our Bureau of f
Reclamation offices. *
• Before continuing, let me address one other question. Has the water transfer policy f
made any difference? The answer is yes. *
• Examples are water rentals from the Idaho water bank and Utah Power and Light ' j
acquisition of 6,000 acre-feet of water for cooling purposes. '»-•*
• However, there is a reason why one would not expect to see December 1988 as a stark f
turning point in water transfer activity. It is only a beginning. ' -i
• Bureau of Reclamation practice in facilitating water transfers is probably best interpreted |
as evolutionary, rather than as having a distinct change in December of 1988. J
• Furthermore, many water transfers take a long time to negotiate, so it may be some ' ]
years before the full impact of the transfer policy can be observed. j
• Let me turn in detail to some recent cases where the Department has implemented or *
facilitated transfers. !
• Perhaps the most dramatic is the agreements reached between the Imperial Irrigation
District and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. \
• Imperial diverts about 3 million acre-feet annually of Colorado River water, which
represents nearly 25 percent of the total diversions from the river.
• Both parties sought to involve the Department in rendering a legal opinion against the
other. As many of you know, the issues had to do with the price that Imperial could charge,
over and above the cost of conservation.
• Although the Department was in the process of examining the legal issues, it chose to
facilitate the process.
• It did this by encouraging the parties to work out an agreement in the advance of any
necessity of rendering an opinion which might have tied up the issue in court for several years.
• As you know, Metropolitan and Imperial reached an agreement under which
Metropolitan will pay Imperial to fund conservation measures within the irrigation district that
would salvage 100,000 acre-feet of water annually for diversion to Metropolitan's service area.
• Metropolitan will pay Imperial $92 million for construction of the conservation facilities,
$3.1 million annually for operation and maintenance, and $23 million in five annual installments
for indirect costs.
• The same two entities reached a separate agreement under which Metropolitan can fund
lining of the earthen Ail-American Canal in exchange for the conserved water. Both State and
Federal studies indicate that there is potential for at least another 100,000 acre-feet of
conservation within Imperial —which may provide the basis for future agreements, between the
two entities.
• I mentioned that transfers of project water can take several forms. The
Imperial-Metropolitan transfer could be described as a renewable, long-term lease under which
the water rights themselves stay with Imperial and the same amount of land stays in production.
• Hie Casper-Alcova to Casper transfer is similar in concept-conservation measures are
utilized and the same amount of land will stay in production, but in the Casper-Alcova case, the
underlying water rights are to change hands permanently.
• In some cases, the Department is an actual participant in the market for water rights,
particularly in Indian water rights settlements. This activity in the market is consistent with the
December 1988 principles.
• The Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988 authorized
the Secretary to acquire 22,000 acre-feet of water from pre-CAP Colorado River contractors.
• The Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District in Arizona agreed to provide the Federal
Government this quantity of water. The water is to be obtained by the purchase of 2,000 acres
of land and certain other measures, such as a reduction in deliveries to other portions of the
district and reduced application rates.
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• One of the principal attractions of the transaction to the district is that the legislation
provided them with an exemption from acreage limitation.
• This transfer represents a permanent reassignment of water deliveries under contract
from the Department
• Another proposed transfer in Arizona, also associated with an Indian water settlement, is
the purchase of water deliveries by the United States from the Harquahala Irrigation District,
southwest of Phoenix, Arizona. This transfer is unique because a large percentage of the district
- more than 25,000 acres of the 33,000 acres - will eventually be retired from production.
• The U.S. would pay a negotiated price for reacquiring the Central Arizona Project water
deliveries. The water would be permanently reassigned to Indian uses for settling the water
claims of the Ft. McDowell tribe or other tribes in the Phoenix area.
• Another interesting aspect of this transfer is that the project lands will be acquired in a
separate, but parallel transaction by Phoenix-area cities, who desire to eventually use the
underlying groundwater to support urban growth.
• I hope these examples illustrate that the Department is actively involved in voluntary
water marketing in many areas of the West, and that there are a variety of forms that water
transfers can take. There are leases vs. permanent sales; transfers where the underlying water
rights change hands and ones where the original owner retains control of the water rights; ones
where lands are retired from production and ones where only the salvaged water is transferred;
and ones in which the Department is merely a facilitator, and also transfers in which the
Department is an active participant in the market
• It would also be informative, I think, to describe cases in which proposed transfers were
either substantially modified or disallowed by the Bureau.
• A proposed transfer in southern Nevada between Basic Management, Incorporated, and
the city of Henderson is a good example.
• In 1942, the Defense Plant Corporation, a federally chartered organization for the
purpose of building and expanding facilities to produce war materials, constructed facilities near
Henderson, Nevada.
• Henderson lies about 13 miles southeast of Las Vegas. The facilities draw water from
Lake Mead on the Colorado River.
• After World War H, the plant was sold into private ownership and Basic Management
acquired the water rights in the amounts of about 33,000 acre-feet for milling and metallurgical
use and 9,000 acre-feet for municipal use in Henderson.
• This additional water was to come from BMTs unused industrial entitlement BMTs
maximum industrial use occurred in 1969 and was only 18,000 acre-feet out of its 33,000
acre-feet entitlement Over the past 11 years, the average annual use for industrial purposes has
been only 7,500 acre-feet
• The Bureau disallowed the contract for additional water with Henderson, as well as the
authority to purvey additional unused water to other entities, in southern Nevada. The Bureau
did not believe that allowing an entity to sell water never put to use was consistent with the
goals of the Department's principles.
• Reclamation believed that Basic Management had ample time since its 1969 contract to
place its full entitlement to beneficial use.
• However, the Bureau did allow a reassignment of water to Henderson to take place.
This was accomplished by reducing the contractual entitlement of BMI; executing an "assignment
and transfer of entitlement to delivery" from BMI to Henderson; and executing a new Bureau
contract with Henderson.
• In effectuating the assignment, BMI permanently relinquished any control over the
assigned water, as they had sought under their original proposal
• There is a point I wish to underscore. Differing State water laws make it absolutely
necessary for the Federal role in water transfers to be that of facilitator. There is really no
place for a sweeping Federal edict in water marketing, since water rights and transfers are
mostly matters of State law and procedure.
• An additional case in which a proposed transfer was disallowed is illustrative because it
has been misunderstood by some in the water community.
• This involved the proposed temporary transfer during the 1989 drought from reservoirs
in the Kendrick Project, operated for the Casper-Alcova Irrigation District in Wyoming, to the
Goshen Irrigation District, a contractor under the North Platte Project.
• As is normal when we deliver water, the Department sought to require that a contract be
written with Goshen for the transfer. Goshen resisted and the case went to court
• In this case, the Casper-Alcova Irrigation District's claim to the water to be provided to
Goshen was even more tenuous than in the BMI/Henderson case. In this case, the storage
water to be transferred was not even under contract to the Casper-Alcova Irrigation District.
Hence, the District held no transferrable interest
• Other districts along the North Platte River that were offered the same temporary
transfer arrangement did sign contracts.
• So we do not say "yes" to every transfer proposed. Sometimes we can't "facilitate."
Finally, here is what I see the future holding for the Department's water transfer activities.
• Interior is a willing participant in the West's emerging water transfer activities. We will
remain flexible and considerate of the unique situation of every transfer. The success of water
transfers depends on multiple factors: the individual district, State water law, and the specific
details of every transaction.
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• Issues will arise in the case of particular water transfers that will need to be resolved - |
such as in the BMI/Henderson transfer. Furthermore, one of our major projects, the Central I
Valley Project in California, is still grappling with procedures for implementing the 1988
principles and the 1989 Bureau of Reclamation guidance. ]
• The Mid-Pacific region issued a draft set of implementation procedures for informal
public comment last spring. ■■]
• However, the water districts had made most of their planting and allocation decisions for
the year, and asked that procedures be reconsidered this fall and winter. The Bureau of ]
Reclamation is currently in the process of adhering to this request j
• In the Central Valley, a large number of irrigation districts in the same project and a ri
number of contracts are not up to current repayment standards. The Interior Department wants ]
to ensure that, during any transfer activity, the water deliveries of other districts are protected,
and that an equitable formula if found to increase repayment from districts desiring to transfer -j
water at a profit. J
• An important point is that we are moving ahead with the new management directions set --*
forth in the Bureau of Reclamation's Assessment '87 report. These new directions may have |
bearing on water transfers.
• In particular, there have been some discussions within the Bureau of taking a more \
active role in voluntary water conservation efforts. *
• Also, there may be some role for devoting some federally- conserved water to public ;
uses, such as fish and wildlife and recreation. '
• We welcome your comments to the appropriate Bureau and Departmental officials on f
our activities as we seek to fulfill our new role for the Bureau. We hope to assist the West in *
meeting its future challenges, particularly in the area of water marketing.
• Thank you for your attention. ' :j
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As described by Rep, Mondell, a water right under the Reclamation Act "only extends
to the use of water on and for the tract originally irrigated"; there is no general
"property right in water with power to sell and dispose of the same elsewhere and for
other purposes than originally intended."
35 Cong. Rec 6679 (1902). 697 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied sub nom. Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee Carson Irr. Dist., 464 U.S. 863 (1983), later proceeding, 878 F.2d 1217
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143. At, § 1005 at 1786.
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U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 at 843 (1984).
146. One exception to the Bureau's implicit position on "appurtenancy" is in Arizona where, as the case
study shows, the Bureau appears confused regarding whether water from Bureau projects in this state
may be severed and transferred from the land. However, the confusion does not derive from any
ambiguity in "appurtenancy" under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act but from concern whether
Arizona's version of appurtenancy, which under certain situations can make water appurtenant to lands
in the basin in which it arises, should govern transfers under the notion of state primacy.
147. Interview with James Turner, Office of the Mid-Pacific Regional Solicitor of the Department of
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150. Another argument offered to remove the cloud of Rep. MondelTs concept of appurtenancy from
transfers is that Congress has impliedly repealed the appurtenancy provision of Section 8, in particular,
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effectuate a reallocation administratively. Thus, the Secretary may, himself, reallocate water from
irrigation to other uses without being at cross purposes with Rep. Mondell's remarks. In other words,
reallocation of project water from irrigation to municipal and industrial uses may be effectuated without
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Rather, they try to find a way in which two facially contrary statutes may be reconciled harmoniously
without repeal. In this instance, the policy of permissive reallocation embodied in the Reclamation -^
Project Act may be implemented through administrative reallocation without repealing a restrictive I
concept of appurtenancy.
151. See W. Governors' Ass'n Water Efficiency Working Group, Water Efficiency: Opportunities for r ]
Action, app. A (July 6, 1987). I
152. For another analysis of the effect of the appurtenancy provision of Section 8 on transfers that ?D
comes to the same conclusion as this analysis, see Roos-Collins, Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to f
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162. 43 U.S.C 390ee (1982). For a complete explanation of the provisions of the RRA that may
create disincentives to transfers see pp. 84-102 of "The transferability of water provided by the State
Water Project and the Central Valley Projea: A report to the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program",
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the RRA is taken from those pages.
163. 43 U.S.C 390cc (1988).
164. 43 U.S.C § 390ee (1988).
165. Construction of Small Projects, Pub. L. No. 99-546, title III, § 302, 100 Stat 3053 (1956) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C § 422(a) (1988)). Pub. L. No. 99-546 is special legislation that applies only the
Central Valley Project. It requires the accrual of interest on contractor O&M deficits incurred after
October 1, 1985. As a result, growers not already paying full O&M rates under the RRA are faced with
the financial equivalent thereof for O&M deficits incurred since 1985. This fact materially reduces the
disincentive to transfers of the "supplemental and additional benefits" proscription of the RRA, provided
that the Bureau avoids imposing rates that exceed full O&M charges.
166. Rules And Regulations for Projects Governed by Federal Reclamation Law, 43 CF.R. § 426,
426.5(a)(3)(ii) (1990).
167. This was the method used in the transfer between the Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District and
the City of Lindsay.
168. In the Lindsay-Strathmore transfer, no profit was allowed. The Bureau did not consider the
amendment to the irrigation contract to constitute a supplemental or additional benefit because, even
though the district payments were changed, the district was receiving a reduced amount of water.
169. Id. § 426.5(a)(3)(ii)(F).
170. Id. § 426.18(b)(l)(B)(2).
171. Id. § 426.
172. There is a more detailed discussion of the need to clarify the repayment terms because this topic,
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Chapter 2.
173. John Sayre, remarks at the Conference "Water Marketing 1990: Moving from Theory to Practice,"
at the University of Denver (Nov. 15, 1990). (This speech is reproduced in Appendix HI to this report.
174. First, its preamble begins with references to the increasing frequency of water transfers, including
"direct sales" and "lease" of water rights. These are terms commonly understood to involve profit or
increased income. Although this language is applied to water transfer activity in general, the preamble
goes on to place transactions involving Departmental water facilities within this overall transfer
environment In fact, Principle 5 states that "the fact that the transaction may involve the use of water
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered during evaluation of a
proposed transaction." This principle is restated in the press release accompanying the principles as
"water transfers involving federally developed water will be treated no differently than any other
proposed transfer."
This press release language and the language of Principle 5 suggests that transfers of
Reclamation water can avail themselves of the same lease and sale institutions as privately developed
water. Furthermore, Departmental staff involved in the drafting the principles indicate that Principle 5
was intended to specifically address the fact that just because federal
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water that is transferred, leased, or sold. Finally, the preamble indicates that the principles were
designed to be responsive the Western Governor's Association request for a policy to facilitate transfers. ^
One key feature of the WGA report was a recommendation that profit be allowed. \
175. First, its preamble begins with references to the increasing frequency of water transfers, including 5
"direct sales" and "lease" of water rights. These are terms commonly understood to involve profit or §
increased income. Although this language is applied to water transfer activity in general, the.preamble ■■'-
goes on to place transactions involving Departmental water facilities within this overall transfer
environment In fact, Principle 5 states that "the fact that the transaction may involve the use of water "1
supplies developed by Federal water resource projects shall not be considered during evaluation of a |
proposed transaction."
176. Drought in California: Arousal of the Market? VoL 5 Water Strategist at 11 (April 1991). |
177. Wahl at 185.
178. Id. at 183. J
179. Presumably "the reduction in the amount to be repaid through power assistance" would imply an ]
equal increase in the amount to be paid by M&I users for the transferred water. I
180. The inservice date may vary for different units of a larger project (such as the Central Valley ^
Project in California) or for blocks of water placed under contract at different time periods (such as in j
the Columbia Basin Project in Washington). - *
181. The repayment period for the project is not always established by contract. For example, the CVP J
contracts run for 40 years, but the repayment period extends much longer, until 2030. The CVP j
repayment period was established through a ratemaking policy adopted by the Secretary in 1988. The
contracts will be renewed based upon rates calculated to achieve repayment of capital costs by that date. s
!
182. In smaller projects, projects supplying only a few water districts, or projects not delivering M&I '
water, there are not likely to be well-established procedures for determining what rate should be charged
for water converted from irrigation to municipal and industrial use. !
183. In addition, there is one legislative situation that is somewhat analogous. The RRA of 1982 had
the goal of removing federal subsidies from irrigation water delivered to land in a form over 960 acres. 5^
The "full cost* formula in the act makes no assessment for past interest charges: it is based on the j
unpaid capital balance. Also, neither the interest or ability-to-pay subsidies apply to such land.
184. The charge in 1987 was higher even though the outstanding balance for irrigation repayment was |
lower than in 1972. v *
185. Memorandum from Acting Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, Washington, D.C., to Regional ■ j
Director, Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 13, 1989) (discussing resolution of interest 4;
charge issues on the basis of negotiation for repayment contracts for the San Juan Chama Project water
supplies). rj
186. The irrigation contracts on these projects do not incorporate these formulas. Rather, in each
contract a specific dollar amount is established for conversions from irrigation use to M&I use (S150 per
acre-foot in the Dolores Project and $82,50 per acre-foot in the Dallas Creek Divide Project). However, \
the contracts indicate that these values are subject to adjustment by the Bureau at the time when the ■
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actual conversion to M&I water takes place, and regional Bureau of Reclamation staff indicate that their
current intention would be to apply the rollover calculation contained in the Definite Plan Reports.
187. If there is additional construction at some later date, then a separate increment would be added
based on the same formula.
188. The charges under formulas S and D would be the same if there were no power assistance.
189. We realize, however, that the Bureau may want to draw a distinction between cases where
irrigation water is contracted and under use (such as envisioned in formula D) and the cases where the
water never was put to use in irrigation, such as in the San Juan Ctaama case. In the San Juan Chama
reallocation, there may be a good rationale for charging M&I users for all of the interest costs, since no
irrigators actually received benefits from the water.
190. Adoption of formula D would go some distance toward decreasing the anomaly.
191. The RRA indicates that prepayment of irrigation costs is not a method by which an irrigation
district can avoid acreage limitation. Therefore, even if a prepayment agreement was worked out under
which all of an irrigation district's charges were paid, the district would presumably still be subject to
acreage limitation until the end of its original repayment period.
192. For additional discussion of public and private roles in acquisitions of water for instream flow, see
Wahl, Acquisition of Water to Maintain Instream Flows, 1 Rivets 195 (1990).
193. Assessment *87, supra note 4, at 2.
194. The case studies in this report indicate that a number of transfers have utilized either the
Miscellaneous Purposes Act (e.g. El Paso County Improvement District No. 1 to Lower Valley Water
Authority) or the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (Casper-Alcova Irrigation District to City of Casper
Wyoming). Chapter 2 contains a more complete discussion of Reclamation law.
195. More complicated legal questions surrounding the applicability of each of these laws to different
situations or the precise distinctions among these authorities might suitably be treated in a Solicitor's
opinion.
196. These historical examples also point up the difficulty of defining "profit" Was it profit if water
users in California were paid an amount exceeding their water cost, intended to reflect the agricultural
and other income they gave up? Was it a profit to users in the Casper-Alcova District to have an
outside entity pay for their canal lining? Would the fees paid to water lawyers and water brokers to
implement a transaction in the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District be considered profit, or
expenses?
197. Az: BuRec Signs Options for 22,000 affor the Salt River Pima • Maricopa Indian Settlement 3, Water
Intelligence Monthly 2 (March 1991).
198. The project lands will be acquired in a separate, but parallel transaction by Phoenix-area cities.
These cities plan to eventually use the underlying groundwater to support urban growth.
199. The Bureau of Reclamation's position in this case was evidently based, in part, on the Bureau's
interpretations of Colorado River Law and Nevada law. The results might have been different in other
locations. For example, New Mexico law provides a forty-year period for proving up municipal and
industrial water rights.
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200. Interior's Policy of Voluntary Water Transactions: The Two-Year Record? 4 Water Strategist 1 (Jan.
1991).
201. This example illustrates the more general difficulty of separating out the price for the use of
delivery facilities from the price for the underlying water entitlements.
202. More specifically, the Bureau used to require that the higher of the contract rate of the two
districts be paid to the Bureau. However, in some cases this meant a revenue loss to the Bureau. This
situation can arise because many contract rates currently fail to cover operation and maintenance costs.
If the purchaser had the higher of the two contract rates, but that rate was farther below the actual cost
of delivering water than in the selling district, then the transfer would result in a net loss of federal
revenue. For that reason, in writing the regulations to implement the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,
the Bureau requires that a transfer not result in any additional revenue losses to the U.S.
203. As noted in the discussion of applicability of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 in Chapter 2
(and the case study in volume II on the Central Valley Project), some water transfers might require
contract amendments. Many such amendments could be considered as providing supplemental or
additional benefits and thereby requiring repayment of O&M costs on all contract water. Probably the
principal type of amendment that might be required would be amendment of an irrigation-only contract
in which the contractor wanted to transfer some of its water to a non-irrigation use. How many
contracts would fall into this category was not investigated in this study. Even on these contracts,
however, it might be possible for water transactions to be executed by implementing (1) a reduction in
deliveries under the irrigation-only contract and (2) a new contract with the M&I entity. If the transfers
were executed in this manner, it is not certain whether they would be considered to provide supplement
or additional benefits. In effect, however, the requirement to increase repayment levels to cover
operation and maintenance costs is already imposed, regardless of amendment, by P.L. 99-546.
Therefore the disincentives for transfers requiring contract amendments in the RRA itself may be small.
Because of the repayment problems on many CVP contracts, the Bureau would likely want to increase
the repayment requirements whether a contract amendment was required or not
204. For a more detailed discussion of these points, and the applicability of the RRA to water transfers
in the Central Valley Project, see Gray, Driver, and Wahl, The Transfeiabflily of Water Provided by the
State Water Project and the Central Valley Project: A Report to the San Joaqoin Valley Drainage
Program at 84-104 (1990).
205. However, this practice was by no means universal, as indicated by the administrative prohibition on
profit within the Central Valley Project and the contractual restrictions on profit in the Central Arizona
Project.
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